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Abstract
This portfolio contains work which was submitted as part of the Practitioner Doctorate 
(PsychD) in Psychotherapeutic and Counselling Psychology at the University of 
Surrey. It consists of three dossiers which reflect the academic, clinical and research 
work undertaken as part of this degree. The academic dossier contains three essays. 
The first essay explores a Winnicottian perspective on how depression can be 
conceptualised and worked with therapeutically. The second essay examines the 
variation within the CBT tradition with respect to how emotion is attended to and 
worked with in clinical practice. With specific reference to depression, the third essay 
explores the possibility of a second-wave CBT approach to practice that would be 
more compatible with the principles of counselling psychology than the standard CBT 
treatments which have adopted the medical model of distress. The therapeutic practice 
dossier gives an overview of my clinical practice during my training. This dossier 
contains descriptions of the clinical placements I have undertaken, and also includes 
my final clinical paper which provides a reflective account of my journey toward 
becoming a counselling psychologist. Finally, the research dossier contains a literature 
review and two empirical research studies. The review explores the historical context 
of contemporary theory of emotion within psychotherapy, by examining the theories 
of emotion within influential philosophical works from the history of Western 
thought. The first empirical piece is a Foucauldian discourse analysis of how emotion 
is constructed in contemporary CBT self-help literature. The second empirical piece is 
a conversation analysis of the recordings of therapy sessions conducted by A. T. Beck, 
seeking to illuminate how emotion is dealt with in the practice of Beckian cognitive 
therapy.
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Introduction to the Portfolio
This portfolio presents a selection of the work that I have submitted during my 
training to become a counselling psychologist. It is organised into tliree dossiers that 
cover the academic, therapeutic practice and research components of the course, and 
its aim is to demonstrate some of the work that I have completed as well as reflect the 
development of my identity as a counselling psychologist. This introduction will give 
a brief summary of the dossiers and of the individual pieces of work that they contain, 
with a view to linking together the academic and research pieces with my personal and 
professional experiences. For this reason I will first provide a short overview of those 
experiences from my personal background which led me to the study of counselling 
psychology.
Personal background
I have always had a strong interest in people and in understanding and reflecting on 
the subtleties of interpersonal interaction. While I therefore briefly entertained the 
notion of studying psychology when I first applied to University, the subject of 
psychology was one that I had not had much contact with. From my social and 
cultural environment I had also taken with me a very negative view of this profession 
as one that deals with the darker aspects of life that are best avoided. I therefore chose 
to dismiss the idea and instead I studied other subjects within the humanities, such as 
philosophy, which I was also drawn to. However, I found that these subjects only 
seemed to skim the surface of what I wanted to immerse myself in. Due to not having 
found a subject that I was really passionate about, and due to concerns about 
employability after graduation, I eventually went so far as to attempt to study 
economics. I immediately found that this academic pursuit was deeply unsatisfying to 
me, and that the only part of the study of economics that I was even remotely 
interested in was the area of human resources. However, while this component of the 
course did involve some use of psychological concepts, I found that the level of 
psychological understanding of the person was very superficial, and I also objected 
strongly to the notion of using psychology as a strategic device to create a smoothly 
running operation for the benefit of the shareholders. I cared about what was in the 
best interest of the individual, regardless of whether it coincided with the interests of 
the organisation. I also wanted to delve much deeper, in terms of psychological theory
relating to the intrapsychic and interpersonal domains, than is done within the field of 
human resources. Due to my dissatisfaction I realised that the ill-conceived 
experiment, of bending myself to become employable through the study of economics, 
was doomed to fail. I therefore resumed my attempts to find the path that would allow 
me to develop the areas that I was truly interested in. However, in the midst of this 
process of searching for purpose and meaning, the vicissitudes of life also conspired to 
create a situation in which I was no longer able to manage. In response to difficult 
events in my life I found myself struggling and realised that I needed help. The 
experience of therapy was undoubtedly one that changed my life in a fundamental 
way. The profound experience of being accepted and understood as I was, enabled me 
to become curious about, and thereby increasingly aware and accepting of, my own 
subjective experience. As a consequence of the increased attention to and awareness 
of my own emotional life that this involved, I developed an enduring interest in 
emotional processes.
As a result of engaging in therapy, I realised that the attitude toward psychotherapy 
and psychology that I had grown up learning, and that was generally present in the 
culture that I lived in, did not fit with me and my interests. I had been avoiding the 
study of psychology, the subject that I was truly interested in, due to having adopted a 
culturally reinforced attitude that did not stem from my personal experiences, and did 
not really belong to me anymore. I was then able to finally embark on the study of 
psychology. I chose psychology because I was interested in working therapeutically 
but did not want to limit my training to one specific form of psychotherapy, since it 
would have meant that the flexibility of adopting different theoretical perspectives in 
thinking about and trying to understand clients would be limited. I was also drawn to 
psychology because of the combined focus on therapeutic practice and research. I 
value critical thinking which precludes the adoption of definite answers and ‘truths’, 
and it was my hope that research, on a good day, involved just that. While the decision 
to study psychology and the initial training in this direction were made in my native 
country of Sweden, after moving to the UK a few years later I discovered counselling 
psychology, and I recognised therein an approach to theory and practice that resonated 
with me. The humanist ethos of this discipline, with its focus on the experience of the 
individual, is a far cry from the focus on managing the individual to serve the
organisation, which is what I objected to so strongly in my brief encounter with the 
study of human resources. After having gone the long way around, I have therefore 
finally been able to engage in the theoretical learning, therapeutic practice and 
research endeavours that I am passionate about.
Academic dossier
The academic dossier consists of three essays written during the second and third 
years of my training. The essays have emerged primarily out of questions or concerns 
related to my clinical practice, and these connections will be briefly presented as they 
apply to each essay.
The first essay is entitled ‘Approaching depression from a Winnicottian perspective’ 
and sets out to explore how depression can be conceptualised and worked with 
therapeutically, based on the writings of Winnicott. This essay was written during my 
second year of training while I was practicing psychodynamic psychotherapy. I was 
struggling with some aspects of psychoanalytic thought, such as the notion of the 
therapist functioning as a blank screen, and of psychopathology as arising from innate 
characteristics rather than as a result of interaction with the environment. In the 
writings of Winnicott, which emphasise such aspects as the importance of creating a 
holding environment in the therapy and the developmental significance of the infant’s 
real relationship with its parents, I found a more relational model and a more empathie 
approach to therapy that resonated with me. The essay is the result of my wish to 
further explore and reflect on the theory of this approach in regard to a common 
description of distress; that of depression, with a view to informing my clinical 
practice.
The second essay is entitled ‘The role of emotion in CBT’ and represents an attempt 
to critically engage with the subject of how emotion is approached in clinical practice 
within the CBT tradition. This essay reflects my interest in emotional aspects of 
subjective experience. As it was written during my final year, my interest in exploring 
this topic in relation to CBT was also motivated by my experience of practicing within 
an lAPT service and sometimes struggling with the emphasis on rationality that 
characterises many of the manualised forms of CBT. With this essay I wanted to
explore the question of variation or development within the CBT tradition in terms of 
how emotional experience is attended to and worked with.
The third essay is entitled Ts a CBT approach to depression compatible with the 
principles of counselling psychology?’. This essay was also written during my final 
year, and was partly inspired by my clinical practice within the lAPT service, where 
the labelling of distress was a pre-requisite for treatment. With specific reference to 
depression, the essay problematizes the adoption of the medical model of distress that 
underlies the standard CBT treatments that target specific ‘disorders’, and questions 
the compatibility of this practice with the principles of counselling psychology. The 
essay also explores the possibility of a different approach to therapy within the 
‘second wave’ of the CBT tradition, one that involves a focus on the unique 
experience of the individual, rather than treating the ‘depression’.
Therapeutic Practice Dossier
This dossier provides an overview of my clinical practice throughout my training, 
beginning with a description of my three clinical placements. In the first year my 
placement was with a University counselling service where my clients were students, 
mostly young adults. My second placement was within a NHS psychotherapy 
department offering long-term psychodynamic psychotherapy for clients with severe 
and enduring mental health problems. In my final year I worked in an lAPT service, 
delivering CBT to clients with a wide range of presentations. This dossier also 
includes my final clinical paper, which provides a reflective account of my 
development as a practitioner within counselling psychology.
Research Dossier
This dossier contains a literature review and two pieces of empirical research. All 
tliree pieces are linked by the common thread of the subject of emotion, although the 
topic is approached from very different angles. As indicated above, my experience of 
personal therapy prior to training sparked an interest in the emotional aspects of 
subjective experience. In these pieces I have combined the topic of emotion with other 
areas that are relevant to counselling psychology, and that reflect my personal 
interests and concerns.
My initial literature review reflects my attempt to engage with the extensive history of 
theory on the topic of emotion that precedes the emergence of counselling psychology 
as well as the wider discipline of psychology. I have always been interested in 
philosophy and in the history of thought. I find it intriguing to observe how similar 
themes and concepts have been recycled and appear in various different forms during 
different periods of history. I also find that it is very relevant to be aware of how 
contemporary thinking is influenced by and situated within a historical context. When 
current theory is read in isolation, divorced from the history of preceding versions, 
then the interesting connections that can be found over the course of history are not 
recognised or acknowledged. In my view, knowledge of the history of thought on a 
topic enriches the understanding of the variety of contemporary positions that exist. 
Since the theory of emotion within psychology has been inherited from the older 
discipline of philosophy, exploring the history of the theory of emotion involved 
delving into the work of influential philosophers within the history of Western 
thought. However, what I found in attempting an analysis of their work, and in 
connecting their conceptualisations of emotion to more contemporary theory within 
various therapeutic traditions, was that the project was somewhat ambitious for such a 
short period of time. While it was fascinating to try to grasp the theories of 
philosophers such as Descartes and Spinoza, the complex task of understanding 
original philosophical works is one that I could have spent several years on. Yet in 
spite of the degree of difficulty involved I thoroughly enjoyed the attempt, and I found 
that the literature review illuminated the historical situatedness of contemporary 
theory of emotion within the psychotherapies.
When I first embarked on conducting empirical research I wanted to build on the 
findings of my literature review, yet I also wanted to shift my focus from the historical 
perspective to something more contemporary. In my literature review I had found that 
the theories reviewed contained value judgements about the desirability and 
acceptability of emotions, and that recommendations regarding the control or 
eradication of emotion were associated with these judgements. In light of these 
findings I wanted to investigate how emotion is portrayed in the theories that underpin 
contemporary psychotherapies. Ever since I began my undergraduate degree in
psychology, and as a consequence became more attentive to the state of the 
psychotherapies, I had been aware of the growing influence of CBT in Sweden. After 
moving to the UK I had encountered a similar trend here, with extensive government 
spending on the lAPT programme and the influence of the NICE guidelines. For an 
examination of how emotion is portrayed within a contemporary therapeutic tradition, 
I therefore chose to focus on CBT due to its current popularity and widespread 
adoption. My reasoning was that the more influential a theory or practice becomes, no 
matter what the subject, the more necessary it becomes to critically examine it. I 
focused on the portrayal of emotion in CBT self-help literature since self-help books 
are such an effective channel for spreading CBT to a wide audience. The social 
constructionist method of Foucauldian discourse analysis enabled me to conduct a 
critical analysis of how emotion was portrayed in the self-help books, by examining 
how the concept was constructed and what the implications of the various 
constructions were.
For my final piece of research I wanted to continue with the thread of emotion within 
CBT, but find a way of examining practice in the form of interaction and dialogue, 
rather than text. I was able to obtain recordings of A. T. Beck conducting cognitive 
therapy, and decided to analyse how emotion was dealt with in these recordings. Here, 
as in the literature review, my interest in the origins and history of therapeutic 
approaches played a part in my choice of data. My reasoning was that the way 
emotion was dealt with by Beck would be very relevant, since the cognitive approach 
underpins CBT. Current practice of ‘CBT’ encompasses the Beckian model. In 
addition, due to Beck’s status as the principal developer of cognitive therapy, his 
clinical practice could therefore be considered representative of the approach. Hence 
an analysis of Beck’s practice would hold more significance than that of random 
practitioners. For this endeavour I used conversation analysis, due to the capacity of 
this method for illuminating process aspects of conversation tlirough focusing on the 
sequentiality of talk. Conversation analysis involves a different approach from that of 
discourse analysis, my method of the previous year, yet both are methods that allow 
for close attention to language. While my choice of methods has been based on the 
nature of the data and of the research questions to be answered, I also have a strong
interest in the use of language, and in how close analysis can reveal aspects of spoken 
or written language that are otherwise easily overlooked or taken for granted.
ACADEMIC DOSSIER
Introduction to the Academic Dossier
The academic dossier contains three essays submitted during the second and third year 
of my training. The first essay is an exploration of a Winnicottian perspective on 
depression, reflecting on how the writings of Winnicott can inform both the 
conceptualisation of depression as well as ways of working therapeutically with 
clients. The second essay examines how emotion is approached in clinical practice 
within the CBT tradition. This involves an exploration of variation or development 
within the CBT tradition in terms of how emotional experience is attended to and 
worked with. The third essay questions the compatibility of standard CBT treatments, 
which have adopted the medical model of distress in targeting specific ‘disorders’, 
with the principles of counselling psychology. With specific reference to the concept 
of ‘depression’, the essay also explores the possibility of a form of second-wave CBT 
that would have less of a focus on treating the ‘disorder’ and instead attend to the 
subjective experience of the individual.
Approaching Depression from a Winnicottian Perspective 
Introduction
In considering different understandings of depression within the psychoanalytic field, 
as well as different ways of working therapeutically, I was drawn to the work of 
Winnicott. While his understanding of depression is based on the work of Freud and 
Klein, his is a more fully relational approach. His greater emphasis on the social 
aspects of human development appealed to me and sparked an interest in his way of 
working clinically on the basis of his more relational model. This paper presents an 
exploration of how Winnicott’s theoretical perspective can be used to understand 
depression and how his approach to therapy can be applied to clinical practice with 
individuals experiencing depression. The analysis is illustrated with reference to a 
clinical case.
Theoretical foundations
While Winnicott emphasized the similarity between his theory and that of Freud, in 
actuality he diverged considerably from Freud’s original views. According to 
Greenberg and Mitchell (1983), Winnicott was able to maintain his retention of 
Freudian principles through a systematic misreading of Freud’s work. Although 
Winnicott retained the instincts of Freudian theory as motivating forces for the 
individual, he relegated them to a secondary position relative to the object relations 
which are fundamental to his theory. Winnicott modelled his understanding of 
depression and the depressive position on the work of Klein (Gomez, 1997), but his is 
a modified version. Winnicott’s description of the depressive position, which he terms 
the stage of concern, is different from the Kleinian version in that Winnicott’s 
formulation is more fully relational. Klein views the depressive anxiety as arising 
from the integration of the good hreast with the bad breast, whereas Winnicott regards 
the task of this stage as the integration of the different caretaking functions of the 
mother (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983). A fundamental difference between the theories 
of Klein and Winnicott also lies in Klein’s lack of consideration of the effects that 
difficulties of the people in the infant’s environment would have on the psychical 
development on the child. Klein regards badness as innate so that pathology arises 
from within the infant, whereas anything good is seen as coming from the parents and
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being introjected by the infant. The issue of parental negative influence on the infant 
is thereby overlooked. Winnicott was very critical of this lack of consideration of the 
potentially harmful influence of the environment and its potential to contribute to the 
creation of pathology (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983).
According to Winnicott’s formulation of the depressive position, people are able to 
bear their guilt over their destructiveness toward the loved object, the parent, if they 
can have the opportunity for reparation. It is therefore the possibility of something 
constructive that makes the guilt over the aggression and destructiveness accessible 
(Winnicott, 1965b). Wimiicott’s conception of reparation differs from that of Klein 
since Winnicott understands the reparation that needs to be possible in the form of a 
real contribution to the real mother, rather than just as a reparation in fantasy. In 
Winnicott’s version it therefore becomes crucial for the real parent to be emotionally 
available and to accept the reparative gestures of the child. Any difficulty that impairs 
the real parent’s ability to be present for the child so that reparation can take place will 
therefore cause problems for the child in terms of its capacity to bear the guilt over its 
own destructive feelings (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983). According to Winnicott 
(1988) it is the possibility of reparation, of something constructive, that makes it 
tolerable for the individual to take responsibility for the hate and destruction that are 
part of loving and to experience the guilt this brings. Winnicott thereby assigns great 
importance to the health and characteristics of the real parents and the impact of these 
features on the relationship and the child’s development.
Winnicott emphasizes the fact that depression means that the individual has reached 
the depressive position in their emotional development, and that they are consequently 
able, to a degree, to accept responsibility for their aggressive and destructive impulses. 
The depressed person is able to hold a certain amount of guilt over their own 
aggressive feelings and therefore they are able to search for the opportunity for 
reparation (Winnicott, 1965a). However, Winnicott holds that the depressive position 
is not fully established until later in life even though it is reached in infancy (Newman, 
1995). For this reason subsequent experiences of aggression and destructiveness 
toward loved ones can still result in a need to conduct an internal reworking in adult 
life. This can then appear in the form of a depression in which the destructive
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impulses must again be accepted and the guilt home (Winnicott, 1986). Winnicott 
(1986) is quite optimistic about the potential for a depression to lift on its own as long 
as it is not contaminated by other difficulties. However, he also holds that if the 
aggression has been repressed it may require deep analysis to lift a depression, 
because the source of the guilt has been repressed and therefore the guilt does not 
make sense any more (Winnicott, 1965a). Depression can also be understood as the 
result of a situation where the possibility of mending or reparation is somehow 
blocked and therefore the individual is not really able to take responsibility for their 
aggressive impulses and bear the related guilt (Winnicott, 1986).
Practical application
The type of depression that Winnicott regards as related to the depressive position is 
that which is experienced by the individual who has had sufficiently good-enough 
mothering so that it is the depressive position that is the relevant difficulty. For 
psychotic clients and those with a schizoid mode of relating the depressive position is 
irrelevant (Winnicott, 1958). In order to illustrate the type of client where the 
depressive position can be regarded as relevant to an understanding of the depression, 
I will refer to one of my previous clients whom I worked with for six sessions in an 
outpatient setting. The contact was limited because the client was a student and was 
due to return to the home of her parents during the summer break. This was a woman 
in her early twenties who had no previous experience of serious psychological or 
emotional difficulty and had had a relatively stable childhood. She had recently been 
diagnosed with mild to moderate depression and was struggling to understand what 
lay behind it. Using Winnicott’s model of depression and the depressive position, her 
depression could be understood as a result of unconscious destructive feelings toward 
her younger sister who had recently broken her hip badly in an accident and was 
getting a lot of attention from their parents. If this aroused unconscious hate toward 
her sister as well as accompanying guilt, those emotional reactions may have been the 
impetus for her ‘blanketing’ of her imier world, which Winnicott (1958) describes as 
the function of depression, to allow for a reworking of her internal world. While my 
experience of working with this client was limited due to the short duration of the 
contact, and the work was not psychoanalytic in nature, I will use her case as a basis
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for thinking about how to work over a longer duration, in the spirit of Winnicott, with 
a depressed client.
Winnicott’s way of working
In his Primitive Emotional Development, Winnicott (1958) attends specifically 
to the complications of therapy for individuals suffering from depression. Winnicott 
expresses the idea that for an analyst to be able to work with a depressed patient, it is 
necessary for the analyst to be in touch with those aspects of his internal emotional 
and psychic life which correspond to those that the client is struggling with. Winnicott 
(1958) states that:
The depressed patient requires of his analyst the understanding that the 
analyst’s work is to some extent his effort to cope with his own (the analyst’s) 
depression, or shall I say guilt and grief resultant from the destructive elements 
in his own (the analyst’s ) love (pp. 146-47)
The idea that Wimiicott presents is that the analyst needs to have a certain familiarity 
and ability to be in touch with his own depression in order to understand and 
experience the depression of the client. The analyst needs to be able to love without 
being afraid of the destruction that is inherent in his love because otherwise the 
analyst will not be able to understand and interpret the fear that the client has of his or 
her own love and its effects. The analyst needs to be more comfortable with the 
anxieties and difficulties of the depressive position than the client is, in order to be 
able to tolerate, and help the client to tolerate, these feelings. In attempting to work 
with my client who is depressed it would therefore be necessary for me to have 
reached the depressive position and to have a sense of reparation as a possibility in 
order to be able to tolerate the destructiveness of love. Winnicott’s argument is 
understandable since therapy would otherwise involve two people who are both 
struggling with the same issues and are both afraid of the same destructiveness in 
love. If my client were to be frightened of the effect that her positive relationship to 
me, which can be understood as a form of love, could have on me because she is 
afraid of her own destructive impulses, then it is important for me to be comfortable 
enough with these aspects in myself that I am able to understand and accept them in 
my client. If I share her fear to the same degree then I will only reinforce her fear and 
be unable to help her become aware of her destructive impulses and tolerate them. The
13
natural difficulty with this line of reasoning is that it requires the therapist to have 
become reasonably comfortable in the depressive position. This is not a matter of a 
technique; this is a requirement of a certain level of emotional development of the 
therapist as an individual.
According to Winnicott, in the beginning of therapy it is necessary for the therapist to 
first create a holding environment so that the client can feel secure in the therapeutic 
situation. This type of holding is similar to the sensitive holding that the mother 
provides for the infant (Jacobs, 1995). The experience of being held by the therapist 
can be created through the delivery of interpretations that are correct and given at the 
right moment (Grolnick, 1993). According to Winnicott the therapist and the 
therapeutic space both serve to encourage transitional experience so that the client can 
engage in a form of play in which difficulties can be worked through (Gomez, 1997). 
The therapist should function as the good-enough mother, wherefore perfectly 
empathie responding is not required (Grolnick, 1993). However, there is still a greater 
emphasis on attunement than in classical psychoanalytical therapy, in which the 
emphasis is more on functioning as a blank screen in order to encourage negative 
transference reactions in the patients (Kahn, 1991). In working with my client in a 
longer-term therapy, the early phase of the therapy would therefore involve attempts 
on my part to communicate empathy and understanding verbally and non-verbally, 
and to stay in contact with her and her experience. Since my adaptation is never 
perfect however, it becomes possible for the client to experience the mistakes that I 
make. According to Winnicott these inevitable failures on the part of the therapist are 
important since they give the client the opportunity to treat them as if they were the 
past failures that were experienced in childhood. This then explains how clients can 
react powerfully to very small mistakes, simply because they are only using the failure 
in the therapeutic situation as the basis for their reaction to the past failure (Winnicott, 
1958). In these situations it is important for the therapist to acknowledge failure 
without becoming defensive (Grolnick, 1993). In the case of my client, if I were to 
drift in my thinking so that I momentarily lost my connection with my client, it would 
be important for me to acknowledge this lapse if my client should confront me about 
my failure of empathy. Winnicott (1958) argued that this was important because if the 
therapist defends himself, the client would be robbed of the opportunity to be angry
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over past failures of significant others. In the case of my client, her father was made 
redundant when she was one year old and this put a considerable strain on the parental 
relationship. It is conceivable that this could have made her mother less emotionally 
available and that my attentive lapse could bring back this early failure. According to 
Winnicott (1965b), by allowing the client to work through the early failure in the 
experience of the therapist’s failure, paradoxically, the therapy is able to succeed 
through failing.
Regarding more specific interventions during the course of therapy, Winnicott 
provides specific advice on the nature of interpretations that can or should be made 
when working with clients who are struggling with the depressive position. In the 
relationship between parent and child, Winnicott (1965b) emphasizes the importance 
of the possibility of reparation for the infant to be able to tolerate the guilt over 
destructive impulses. The importance of reparation is also relevant in the case of the 
client in therapy. According to Winnicott (1986) it is important that the therapist 
should not interpret any attempt at reparation as the sign of an unconscious destructive 
impulse since that would not be helpful to the client. Since the idea of possible 
mending in some way is what makes it possible for the individual to become able to 
take responsibility for his destructive impulses and bear the guilt, any reparative 
tendencies indicate that the client is able, to a certain degree, to take responsibility for 
the destructive impulse that lies behind the desire for reparation. Instead of 
interpreting reparation as unconscious destruction, Winnicott (1965b) advocates 
helping the client to become more aware of the destructive urges without connecting 
them to the attempt at mending. Subsequently it can then be useful to remind the client 
of the reparative tendency that was already present, in order to support toleration of 
the guilt. Winnicott relates this reasoning to interpretations about reparative gestures 
that are made toward the therapist. In working with my client it would therefore not be 
useful to interpret any ideas about being helpful toward me or any helpful gesture as 
the sign of destructive urges. For instance, if my client were to indicate that she hoped 
that I would find her material useful in completing any assignments for my course, 
then it would not be helpful for me to interpret this as evidence of her unconscious 
destruction of me. Any interpretation of destructive wishes toward me would instead
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need to be made based on other aspects of our interaction, where the destruction could 
be more directly approachable.
An important theme in Winnicott’s writing is the survival of the therapist or the parent 
(Jacobs, 1995). Winnicott (1958) especially emphasizes the importance of the survival 
of the therapist in regard to work with clients who are struggling with the depressive 
position. The importance of the mother’s survival of the infant’s destruction of her, 
lies in the need for the mother’s continued presence so that she is available for 
reparation from the infant, thus enabling the infant to tolerate his own destructiveness 
and the guilt that comes with the depressive position (Winnicott, 1965b). The survival 
of the therapist has a similar function. It is important for the therapist to survive 
attacks without retaliating (Jacobs, 1995), since this enables the client to work through 
the destructiveness inlierent in loving and to tolerate these urges and the guilt that they 
lead to. In that sense, simply staying with my client and allowing her expeiience to 
unfold without reacting aggressively is the most important contribution that I can give. 
However, Winnicott does not advocate passivity when he emphasizes the role of 
surviving. The therapist is free to respond to the client as long as this response is not 
in the form of retaliation (Jacobs, 1995). Any communication from my client that 
would be felt by me as an attack is therefore something that I need to ‘survive’ 
without becoming defensive or responding in a similar vein. While I can respond in 
the moment I should not allow the client’s attack to affect the general continuity of my 
empathie attitude toward my client, since my continued presence in this manner 
represents my survival as well as the survival of the therapeutic relationship. The 
message I am thereby sending is that destruction does not mean final destruction, 
rather it is possible to salvage and continue the relationship.
Conclusion
The difficulty that is encountered in trying to write about how to do therapy as 
Winnicott recommended, is that Winnicott did not hold with rigorous technique but 
rather seems to have had a personal style which emphasized creativity and the 
freedom to make mistakes (Grolnick, 1993). While Winnicott’s therapeutic style is 
very appealing in its relational nature, he has been criticised for going too far in his 
own attempts at creating therapeutic change in highly dependent, regressed clients
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(Gomez, 1997). It is perhaps the case that Winnicott’s mode of therapy can be 
regarded as an option that may allow for very deep therapeutic work, but that must 
also be approached with some caution. It is also important to remember that some 
parts of Winnicott’s approach may mainly be applicable to working with the more 
psychotic rather than neurotic elements in the client (Jacobs, 1995). Therefore it may 
be that certain aspects of his way of working should primarily be employed in those 
instances when the client has regressed to such very early stages of development, and 
not when higher levels of functioning are demonstrated. However, keeping such 
caveats in mind, it is possible to appreciate the warmth and the understanding that 
characterise his highly relational approach to therapy.
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The Role of Emotion in CBT
Introduction
The role of emotion in cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) cannot be summarised 
easily, for what is often referred to as one therapy is really a tradition of numerous 
different therapies, that share various aspects of the CBT conception of psychological 
problems and of the nature of the change process (Mansell, 2008). The development 
of the CBT tradition can be described in terms of waves, and what is generally thought 
of as CBT is a form of therapy that developed during the 1970s and 80s and is 
currently known as belonging to the second wave of the CBT tradition. Since then this 
form of CBT has undergone changes in response to criticisms, and later developments 
have incorporated other psychological theories and philosophical approaches to create 
a diversity of therapies that constitute the third wave (Mansell, 2008). The role of 
emotion in CBT therefore varies depending on the specific form of the therapy that is 
examined. This review aims to explore the varying interest in emotion in the CBT 
therapies.
Emotion in first and second wave of CBT
The descriptions of the role of emotion in the early CBT tradition vary dramatically 
depending on the author. According to a more critical perspective, prior to the 1980s 
the focus on cognition in CBT meant that emotion was largely treated as merely a 
product of cognition (Safran, 1998). This view holds that early forms of CBT tended 
to regard emotion as a problem that should be remedied with the use of interventions 
that targeted faulty thinking, since that was considered to be the basis of the difficult 
emotions. Emotions needed to be controlled rather than facilitated, and there was a 
general lack of recognition of the value of inviting emotionality into the therapy 
(Safran, 1998). A very different description of the role of emotion in CBT can be 
found from other sources, according to which emotion is regarded as central to CBT. 
Referring to Beckian CBT, the origins of which can be found in the 1970s, Wills 
(2009) states that “emotion is crucial in CBT” (p.50) and argues that the role of 
emotion in CBT is sometimes misunderstood. According to his account a focus on 
cognition does not imply a lack of interest in emotion, and he presents the emphasis
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on finding ‘hot’ cognitions, thoughts that are emotionally salient, as evidence of the 
centrality of emotion to CBT (Wills, 2009). However, according to Safran (1998) this 
interest in hot cognitions has not been present fi*om the beginning of the CBT tradition 
and has only gained general recognition during the last 25 years.
A historical perspective shows that the development of CBT grew out of a 
dissatisfaction with both behaviourism and psychoanalysis, and that the ‘cognitive 
revolution’ supported a growing interest in cognition in therapy (Dobson & Dozois, 
2010). A few decades later an increasing interest in emotion in academic psychology 
led to a questioning of the view of emotion as an epiphenomenon of cognition (Safran 
& Greenberg, 1991). Criticisms of a lack of interest in emotion in CBT can therefore 
be understood as part of a general trend in academic psychology toward a greater 
focus on emotion.
Current literature on CBT describes the relationship between emotion and cognition as 
mutually influencing (Sanders & Wills, 2005). The cognitive model has always 
assumed the existence of a reciprocal relationship between emotion and cognition 
(Beck, 1971), and this assumption is reflected in current popular versions of second 
wave CBT such as that of Greenberger and Padesky (1995), in which cognition, 
emotion, physiology and behaviour are described as mutually influencing. However, 
second wave approaches to CBT still operate on the assumption that the individual’s 
response to their environment is mediated by their cognitions, and therefore emotional 
responses can be changed by changing cognition (Dobson & Dozois, 2010). This leads 
to a focus on cognition rather than emotion, in a way that is reminiscent of the 
traditional CBT treatment of emotion as something that needs to be controlled with 
the use of techniques (Safi-an & Segal, 1990). In current literature remnants of this 
view exist in introductory books on Beckian CBT such as that by Westbrook, 
Kennerley and Kirk (2011), in that the focus is clearly on cognition and how it can be 
altered to influence emotion.
The treatment of emotion as something to be changed tlirough cognition, is very 
different from that found in other approaches where emotion is more directly invited 
and attended to. As an extreme example, emotion-focused therapy primarily works
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with acceptance and validation of the emotional experience of clients, and is less 
focused on the task of changing cognition in order to influence emotion (Greenberg, 
2007). The assumption is that the experience of the relationship with the therapist, 
who validates the client’s emotions and is empathie, will be internalised so that the 
client develops the ability to regulate emotion through empathy for the self. It 
therefore appears that in comparison with an approach that relies more heavily on 
working with emotion, second wave CBT does to a certain extent still maintain a 
comparatively strong focus on altering cognition through rational consideration. 
Whether emotionally salient or not, cognition is regarded as the highway for engaging 
with the intrapsychic domain, and as a consequence CBT could therefore be accused 
of neglecting the emotional aspects of experience.
One aspect of traditional CBT that is considered to be more emotionally involving is 
the behavioural component. Studies have shown that behavioural experiments are 
experienced as more emotionally driven and as having a more emotional outcome than 
interventions that are more cognitive in nature (Bennett-Levy, 2003). This because 
behavioural experiments that are designed to test beliefs often involve engaging in 
activities that are anxiety-provoking, and because the learning that is gained is at an 
experiential level when the emotional system is fully activated (Sanders & Wills, 
2005). This would mean that the emotional involvement in second wave CBT is less 
present in the explorative phase in the dialogic interaction between therapist and 
client, and more in the subsequent phase when action is required. However, while 
behavioural experiments certainly involve heightened emotional arousal, this does not 
constitute inviting or working with emotion and emotional expression within the 
therapy sessions. It is merely inducing strong emotion through exposure to feared 
situations that are generally confronted outside of the sessions.
The therapeutic relationship
Apart fi-om emotion, another area of therapy that the CBT tradition is often accused of 
having neglected is that of the therapeutic relationship. Due to the intimate connection 
between interpersonal relating and emotion, this lack of interest in the therapeutic 
relationship also has implications for how much emotion is attended to. Although 
Beck emphasized the importance of having a good therapeutic relationship, he
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believed it to be necessary but not sufficient for psychological change to occur 
(Sanders & Wills, 2005). Actual change was thought to result from the behavioural 
and cognitive strategies and techniques employed in the therapy. Even in current CBT 
literature, such as the introductory book on Beckian CBT by Westbrook et al. (2011), 
when the therapeutic relationship is discussed only minimal space is dedicated to the 
possibility of using the interaction between client and therapist to understand the client 
and further the therapy. Instead the focus is on dealing with ruptures in the alliance so 
that the primary work can be resumed. It is my personal experience of practising 
within an lAPT service, that in the form of second wave CBT that is being practised in 
lAPT, the interaction between therapist and client is only actively worked with if it is 
considered to contribute to difficulties in the therapy. Traditionally CBT therapists 
have tried to overcome an impasse in therapy by working cognitively with clients, 
using techniques aimed at thought processes such as challenging cognitive distortions 
(Katzow & Safran, 2007). This has effeclively meant that in traditional CBT the 
emotional aspect of the relationship between therapist and client has not been worked 
with or even attended to.
The lack of interest in exploring the therapeutic relationship, and using it to 
understand and work with clients, is highly relevant to a discussion of the role of 
emotion in CBT due to the emotionality of interpersonal processes. Emotion is deeply 
involved in social interaction (Safran & Greenberg, 1991; Cowie, 2010), and therefore 
to neglect the relationship between therapist and client is to ignore the emotionality of 
both. Social interaction involves intrapersonal aspects of emotion such as feeling, and 
interpersonal aspects such as nonverbal communication (Cowie, 2010). All of this is 
left aside if the therapeutic relationship is not regarded as a source of information or a 
field for exploration and discovery. In this respect emotion has certainly been 
neglected in second wave CBT, and this neglect has brought a great deal of criticism, 
which the practice and theory of CBT has had to respond to. Notably Safran and Segal 
(1990) have addressed this need for a greater focus on the interpersonal aspects of 
therapy within the CBT tradition, and have linked it with the need for activation of 
emotion in therapy. It seems that while current fomis of second wave CBT take an 
interest in emotion to the extent that focus is placed on accessing thoughts that are 
emotionally salient, and while there has been increasing interest in the therapeutic
22
relationship and the necessarily emotional interaction between therapist and client, 
there still remains a flavour of the traditional focus on cognition and technique, as is 
evidenced by contemporary introductory texts such as that that of Westbrook et a l 
(2011).
Second wave CBT in clinical practice
The implications of clinical practice according to a traditional second wave CBT 
approach can be illuminated by considering the case of one of my former clients, a 
young woman who presented with a lot of anxiety and recurrent depression, and 
would spend most of a session in tears contemplating the hopelessness of her 
situation. A second wave CBT approach would involve attempting to engage this 
client in a joint exploration and rational evaluation of her negative automatic thoughts. 
Examination of thoughts to reveal patterns of distorted thinking would follow, and the 
therapy would eventually unearth rules and assumptions that serve to manage living 
with core beliefs. Subsequently these rules and beliefs would be tested with 
behavioural experiments (Westbrook et a l, 2011). Unfortunately the therapy would 
likely founder on the client’s sense of injury when faced with a perceived lack of 
validation of feeling, and subsequent refusal to engage in rational exploration of 
alternative ways of thinking. By attending to my own emotional response, in working 
with this client I found that I was generally not very moved by her distress. Instead I 
experienced her as quite angry although she consistently denied this. Drawing on the 
theory of different global categories of emotional expression, as described by 
Greenberg and Safran (1987), this could be understood as indicating that her anxiety 
and sadness were not her primary emotions, but were rather secondary or instrumental 
emotions, and that underlying these was the anger that she had been taught not to feel 
or express and of which she was unaware. In working with such a client it becomes 
vital to be aware of one’s own emotional response and to address the anger that was 
being communicated non-verbally by the client. A second wave CBT approach which 
does not attend to the emotional aspects of the interpersonal relationship, but simply 
attempts to monitor and question negative automatic thoughts or notice patterns of 
distorted thinking, would not address the complexities of this client’s presentation. 
Instead the therapy would become consumed by working with the thoughts of
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hopelessness and helplessness that this client could readily describe and was 
disinclined to question.
Third wave CBT
The third wave of CBT consists of a number of different therapies that have made 
significant advances by incorporating aspects of other therapies as well as Eastern 
philosophy (Mansell, 2008). These advances have generally involved a greater 
emphasis on more emotional ways of working. Examples of how this greater 
emotional involvement functions in practice can be found in schema-focused therapy, 
mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT), dialectical behaviour therapy (DBT), 
and acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT).
Schema-focused therapy as developed by Young (1990) places great emphasis on 
using the therapeutic relationship as a vehicle for change. This perspective on the 
therapeutic relationship gives rise to something more nurturing than the rather 
business-like collaborative relationship fostered in second wave CBT. One aspect of 
how the therapeutic relationship is used as part of the change process is through 
limited reparenting. The experience of relating to an empathie therapist who is 
consistently warm and sympathetic is thought to counteract common schemas held by 
clients regarding interactions with other people (Young, 1990). The focus on creating 
a sense of security in the relationship and on the empathie response to clients’ 
feelings, reflects a greater interest in the clients’ emotional experiences of the 
relationship with the therapist and the power of this experience to enable change. A 
former client of mine was very fearful of the contempt of others, and would frequently 
interpret my verbal or non-verbal behaviour as signalling a negative evaluation of her. 
For her the experience of a consistently empathie relationship in which her recurrent 
angry outbursts would not be met with the retaliation or rejection that she expected, 
would provide the possibility of a reparative interpersonal experience, one that could 
produce change at an emotional level beyond rational thought.
The schema-focused approach also involves using experiential techniques from 
Greenberg’s emotion-focused therapy (Kellogg & Young, 2006). Techniques that 
utilise imagery and Gestalt-inspired dialogues such as the two-chair technique enable
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increased emotional arousal in session and thereby allow for modification of 
underlying schemas that would not be accessible for change in a less emotional state 
(McGinn & Young, 1996). Working with my former client using imagery techniques, 
it would be possible to invite her to visualize distressing memories of being abused, 
and enable her to remember the experiences more clearly by helping her to tolerate the 
associated emotions. She could then use this newfound ability to tolerate the affect for 
modifying the images, thereby introducing a new perspective on her experiences 
(McGinn & Young, 1996). This could be done by having her imagine that she 
confronts her abuser.
Other third wave therapies within the CBT tradition have moved away from the 
typical emphasis on changing cognitions and behaviours, toward an approach that 
involves acceptance. In MBCT the integration of mindfulness meditation practices 
with cognitive therapy, has allowed for the development of a treatment for recurrent 
depression which emphasizes acceptance and being present in experience (Bamhofer 
& Fennell, 2009). The change-focused techniques of cognitive therapy that involve 
ways of uncoupling from negative thoughts, are combined with the acceptance- focus, 
of being present and aware of thoughts, emotions and bodily sensations, that is the 
core of mindfulness meditation (Lau & McMain, 2005). The practice of mindfulness 
is about turning toward experience of emotion and thoughts rather than away. For the 
previously described client suffering from depression and anxiety, this practice of 
accepting and experiencing emotion would be a radical change fi*om her usual 
attempts to either avoid being aware of negative thoughts and emotions or engage in 
rumination. In MBCT the emphasis is on changing your relation to emotional pain and 
difficult thoughts rather than changing the content of thoughts. A similar integration 
of change and acceptance is found in DBT which involves a lot of validation and 
acceptance of the emotional pain of clients, but is also focused on achieving change so 
that increased emotional regulation and behavioural control become possible (Swales 
& Heard, 2007). While aspects of traditional CBT with its focus on achieving change 
still remain in MBCT and DBT, the acceptance-based parts of the therapies involve a 
completely different way of approaching emotion. While this concept appears to be 
thoroughly rooted in Eastern philosophy, ACT involves a similar emphasis on 
acceptance but without incorporating mindfulness (Lau & McMain, 2005). There the
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use of exposure to emotional experience is used in an entirely Western way to 
encourage the acceptance of emotion without allowing it to determine behaviour 
(Blackledge & Hayes, 2001).
Conclusion
A review of the role of emotion in the CBT tradition reveals that it has undergone 
considerable change: from the early forms of traditional CBT, in which emotion was 
regarded as something that needed to be controlled through accessing the cognitions 
that caused it, to the third wave therapies where emotion is invited into the therapy 
and attended to, as in schema-focused therapy, or experienced and accepted, as in 
MBCT, DBT and ACT. While the radical nature of the acceptance-based strategies of 
MBCT and DBT is somewhat watered down by the inherent tensions in the balancing 
of acceptance and change, they still represent an attempt to engage with emotion in a 
way that is very different from the common sense impulse to modify and correct 
emotional experience through therapy. However, although these new developments 
act as a breath of fresh air for the CBT tradition, there probably still remains a place 
for increased focus on the more tried and tested method of engaging with emotion 
tlirough the therapeutic relationship.
26
References
Bamhofer, T., & Fennell, M. J. V. (2009). Mindflilness-based cognitive therapy: 
preventing relapse in depression. In G. Simos (Ed.), Cognitive behaviour 
therapy: A guide fo r  the practising clinician (Vol. 2, pp. 34-47). Hove, UK: 
Routledge.
Beck, A. T. (1970). The role of fantasies in psychotherapy and psychopathology. 
Journal ofNerwous and Mental Disease, 150, 3-17.
Beck, A. T. (1971). Cognition, affect and psychopathology. Archives o f  General 
Psychiatry, 24, 495-500.
Bennet-Levy, J. (2003). Mechanisms of change in cognitive therapy: The case of 
automatic thought records and behavioural experiments. Behavioural and 
Cognitive Psychotherapy, 31, 261-277.
Blackledge, J. T., & Hayes, S. C. (2001). Emotion regulation in acceptance and 
commitment therapy. Journal o f  Clinical Psycholgy, 57(2), 243-255.
Clark, D. M. (1986). A cognitive model of panic. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 
24, 461-470.
Cowie, R. (2010). Describing the forms of emotional colouring that pervade everyday 
life. In P. Goldie (Ed.), The Oxford handbook ofphilosophy o f  emotion (pp. 
63-94).
Dobson, K S., & Dozois, D. J. A. (2010). Historical and philosophical bases of the
cognitive-behavioral therapies. In K. S. Dobson (Ed.), Handbook o f  cognitive- 
behavioral therapies (3rd ed., pp. 3-3 8).New York, NY: Guildford Press.
Greenberg, L. S. (2007). Emotion in the therapeutic relationship in emotion-focused 
therapy. In P. Gilbert & R. L. Leahy (Eds.), The therapeutic relationship in the 
cognitive behavioural psychotherapies (pp. 43-62). Hove, UK: Routledge.
Greenberg, L. S., & Safran, J. D. (1987). Emotion in psychotherapy. New York, NY: 
Guildford Press.
Greenberger, D., & Padesky C. A. (1995). Mind over mood: Change how you feel by 
changing the way you think. New York, NY: Guildford Press.
Holmes, E. A., Mathews, A., Mackintosh, B., & Dalgleish, T. (2008). The effect of 
mental imagery on emotion assessed using picture-word cues. Emotion, 8, 
395-409.
27
Katzow, A. W., & Safran, J. D. (2007). Recognizing and resolving ruptures in the 
therapeutic alliance. In P. Gilbert & R. L. Leahy (Eds.), The therapeutic 
relationship in the cognitive behavioural psychotherapies (pp. 90-105). Hove, 
UK: Routledge.
Kellog, S. H., & Young, J. E. (2006). Schema therapy for borderline personality 
disorder. Journal o f  Clinical Psychology, 62(4), 445-458.
Lau, M. A ., & McMain, S. F. (2005). Integrating mindfulness meditation with
cognitive and behavioural therapies: the challenge of combining acceptance- 
and change-based strategies. The Canadian Journal o f Psychiatiy, 50, 863- 
869.
Mansell, W. (2008). What is CBT really, and how can we enhance the impact of
effective psychotherapies such as CBT? In R. House & D. Loewenthal (Eds.), 
Against andfor CBT: Towards a constructive dialogue? (pp. 19-32). Ross-on- 
Wye, UK: PCCS Books.
McGinn, L. K., & Young, J. E. (1996). Schema-focused therapy. In P. M. Salkovskis 
(Ed.), Frontiers o f  cognitive therapy (pp. 182-207). New York, NY: Guildford 
Press.
Safran, J. D. (1998). Widening the scope o f cognitive therapy: The therapeutic 
relationship, emotion, and the process o f  change. Northvale, NJ: Jason 
Aronson.
Safran, J. D., & Greenberg, L. S. (Eds.). (1991). Emotion, psychotherapy, and change. 
New York, NY: Guildford Press.
Safran, J. D., & Segal, Z. V. (1990). Interpersonal processes in cognitive therapy. 
New York, NY: Basic Books.
Sanders, D., & Wills, F. (2005). Cognitive therapy: An introduction. London, UK: 
Sage Publications.
Singer, J. A. (2006). Imageiy in psychotherapy. Washington, DC: American 
Psychological Association.
Swales, M. A., & Heard, H. L. (2007). The therapy relationship in dialectical 
behaviour therapy. In P. Gilbert & R. L. Leahy (Eds.), The therapeutic 
relationship in the cognitive behavioural psychotherapies (pp. 185-204).
Hove, UK: Routledge.
28
Wells, A. (1997). Cognitive therapy o f anxiety  ^disorders: A practice manual and 
conceptual guide. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons.
Westbrook, D., Kennedy, H., & Kirk J. (2011). An introduction to cognitive
behaviour therapy: Skills and applications (2nd ed.). London, UK: Sage 
Publications.
Wills, F. (2009). Beck’s cognitive therapy. Hove, UK: Routledge
Young, J. E. (1990). Cognitive therapy for personality disorders: A schema-focused 
approach (3rd ed.). Sarasota, FL: Professional Resource Press.
29
Is a CBT Approach to Depression Compatible with the Principles of Counselling
Psychology?
Introduction
Among the available categories of psychological distress, depression has been claimed 
to be the greatest threat to the mental health of the public (Murray & Lopez, 1996), 
and in a recent expression of the concern regarding depression, the theme for the 
World Mental Health Day of 2012 was; “Depression: a global crisis” (World Health 
Organisation, 2012, October, 10). Depression is therefore a very commonly occurring 
diagnosis of distress in many parts of the world. However, despite the apparent 
ubiquity of this diagnosis, the concept of depression is not entirely uncomplicated.
The present paper will consider some of the difficulties with the diagnosis of 
depression, whilst also exploring the possibility of using CBT to work therapeutically 
with individuals experiencing emotional distress in a way that is compatible with the 
principles of counselling psychology practice.
Diagnosis of depression
According to a social constructionist perspective, the current classifications and 
understandings of depression and other ‘psychological disorders’ are culturally and 
historically located constructions (Maddux, Gosselin & Winstead, 2005). The organic 
and psychological explanations of mental disorder that exist in current literature are 
modem phenomena that have replaced earlier beliefs (Kring, Davison, Neale & 
Johnson, 2007). Previously depression has been viewed as an indication of the 
sinfulness of the sufferer (Milton, Craven & Coyle, 2010). The postmodem 
perspective holds that the current categorisation of psychopathology, as separate 
disorders with separate diagnoses, is a construction that does not reflect the tme nature 
of any assumed underlying reality, but rather is only one possible way of approaching 
psychological distress (Maddux et al., 2005). The system of classification reflects the 
medicalization of emotional suffering (Douglas, 2010).
Current practice in mental health is generally guided by the fourth edition of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual o f Mental Disorders {DSM-IY-TR) (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000), a widely used system of categorisation of distress
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based on descriptions of symptoms rather than aetiology (Douglas, 2010). According 
to Horwitz (2011), the introduction of the categorical classification of mental disorder 
that is still in existence in the current version of the DSM, was motivated by 
professional agendas as well as considerations regarding financial and pharmaceutical 
advantages, and the choice of diagnostic criteria for major depressive disorder was 
somewhat arbitrary. The criteria for the diagnosis of major depressive disorder 
according to the DSM-IV-TR require the presence of five symptoms out of a list of 
nine, with the added requirement that one of the five must be either depressed mood or 
loss of interest or pleasure (APA, 2000). As a result there are multiple different 
possible combinations of symptoms that would still qualify for the diagnosis, and two 
individuals could be diagnosed with depression despite having no symptoms in 
common (Pilgrim & Bentall, 1999).
The practice of diagnosing distress in terms of labels such as ‘depression’ is 
problematic in that it locates the pathology within the individual and emphasises the 
existence of ‘disorder’. The diagnostic system involves a lack of recognition of the 
inherent social nature of diagnosis, so that diagnoses are given an aura of truth 
(Douglas, 2010). The location of disorder in the individual also serves to obscure the 
role of the social and cultural context in the development of the distress (Milton et al., 
2010). It has been argued that the diagnostic system has practical utility (Kendell, 
2003), however the existence of high levels of dual diagnoses indicates a fundamental 
problem with the system of classification (Douglas, 2010). A diagnosis may be 
practically useful for the individual as a means of accessing psychological therapy that 
would otherwise be withheld. Yet the need for having a diagnosis in order to get help 
indicates a flawed system rather than the utility of diagnoses. A diagnosis can be 
helpful to some individuals if it enables them to externalise their difficulties or 
conceptualise the distress as not being self-induced, but for others a diagnosis is 
stigmatising (Douglas, 2010).
Experience of depression
The experience of depression is described as one in which life is less enjoyable or 
one’s mood is consistently low. Common descriptions are of becoming intensely self- 
critical and thinking of oneself as worthless and defective. A feeling of hopelessness
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in regard to the present and the fiiture is often experienced, and the sufferer is 
unmotivated to engage in any activities due to a loss of pleasure. There is thus a 
slowing down of activity but there can also be an experience of agitation or 
restlessness. A lack of energy is commonly described, and while depression is often 
experienced as sadness, despair and anxiety, many also become very irritable. Life is 
generally experienced as meaningless. To others the self-criticism and despair of the 
sufferer often seems irrational. Relationships often suffer since people will encourage 
the suffering individual to feel better, thereby increasing the guilt of the individual 
who is unable to comply with these expectations. Those close to the sufferer risk 
becoming annoyed with the inability of the individual to respond ‘as usual’ and to 
resent the withdrawal from interaction that is often evident. Relationships are also 
strained by the tendency for sufferers to direct the irritability that they experience at 
those who are close to them (Gotlib &Hammen, 1992; Rowe, 1978).
Implications for the therapeutic relationship
The nature of the distress that is common in states that are diagnosed as ‘depression’ 
poses certain difficulties in terms of the therapeutic relationship. The hopelessness and 
despondency which are described in many accounts of depression can be somewhat 
contagious, in that it is possible for therapists who empathise too much with the 
client’s experience to become engulfed by the client’s lack of hope and to begin to 
believe that the situation is hopeless. The client’s experience of hopelessness and 
despair can also lead to desperation on the part of the therapist and to attempts to 
rescue the client rather than engage with the despair. Other possibilities include the 
risk of therapists becoming emotionally withdrawn in response to the despair of the 
client, or in response to the client’s equally withdrawn manner. In addition the client 
often feels deeply ashamed and self-critical and may therefore be reluctant to share the 
details of their distress for fear of criticism or rejection by the therapist.
Working within the CBT tradition
Within counselling psychology there is an emphasis on the individuality of the clients 
and the knowledge that there is no perfect model or theory that will fit every client 
(Ashley, 2010). Hence I have chosen to consider the practice of CBT simply due to 
the current popularity of this approach. In the National Health Service (NHS)
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depression is typically treated with CBT, since this form of therapy is recommended 
for depression by the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) 
(NICE, 2009). The widespread promotion and delivery of CBT makes it relevant to 
critically evaluate the contributions of this therapeutic tradition and its relation to the 
practice of counselling psychology.
In contemporary practice in the NHS there is extensive reliance on manualised 
versions of CBT, such as those of Wells (1997), that are geared toward specific 
diagnoses. These treatment protocols have thus adopted the medical model of distress, 
and instead of approaching each client as an individual with a unique experience, there 
is the tendency to treat the ‘depression’ in rigid accordance with the instructions of the 
manual (Boucher, 2010). The question is whether this form of CBT practice is 
unavoidable or whether it would be possible to draw on this therapeutic tradition in a 
way that is compatible with counselling psychology. For therapy to involve CBT, 
must the client who has been given the label of ‘depression’ be treated according to a 
protocol that specifies techniques to be employed, yet neglects to mention the role of 
the therapeutic relationship or the value of open curiosity about the experience of the 
individual?
The existence of an array of different forms of therapy under the umbrella of the CBT 
tradition indicates that variation in the therapeutic approach is possible (Mansell, 
2008). According to Boucher (2010) a distinction can be made between two separate 
understandings of what could be characterised as second-wave CBT. In the standard, 
manualised form of CBT the protocol is followed rigidly and the emphasis is on 
implementation of techniques to correct the client’s distorted and dysfunctional 
thinking. In the alternative approach there is a reduced focus on technique and instead 
other aspects of therapy are given more space. Rather than treating a ‘disorder’, this 
way of working therapeutically would involve a focus on the unique experience of the 
individual. The basis of CBT is to explore and challenge the way that people interpret 
their world. If the therapist adopts a stance that is less directive and more curious and 
explorative, then CBT could potentially be practised as a joint exploration of the 
subjective experience of the client. CBT then becomes a useful framework for 
thinking about the interplay between early experiences and current difficulties
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(Boucher, 2010). Although basic texts on CBT often promote a technique-oriented 
form of practice. Beck et al. (1979) cautioned against an over-reliance on technique to 
the detriment of the therapeutic relationship. With a shifting emphasis from ‘doing to’ 
to ‘being with’ the client, CBT could become more about stepping into the 
phenomenal world of the client (Boucher, 2010). It therefore seems that some form of 
second-wave CBT can potentially be practised in a way that is more compatible with 
the humanist philosophy and relational focus that are fundamental to counselling 
psychology.
Formulation in CBT
The risk with using a model of therapy to guide our understanding is that we perceive 
only what the model encompasses or highlights, and that we become oblivious to 
other competing understandings of a person’s situation. In relying on a CBT 
framework for thinking about a client’s experience it would be important to recognise 
that CBT focuses on cognitions, and to maintain an awareness of this bias so that the 
relevance of other aspects is not lost. The CBT model also involves a focus on the 
individual as the locus of pathology, and thereby there is a lack of consideration of the 
context in which the distress has arisen. This tendency for the model to ignore the 
social and cultural aspects would also need to be held in awareness.
Whilst engaging in an exploration with the client, a CBT framework for therapy 
would lead to the emergence of a formulation. The CBT understanding of the genesis 
and maintenance of distress is focused on the creation of beliefs about the self, as well 
as on attempts to survive with these beliefs by compensating for them through actions. 
These beliefs are understood as having developed in childhood as a result of 
interaction with others, primarily carers. The formulation would also involve an 
understanding of how the client’s view of self and others would lead to certain ways 
of interacting with others and expectations of the behaviour of others, as well as to the 
interpretation of events in accordance with these beliefs (Beck et al., 1979). In order to 
encompass other aspects of experience as well, beyond that which is illuminated by 
the CBT model, it would be important to draw on other theories in order to gain a 
more complete picture. This would be entirely compatible with the pluralistic stance
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that underlies counselling psychology practice (McAteer, 2010). The use of other 
models for understanding would depend on the nature of the material being brought.
Therapeutic practice
In order to avoid imposing a CBT conceptualisation on the client, it would be 
important to hold any formulation based on the client’s story very loosely. As Safran 
and Segal (1990) have indicated, a detailed formulation will blind the practitioner to 
what is actually happening in the present moment of the therapeutic meeting. They 
instead advocate having a very general formulation that can be revised continually. 
Wlien CBT is practised in accordance with standardised manuals it results in pre­
packaged formulations where the client’s story has been moulded to fit into the CBT 
framework. This form of practice risks leading to the creation of similar formulations 
for many different clients instead of individualised understandings (Milton et al., 
2010). Rather than to quickly jump to such a formulation, a respectful way of 
engaging with clients would be to have in mind a loose framework of the impact of 
early experiences on sense of self and relating to others, and to engage in a dialogue 
with clients to develop their own understanding of their stories. The emphasis of such 
an exploration would be on encouraging curiosity about subjective experience and 
treating clients as the experts on their own experience.
A difficulty with the concept of psychological change within CBT is the emphasis on 
cognition, and the focus on achieving cognitive change in order to change emotional 
and behavioural responding. While the model assumes a reciprocal relationship 
between emotion and cognition, the relationship has sometimes been interpreted as 
causal and the emphasis is always on modifying cognition (Sanders, 2010). This 
creates a rather limited focus and therefore the emphasis on cognition could usefully 
be complemented with increased attention to emotion. Safran and Segal (1990) have 
emphasised the importance of emotional immediacy in working therapeutically using 
cognitive therapy. This involves working with material that is emotionally alive for 
the client in the present moment, and helping clients to gain access to their associated 
feelings on a subject if they are not readily able to do so. When clients struggle to 
access emotional material, therapy may involve helping them to verbalise fears 
regarding the experience and expression of emotional content (Safran & Segal, 1990).
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When attempting to work within the CBT tradition there is the risk of not attending 
sufficiently to interpersonal aspects. In this respect standard CBT is at odds with the 
practice of counselling psychology, which emphasises the importance of a relational 
stance in therapeutic work (Manafi, 2010). An attempt to remedy the lack of interest 
in relational processes in the CBT tradition is the interpersonal approach to cognitive 
therapy described by Safran and Segal (1990). This approach involves exploration of 
the client’s schemas for interpersonal relating through close attention to the unfolding 
interaction between the client and the therapist. The client’s beliefs and expectations 
are identified and explored in collaboration with the client. Emphasis is placed on 
therapists’ self-awareness of their contribution to the process, so that the importance 
of identifying emotional responses toward the client, and of engaging in 
metacommunication about the interaction, is highlighted (Safran & Segal, 1990). This 
approach is compatible with the counselling psychology emphasis on the importance 
of therapists having an awareness of their part in the therapeutic encounter 
(Strawbridge & Woolfe, 2010).
Counselling psychology versus CBT perspectives on distress
The standard form of CBT is an empirical approach that is based on a realist position, 
in that it assumes the existence of an external reality and the possibility of an objective 
understanding of this reality (Guidano, 1991). Such a realist approach to CBT means 
that therapists can be positioned as experts with the power to detemiine the correct 
way of understanding reality (Strong, Lysack & Sutherland, 2008). This is not readily 
compatible with counselling psychology principles, which reject the traditional 
position of the therapist as the expert who delivers his verdict and proceeds to treat the 
pathology of the individual (Manafi, 2010; Milton et al., 2010). Counselling 
psychology is informed by social constructionism (Manafi, 2010), which describes 
classifications of psychopathology as culturally and historically located constructions 
rather than true descriptions of reality (Maddux et al., 2005). While a realist approach 
to CBT would pose problems for counselling psychologists, some practitioners hold 
that CBT could potentially be practiced in ways that are more in line with a social 
constructionist perspective (Boucher, 2010; Guidano, 1991)
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As a counselling psychologist, working with any client in distress entails ‘being with’ 
the client and being open to a joint exploration of the subjective experience of the 
client (Strawbridge & Woolfe, 2010). This stance is based on the humanistic and 
phenomenological paradigm that is central to counselling psychology, and which 
emphasises the elucidation of how the individual perceives and attributes meaning to 
their subjective experience (Manafi, 2010; Strawbridge & Woolfe, 2010). The practice 
of manualised CBT is therefore not compatible with counselling psychology practice 
due to the emphasis on ‘doing to’ the client rather than ‘being with’. Such treatment 
protocols also conflict with the underlying philosophy of counselling psychology in 
that they embrace the categorisation of distress as ‘disorder’ within the framework of 
the medical model, and are effectively encouraging a focus on the diagnosed disorder 
rather than the individual experience of the client (Boucher, 2010). In addition, the 
system of classification of disorder that is present in the DSM places psychopathology 
firmly within the individual, thereby obscuring the contribution of social conditions to 
the experience of distress (Milton et al., 2010). This lack of attention to the context of 
distress is similarly present in the CBT model which focuses on the individual and the 
interpretation of the situation (Beck et al., 1979). While counselling psychologists do 
not deny the actual suffering of clients, these conceptualisations of distress that are 
intrinsic to the medical model of psychopathology are criticised (Milton et al., 2010).
Conclusion
While it is clear that the standard version of CBT as presented in contemporary 
manuals is not compatible with counselling psychology practice, there are other 
aspects of the CBT tradition that are more harmonious with the principles of 
counselling psychology. The exploration of subjective interpretations of events, as 
well as of the meanings that clients assign to their experience, is an integral part of 
humanistic practice (Ashley, 2010) and is also central to many versions of CBT 
(Boucher, 2010). As has been argued in this paper, deviation from manualised 
versions of second-wave CBT potentially enables a clinical practice that is more 
compatible with the ethos of counselling psychology (Boucher, 2010). According to 
Ashley (2010) this can be achieved by retaining a humanistic stance in the practice of 
CBT, so that rather than imposing the CBT model on the client, the client is supported 
in the exploration of experience.
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THERAPEUTIC PRACTICE DOSSIER
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Introduction to the Therapeutic Practice Dossier
The therapeutic practice dossier provides an overview of my clinical practice during 
the three years of my training. This includes a description of the clinical placements I 
have undertaken, providing information on the context of the placements, the 
therapeutic approaches I have practiced in accordance with, and the client populations 
I have worked with. The dossier also includes my final clinical paper which provides 
an account of the development of my approach to practice and my journey towards 
becoming a counselling psychologist.
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Description of Clinical Placements 
First Year Placement: University Counselling Service
October 2010 -  July 2011
My first placement was within a University counselling service which provided 
counselling for staff and students. The service comprised of six counsellors who were 
employed on a full or part-time basis. Their approach to practice was mainly 
integrative, although some of the counsellors had a more pure person-centred 
approach. My supervisor worked in an integrative manner, drawing on person-centred, 
psychodynamic and cognitive-behavioural ways of thinking.
The service mainly received self-referrals; however clients were occasionally referred 
to the service by their GP or by a member of staff from their department in the 
University. Following referral clients were placed on a waiting-list for assessment. 
Clients were initially seen for one face-to-face assessment session before they were 
accepted for individual therapy, subject to availability, or placed on a waiting-list for 
therapy. Alternatively, if the needs of the client were for more extensive interventions 
than the service could offer, the client was referred to more specialised services. There 
was a great deal of variation in the presentations of clients, although many sought help 
for difficulties related to academic work or relationships. Most had no prior 
experience of counselling or psychotherapy.
The purpose of the service was to provide short-term interventions, so that clients 
were usually seen on a once-weekly basis for a maximum of six sessions. There was 
however the option of extending the number of sessions beyond the standard six based 
on the individual needs of the clients. Due to the short-term nature of the work the 
service was expected to have minimal waiting-periods and be able to see clients for 
both initial assessment and commencement of therapy shortly following referral.
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The counsellors had a dual role in that apart from providing short-term therapy 
interventions, they were also able to provide their clients with recommendations with 
respect to consideration of mitigating circumstances for academic purposes. In cases 
where additional support was needed counsellors were also able to assist clients by 
liaising with members of University staff, subject to having obtained written 
permission from their clients to do so.
My approach to practice was primarily person-centred, although my supervisor would 
also suggest some interventions based on psychodynamic or cognitive-behavioural 
ways of thinking. I received weekly individual supervision and attended monthly team 
meetings where there was opportunity to present and discuss clinical cases. In 
addition I participated in monthly seminars in which members of the team, including 
myself, gave presentations on a variety of topics that were relevant to practice. 
Alongside providing counselling foi individual clients, I was also able to conduct 
initial assessment sessions.
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Second Year Placement: NHS Psychotherapy Department
October 2011 -  July 2012
My second placement was within a NHS psychotherapy department. There I was part 
of a team that consisted of one psychiatrist, two individual psychotherapists and three 
group analysts. The department also included several honorary psychotherapists.
This department was a secondary care service which offered long-term 
psychodynamic psychotherapy to clients with complex mental health issues. Clients 
received therapy individually or in groups. For individual psychotherapy the 
maximum duration was two years, whilst group therapy was offered for periods of one 
to three years. The department ran several different groups including specialist groups 
for young adults and victims of childhood sexual abuse. Referrals to the department 
came from GPs, CMHRSs and psychiatrists. The clients had all had various forms of 
therapeutic intervention in primary care or within a CMHRS prior to being referred to 
the service, and most had been struggling with mental health issues for many years. 
Wlien they first entered the service clients were assessed over two to four sessions and 
then placed on a waiting list for individual or group therapy. For clients to be offered 
psychotherapy with this service they needed to be deemed to be suitable for 
psychodynamic work and to have severe and enduring difficulties that were beyond 
the capability of the CMHRS or primary care.
My approach to practice in this placement was psychodynamic. I was first supervised 
by a Jungian psychoanalyst for four months, and then by a psychoanalytic 
psychotherapist for the remainder of my placement, following the transfer of my first 
supervisor to a different department. I saw four individual clients for a period of nine 
months. These clients had complex interpersonal difficulties and the majority had 
been diagnosed with personality disorders. Alongside my work with individual clients 
I also co-facilitated a continuous psychodynamic therapy group in which most of the 
participants had experienced sexual abuse in childhood. For the group work I was 
supervised by a group analyst.
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As part of my role I wrote all formal letters pertaining to my individual clients, such 
as assessments and discharge letters summarising the therapy. Due to the complex 
nature of my clients’ difficulties I liaised with social workers and psychiatrists 
involved in the care of my clients. I was also able to observe several assessments and 
to write the associated assessment reports.
I attended weekly team meetings in which referrals were discussed and where I was 
able to present clinical cases. I also attended weekly group supervision where we 
discussed issues arising from the therapy groups. In addition I was able to attend 
interdisciplinary seminars where a range of different professionals, from social 
workers to psychiatrists, discussed complex clinical case presentations.
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Third Year Placement: Improving Access to Psychological Therapies Service
October 2012 -  September 2013
My final placement was in an lAPT service. The service comprised of psychologists 
and CBT therapists as well as a psychiatrist. There were also a number of other trainee 
psychologists and lAPT trainees. When I began my placement the management of the 
service had recently changed and the operation of the service was undergoing 
significant alteration.
The service mainly received referrals from GPs; however a minority consisted of self- 
referrals. Following referral clients were given a telephone assessment by one of the 
practitioners and subsequently placed on a waiting-list for therapy. Clients were 
accepted into the service based on their scores on psychometric measures. Clients with 
mental health difficulties that were considered to require support beyond the 
capability of the service, such as personality disorders and eating disorders, were 
referred to secondary care services. The service operated in accordance with a stepped 
model of care so that clients were first offered Tow-intensity’ interventions in larger 
groups and subsequently ‘high-intensity’ interventions in smaller groups or 
individually. Although practitioners had been placing some clients directly onto the 
waiting-list for individual CBT in response to the clients’ insistence on not wanting to 
participate in groups, during the second half of my placement the management of the 
service decided to disallow this practice.
All clients were first offered one psycho-educational session about CBT in a large 
group format. Following this most clients were offered a six-week CBT group of 15- 
25 participants, aimed at treating either depression, anxiety or panic. These groups 
were intended to teach basic CBT techniques. Following the six-week intervention, 
clients who wanted further input were offered a high-intensity twelve-week CBT 
group of 6-8 participants, for either depression or generalised anxiety disorder. Clients 
who at assessment were labelled as having primarily obsessive compulsive disorder, 
social phobia, health anxiety or body dysmorphic disorder were immediately offered a 
high-intensity group aimed at treating these problems. If clients wanted further input
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following the high-intensity groups they were offered individual CBT subject to 
review. Only clients who were considered to have symptoms of PTSD were offered 
individual therapy immediately following assessment. The system of assigning 
specific labels to distress was therefore elemental to the operation of the service.
Once accepted into individual therapy, clients were offered an initial six sessions 
which could be extended by a further six sessions to a maximum of twelve. However, 
due to my trainee status I was allowed greater flexibility and was therefore able to 
sometimes continue working with clients beyond the original twelve sessions. The 
individual therapies were meant to follow CBT treatment protocols whenever 
possible, with the exception of cases where there was no existing protocol to fit the 
client’s presentation. Apart fi*om my work with individual clients I also co-facilitated 
a high-intensity CBT group for generalised anxiety disorder. I received weekly 
individual supervision for my clinical work.
As part of my duties I wrote discharge letters to GPs for my individual clients. When 
clients finished therapy I was responsible for finding suitable new clients on the 
waiting-list and contacting them per telephone to offer individual therapy.
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Final Clinical Paper 
Finding a Way of Being With: A Snapshot of a Continuing Process 
Introduction
The task that this introduction commences, which is to create a coherent narrative of 
my progression through this course and of the clinical practice that has emerged in the 
process, seems somewhat daunting. On reflection I realise that this is due to my sense 
of not being a finished product; I do not experience myself as the result of a journey 
that is about to end. Instead I feel that this is only the beginning of my development as 
a practitioner, and therefore I hesitate to set down in black-and-white any form of 
summary of where I am now. I want to say,” wait a few more years, maybe ten, and 
then ask me about my practice. Maybe ITl have a clearer narrative by then.” But since 
you’re now reading this, it means that I have been able to create something.
There are many aspects of counselling psychology that resonate with me and that are 
relevant to my clinical practice. I was initially drawn to this profession for the stance 
of pluralism, since it allows for the consideration of various theories depending on the 
presentation of the individual client, and does not require complete allegiance to any 
psychotherapeutic tradition (McAteer, 2010). While I can find it disconcerting to be 
faced with the distress of clients without any certainty about which theoretical 
perspectives will best guide my practice, I am much more wary of the alternative, of 
being wedded to one theory and having to understand every client through its lens.
In the same way that I was drawn to the flexibility and critical thinking that a pluralist 
stance entails with regard to theory, my approach to practice also rests firmly on the 
humanistic and phenomenological paradigm which underpins counselling psychology 
(Ashley, 2010). The emphasis on the therapeutic relationship as the most significant 
component of therapy resonates with my own experience of personal therapy, which 
provided the original inspiration for choosing this path myself. My experience of 
therapy was of a safe space where I was able to increasingly become aware of and 
develop an acceptance of my subjective experience, and in particular my emotional 
life. This involved becoming curious about the processes of my own subjective 
experiencing and meaning-making, and how this connected with my emotional
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reactions. While I am by no means finished with this process of knowing and 
accepting more of myself and my subjective life, what enabled me to begin it was the 
nature of the relationship that was offered me in therapy. It was the safety of a 
relationship in which I was accepted and understood, and which modelled interest and 
curiosity about my subjective experience. It was the experience of this relationship 
which enabled me to change my way of approaching myself, and in the process 
become curious about myself. In keeping with my own experience of therapy, I 
therefore conceptualise the relationship that I offer as the principal medium for change 
and understanding, and therefore my way of being, and the extent to which I am 
comfortable with myself, are central to my practice. While knowledge of theory is an 
important instrument in making sense of client presentations and can provide a 
necessary foothold that has a containing function for the practitioner, developing the 
ability to be aware and accepting of my own subjective experience is fundamental to 
my practice. To a certain extent this account of my clinical practice is therefore a 
narrative of my way of being with clients and how this has developed during the 
course.
In writing about the theoretical understanding that guides my practice I should also 
mention my interest in emotional processes. It is widely recognised within the field of 
psychotherapy that emotion has a central role in the therapeutic endeavour (Safi-an & 
Greenberg, 1991), and my experience of personal therapy has also supported this 
perspective. Through my personal therapy I have gained a greater understanding of 
my own emotionality, and my interest in the subject of emotion has never wavered 
since. This interest is discernible both in my choice of research area and in some of 
the clinical illustrations that are part of this paper. In my clinical practice I have come 
to hold the view that therapy involves facilitating the client in gaining a greater 
awareness of subjective experience in general, and that an important aspect of this is 
the ability to become aware of, reflect on, and accept emotional life. This is not to 
ignore the relevance of other aspects of subjective experience. Emotional reactions are 
always linked to other facets of our inner lives, such as what we refer to as ‘thoughts’. 
Paying attention to emotional processes therefore never excludes attending to other 
aspects. I am also aware that attending to emotional experience is a practice that needs 
to be moderated depending on the presentation of the individual client. Particularly
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clients who are highly emotional do not necessarily benefit from an intensified focus 
on the emotional experience that they are already deeply involved in expressing.
There are therefore two themes, of interpersonal relationship and of emotion, which I 
particularly recognise in my clinical thinking and which are therefore also discernible 
throughout this narrative of my clinical practice. As I have progressed through the 
course I have found various theoretical perspectives on these topics that have helped 
me to develop my own perspective as a practitioner. This account of my clinical work 
describes my development of an approach to practice, and how my way of being with 
clients has been informed by and understood through theory. Where this involves 
mention of client work, pseudonyms have been used, and identifying markers have 
been removed to protect client confidentiality.
Being with
Counselling psychology emphasises the importance of being with clients rather than 
doing to (Strawbridge & Woolfe, 2010). This stance, which involves recognition of 
the significance of the relationship in therapy, was immediately appealing to me when 
I started my training. I knew that my own experience of personal therapy had been 
valuable due to the nature of the being with that I had experienced and not due to any 
techniques. My experience therefore seemed to be a confirmation of the person- 
centred emphasis on the importance of the therapeutic relationship. However, in my 
clinical practice over the course of my training, I have found that the deceptively 
simple act of being with has sometimes been elusive, and that the nature of my being 
with clients has undergone changes.
In my first placement I worked with students on a short-term basis. My clients often 
presented with particular problems that they wanted help with solving as quickly as 
possible. Wliile this is an understandable and common request, at this stage in my 
training I struggled to find a way of engaging my clients in a process of joint 
exploration that would awaken their curiosity about themselves, rather than their 
desire for an immediate ‘solution’ that would be impossible to find. Althougli I 
believed in the usefulness of being with and providing a space for reflection, I still felt 
that I was not doing enough.
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My difficulty was apparent in my work with Amy, a young woman who experienced a 
great deal of anxiety in social situations. Amy was intensely critical of herself and 
expected others to respond to her in the same way. While being open about her 
anxiety in the therapy was therefore also difficult for her, she was able to engage to a 
degree due to the safety of confidentiality and the fact that she was only revealing her 
distress to one person and not a wider audience. She therefore could speak to me about 
her anxiety and self-criticism as well as her despair at the thought of not being able to 
change this. I was moved by her distress and experienced an increasing sense of 
desperation about what I perceived as my lack of ability to provide any form of relief 
for her. At this point being able to explore my experience in supervision and personal 
therapy was invaluable. I was able to reflect on my felt need to be a ‘good enough’ 
therapist, and my tendency to take on responsibility for the outcome of the therapy. I 
came to understand that I found myself struggling due to the interaction of these 
aspects of my subjective way of being, with the context of a short-term service and my 
client’s hope for immediate change. My response was to put pressure on myself and 
thereby on the therapy to ‘deliver’ change. Through being able to reflect on this 
process I was increasingly able to ‘be with’ Amy without experiencing the same 
pressure and desperation to create change. As the quality of my approach subtly 
shifted, we were able to engage in an exploration of Amy’s view of herself. Through 
the exploration of her experience, Amy seemed to be able to be more accepting of her 
fear and less harsh in her criticism of herself. While it is impossible to explain the 
unfolding of this process with any certainty, and in all likelihood there were myriad 
reasons for the shift that seemed to take place, I came to understand it in terms of 
theoretical perspectives on the therapeutic relationship, and specifically the role of 
empathy, as conceptualised within the person-centred approach.
While there are many different views on the nature of empathy, I have come to 
understand it as a cognitive and affective process that involves endeavouring to take 
the perspective of the other, as well as the capacity to perceive and resonate with 
another’s emotional state. What appealed to me was the view of empathy as directly 
involved in facilitating change, rather than merely an aspect of a therapeutic 
relationship that lays the groundwork for other interventions. According to this
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perspective, the experience of being empathically listened to and understood results in 
an increased receptivity to, and deeper awareness of, one’s subjective experience, as 
well as the ability to symbolise it and reflect on it (Barrett-Lennard, 1997). This is 
possible because the experience of receiving empathy allows the client to feel safe 
enough to approach aspects of experience that are otherwise too threatening or involve 
too much vulnerability. This process is also understood as involving the development 
of a different way of relating to oneself, so that through internalizing the therapist’s 
empathie responding toward all aspects of their experiences, clients develop a greater 
capacity for self-empathy (Warner, 1997).
The theoretical explanations of the function of empathy seemed to clarify the process 
of my work with Amy, as well as illuminate my own experience of personal therapy 
and how it had enabled me to become more accepting of myself and more attuned to 
my subjective experience. By being more present and open to Amy’s experience, 
instead of focused on helping her change her experience, I became able to be more 
empathically responsive. This could then be understood as enabling her to be more 
receptive of and empathie toward her own experience. Through the theoretical 
perspectives on the role of empathy and the relational aspect of therapy, I was able to 
find this understanding of the therapeutic process that resonates with me and that I 
have carried with me throughout my clinical practice in later placements as well.
Becoming more comfortable
My placement in the second year was in a psychotherapy department where clients 
were offered longer-term psychodynamic therapy. I was therefore able to work with 
the same clients for the duration of my placement. Having the luxury of this longer- 
term arrangement allowed me to develop a way of being with clients that I had not 
experienced before. As a result of my experiences of working with clients in the first 
year, and of having a space to reflect on these experiences in personal therapy, I had 
become more comfortable in the role of therapist. When I then came to the slower 
pace of longer-terai therapy in the second year, I was able to engage with the clients in 
a different way. I found that I was able to be present as just another human being, 
without striving to be a certain way in order to be good enough. I remember thinking 
that all I really needed to be was myself; but mainly it was not an experience of
53
intellectual thought but one of emotional experiencing. This seemed to allow me to be 
more open and responsive to the moment-to-moment experiencing of my clients in the 
sessions. I have come to understand this change in terms of a greater capacity to be at 
home with my own subjective experience. This allowed me to be more aware of my 
own process and thereby to be more attuned to the experience of my clients. Within 
person-centred theory, being able to be empathically responsive to others is regarded 
as being dependent on the capacity to be congruently present and in contact with one’s 
own subjective experience (Vanaerschot, 1997). I have been able to use this 
theoretical perspective to understand that it was a greater acceptance of myself and my 
subjective experience, which allowed me to be present as I was and trust that it would 
be enough that I had some knowledge of psychological theory and the willingness to 
listen and be interested. Inevitably the pressures of trying to formulate and practice in 
accordance with psychodynamic theory, whilst working with clients whose problems 
were complex and long-standing, eventually led me to again struggle with doubts 
about being ‘good enough’. However, I was still able to retain some of the increased 
openness and responsiveness that I experienced so profoundly in the beginning of the 
placement.
I now felt comfortable enough to use my experience of more subtle aspects of the 
client’s emotional state and reflect this in the session, instead of staying with what was 
more clearly apparent. An example of this that I remember well is an exchange from 
an early session with Kate, a young woman who had a history of self-harm and who 
struggled with her experience of anger. In the initial sessions Kate was quite reserved 
and she rarely made eye-contact or spoke about anything very personal. In the third 
session Kate was speaking about her experience of interacting with groups of people. 
There was an edge in her voice and she was talking about herself in a disparaging way 
whilst directing her words to the floor.
Kate: “When I’m talking to people in a group I’m always just thinking about what I’m 
saying and I don’t really listen and it’s just so stupid and self-absorbed.”
Eva: “To me it sounds like you’re afraid.”
54
Kate looked at me with her eyes wide and then after a pause she started to talk in a 
softer voice about her experience of coming to the therapy with me and how she 
worried about what I would think of her.
In other situations I may have reflected on the self-criticism or the slight edge in her 
tone of voice. Any of these aspects would have been potentially relevant, and her 
tendency to be self-critical was in fact something that we did later spend a lot of time 
on. However at this point I said something that came from my own experience of 
being with Kate in the session. By being tentative I made it clear that this was simply 
my impression. The reason I remember this occasion so clearly is because of her non­
verbal reaction which seemed to indicate that she had received what I had said. While 
before she had been addressing the carpet and her speech had been pressured and 
rapid, she instead looked straight at me, and when she spoke again her voice was 
softer and the pace was slower. I had the experience of a change in the atmosphere of 
the session. Following this session there developed a relationship where it was 
possible to talk about things that Kate had previously been silent about. I was able to 
make sense of this shift through the theoretical perspectives on empathy, in that 
through being more comfortable with myself I was able to respond to Kate from my 
awareness of more subtle nuances of her emotional state. As a consequence of feeling 
that she was understood Kate was able to feel less alone, and thereby she felt safer to 
approach aspects of her experience that she found more threatening. The experience 
helped to cement the value of sharing my perceptions and intuitions with the client, so 
that I was increasingly able to venture beyond what I had previously regarded as safe 
ground.
Engaging with object-rdations theory
In the second year I found myself drawn to the object-relations school, due to its 
emphasis on the centrality of relationship, both internal and external (Gomez, 1997). 
However, despite my enthusiasm for the emphasis on relationship and the utility of 
many of the concepts, the tendency for theories to involve conceptions of internal 
psychic structures is something I find difficult to accept. Through engaging with the 
social constructionist perspective in my research, I have come to view ideas about 
internal structures such as the ‘psyche’ as constructions that are the product of culture.
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I could therefore find object-relations theory useful for formulation and for 
understanding processes that occurred between a client and myself m the therapy, but 
the suggestion of any actual internal psychic structures is one that I could never 
accommodate. Apart from this difficulty I also struggled with other aspects of object- 
relations theories, such as the lack of consideration of the role of the environment for 
the development of the child that is associated with Klein’s (1975) one-sided focus on 
internal phantasy. Engaging with the object-relations sehool was therefore a 
tumultuous experience, and while I was never able to find a theory or a perspective 
that I could agree with in its entirety, I did find concepts that were useful for me in 
thinking about clients, even iff  did not accept these theories as descriptions of ‘truth’.
My use of object-relations theory for understanding the relationship in therapy, can be 
illustrated by my work with Jane, a young woman with a long history of mental health 
problems and severe self-harm. She described struggling with managing her emotional 
life and frequently finding herself overwhelmed by anger and despair. Jane’s 
behaviour in the sessions was characterised by sudden and powerful shifts in her 
emotional state and manner of relating to me. While she was sometimes very friendly 
in her behaviour toward me, at other times she would become very angry and upset, 
and communicate this through outbursts or stony silences. On several occasions 
during the therapy she threatened to commit suicide.
I found that particularly the theory of Fairbaim (1952) helped me to understand Jane’s 
way of relating to herself and others. Fairbaim’s amendments to the Kleinian theory 
allow for an understanding of suffering as arising from lack of care rather than from 
the innate destructiveness of the child (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983). This makes his 
theory inherently relational and thus compatible with my own nascent understanding 
of development. According to this perspective early experiences of lack of care would 
give rise to splitting, so that others are altematingly related to from the extremes of a 
needy hopeful position or from a position of anger and rejection (Fairbaim, 1952). 
While I found aspects of Fairbaim’s theory somewhat complicated, it offered a 
relational model for understanding the sudden shifts, as well as the anxiety and anger 
that Jane seemed to experience when dealing with any form of separation. Based on 
this theoretical understanding I tried in the therapy to communicate with Jane about
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her emotional shifts, in order to support an increased awareness of this process. While 
I continue to value the role of empathie understanding and responsiveness in therapy, 
through my work with clients in the second year I also came to appreciate the need for 
theory that can explain processes of relating such as that which I experienced with 
Jane.
At times I experienced very strong feelings toward Jane and in relation to my work 
with her. My emotional reactions were characterised by anxiety, anger and despair, as 
well as feelings of tenderness and maternal protectiveness. At times I found myself 
struggling to bear the intensity while still remaining open and non-defensive in the 
relationship. Due to the strength of these emotional experiences, I relied heavily on 
supervision and personal therapy for the reflective space to be able to speak openly 
about my experience and thereby process the emotional impact. I found the theoretical 
understanding of containment, as described by Bion (1962), very useful for 
conceptualising the value of this support and its significance for the therapy with Jane. 
It was due to the containment that I experienced in supervision and personal therapy 
that I was able to offer containment for Jane’s distress. Through her interaction with 
me Jane allowed me to experience something of the intensity and flavour of her 
emotional life. By being able to process my experience I could refrain from acting out 
my emotional reactions and was instead able to hold Jane’s anxiety. I could therefore 
remain open to her when she returned to the therapy. Thinking of Winnicott’s (1958) 
emphasis on the importance of the survival of the therapist, the therapeutic value of 
this process can also be understood as being that the relationship was able to withstand 
and survive the ‘attacks’ and be repaired, and that we were able to a certain extent to 
reflect on the shifts in Jane’s experience.
Grappling with the CBT tradition
My approach to practice is fully compatible with the notion of therapy increasing the 
client’s awareness of subjective experience. In that regard the methods of cognitive 
therapy, for self-observation and recording of thoughts, can provide a very accessible 
and concrete way of introducing attention to subjective experience, particularly for 
clients who are not inclined to be reflective. I have however struggled with the lack of 
attention to relational aspects of therapy that I have perceived in the practice of CBT.
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There are aspects of the theoretical foundation of ‘standard’ CBT that can be 
compatible with a more relational understanding. The concept of schemata reflecting 
beliefs about self, others and the world can be understood as another model of 
internalization of experiences of relationships. However, despite the potential of this 
theoretical perspective, I have found that within the manualised forms of CBT that are 
delivered within lAPT, there is a tendency to focus on the teaching of techniques to 
the exclusion of any attention to interpersonal aspects. The prevailing attitude seems 
to be that a therapeutic alliance is simply a necessary foundation for the 
implementation of treatment, and that attention is only given to the relationship in the 
case of ruptures in the alliance. I found that this de-emphasis of the interaction in the 
sessions meant that valuable ways of understanding clients, in terms of their ways of 
relating interpersonally, were left unattended to, and the potential of the relationship 
as a vehicle for change was not considered.
Searching for a language within the CBT tradition for thinking about process aspects 
of therapy, I discovered the interpersonal approach to cognitive therapy that is 
described by Safran and Segal (1990). Their description of how the client’s schemas 
for interpersonal relating can be explored, through close attention to the interaction 
between the client and therapist as it unfolds in the session, provided a relational 
framework for practising within the CBT tradition. While the nature of my placement 
required that clients be ‘treated’ in accordance with manualised CBT for their 
respective ‘disorders’, I was also able to think about the interaction with clients in 
terms of the interpersonal approach. This can be illustrated by my work with Alice. In 
my interaction with Alice I became aware of a tendency on my part to be very 
supportive and reassuring. Wliile being supportive is a natural part of the CBT 
approach, I found that at times I responded with reassurance when perhaps an 
exploration of Alice’s uncertainty and anxiety may have been fruitful. In tenus of 
theory my response to Alice could be understood as participation in a cognitive- 
interpersonal cycle, in which Alice sought to avoid the criticism of others through 
behaviour which invited reassurance. Through attending to the process in the sessions 
I was able to connect my reassurance with my emotional response to certain non­
verbal aspects of Alice’s communication that related to tone of voice and facial 
expression. This awareness enabled me to communicate with Alice about the
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interaction, an intervention which lead to exploration of her experience of interacting 
with others and her concern with behaving correctly and being ‘perfect’. Through 
reflective attention to my experience of the process it was thereby possible to explore 
aspects that might otherwise be ignored. While the use of cognitive techniques and 
behavioural experiments can be very useful for many clients, I have found it valuable 
to retain an awareness of the interaction with the client, and to use my own experience 
of the client in trying to create an understanding. These aspects of practice are almost 
non-existent in manualised versions of CBT.
Incorporating a social constructionist perspective
My research has allowed me to delve into the intricacies of social constructionism. In 
my clinical practice I have therefore come to appreciate the importance of being aware 
of the constructed nature of the concepts that are used in psychotherapy to make sense 
of people’s experience. Even the basic terms of this profession, such as the ‘psyche’, 
become recognisable as merely concepts. This awareness allows for a distinction 
between the map and the territory, so that theories are not mistaken for accurate 
descriptions that correspond to any reality of inner life. However, while this awareness 
is important in terms of avoiding complete belief in the theories as representations of 
reality, it is also the case that language is necessary for communication, and that there 
is no way of talking about experience without using the sense-making that is available 
through language. In therapy we are always engaged in constructing the world in these 
terms. When speaking of certain aspects of experience as ‘emotion’, and 
distinguishing separate categories of emotion such as ‘sadness’ or ‘joy’, we are using 
constructs that are culturally and historically located. However, the subjective 
experience of the individual is not a construction, and the pain that is being referred to 
is a felt reality. It is therefore an important function of therapy to support clients in 
becoming more aware of subjective experience and being able to express these 
experiences using language. The act of symbolisation allows for further reflection on 
experience and for the creation of new meanings. The use of socially constructed 
concepts for the sake of mutual intelligibility is therefore necessary, but this does not 
diminish the importance of being aware of their constructed nature.
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The lens of social constructionism also illuminates the construction that is involved in 
the categorisation of ‘pathology’ that guides current practice in mental health. The 
NICE guidelines and the manualised CBT treatments delivered through lAPT embrace 
the categorisation and treatment of ‘disorder’. In my placement I have observed how 
the practice of categorisation is an integral part of the operation of the service, such 
that clients are required to be labelled with a particular ‘disorder’ and then given the 
designated treatment based on this categorisation. Having to practice within this 
context I have found that I am uncomfortable with this approach, in which the 
humanist stance of attending to the individual’s subjective experience of distress is 
lost, and replaced with a focus on diagnosed disorder in accordance with the medical 
model of psychopathology. While it may seem efficient in theory, it strikes me as a 
form of mechanisation of therapy based on categorisations of distress that are of 
questionable utility and relevance.
Conclusion
What stands out for me after having created this narrative of my clinical practice and 
theoretical understanding, is how intertwined my practice is with who I am. For me 
the idea of the neutral analyst is most definitely a myth, and what I offer a client is a 
relationship in which I am very much a part. Therefore I find that the foundation of 
the practice of therapy is to have an awareness of one’s own experience of the 
interaction, as well as an openness to the experience of the other. Theory is a useful 
guide and a support, but it is also important to be aware of the constructed nature of 
theory and to always be clear that the theory is only a guide and nothing more. 
Receptivity and attunement to the individual experience of the client must never be 
lost or obscured behind the certainty of a theoretical explanation. As I near the end of 
this course I find that my clinical practice has reaffirmed my belief in the importance 
of the relationship in therapy, and when I continue my journey I will hold on to this 
understanding. Since my understanding is of an experiential and emotional nature 
rather than only theoretical or intellectual, I also have faith that I will never lose it.
As a result of peering through the lens of social constructionism, I have come to view 
any conversation with a client as a process in which we jointly construct a certain 
version of what we talk about, and consequently of our world. While I have been
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writing this account of my clinical practice in solitude, it is nonetheless a 
communication with an imagined recipient. As such it is also a particular construction 
of my experience and of my view of my clinical practice at this time. While it is 
therefore only one among several possible narratives, it is also merely a snapshot of 
this stage of my development as a practitioner. This paper gives a sense of my current 
understanding, but I know that I have only scratched the surface of the complex issues 
I have touched upon, and I hope that with more time I will be able to delve deeper into 
these questions.
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Introduction to the Research Dossier
The research dossier contains one literature review and two pieces of research, all of 
which are connected by the common subject of emotion. The literature review 
explores the historical context of contemporary theory of emotion within 
psychotherapy, by examining the theories of emotion of influential philosophical 
works throughout the history of Western thought. The review examines how emotion 
is conceptualised in these works, and reveals value judgements about the desirability 
and acceptability of emotion, as well as connected recommendations regarding the 
control of emotion. The review shows that the themes that are present in these early 
theories are still relevant to contemporary emotion theory. Following this the first 
piece of research is a Foucauldian discourse analysis of how emotion is constructed in 
contemporary CBT self-help literature. The analysis revealed a portrayal of emotion 
that supports the enterprise of CBT, whilst marginalising alternative constructions of 
emotion. The second piece of research presents an analysis of how emotion is dealt 
with in the practice of Beckian cognitive therapy. This is accomplished through a 
conversation analysis of the recordings of therapy sessions conducted by A. T. Beck, 
the principal developer of cognitive therapy. The analysis revealed a general lack of 
fi-ee exploration of, and empathie responsiveness to, clients’ expressions of emotional 
experience.
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Abstract
This article focuses on the theories of emotion of well-known philosophers in Western 
history. The theories of Aristotle, the Stoics, Descartes, Spinoza and Hume are 
examined. The review explores the view that each theory has of the nature of emotion; 
whether emotion is predominantly explained in terms of cognition or 
physiology/feeling. The analysis also looks at the value that is placed on emotion and 
whether the theories advocate control of emotion. The review shows that the themes 
that are present in these early theories are still relevant to contemporary emotion 
theory. Theories with a stronger cognitive focus seem to depict emotion in more 
negative terms and to more forcefully advocate the control of emotion. However, 
value judgements are found throughout.
Keywords
Emotion, history, passion, philosophy, theory
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Introduction
Emotions are fundamental to the human experience. According to Wright (1604) the 
passions “trouble wonderfully the soul” (p. 94), and while the terminology may have 
changed since his day the sentiment still remains true. Emotional experience gives 
colour to life and while it may at times indeed be wonderful to be troubled by 
emotions, at other times it is merely troubling. Emotion is central to counselling 
psychology since the profession specifically deals with the subjective human 
experience. Having theories of emotion to support understanding is therefore vital to 
guide our practice.
In considering contemporary emotion theory, it is important to recognise that it is 
situated within a historical context. Psychology inlierited the study of emotion from 
philosophy (Lyons, 1980), so that the theories that exist today are resting on the 
shoulders of centuries of debate. Seeing the greater historical context allows us to 
understand how old these theoretical threads are, and to appreciate how every position 
taken up today is either a continuation of or a reaction against an older position. A 
much cited debate in the psychology of emotion is that between Zajonc and Lazarus in 
the 1980s (Reddy, 2001). The debate concerned the relation between emotion and 
cognition, an issue which has still not been resolved within psychology (Deigh, 2010). 
This debate could be said to have its origins in the opposition between the radical 
feeling theory of James and Lange, and the cognitively oriented emotion theories of 
the cognitive revolution in psychology. However, the cognitive and organic/feeling 
traditions of emotion theory have existed in various forms long before such relatively 
modem times (Lyons, 1980). The purpose of this article is to review some of the 
major contributions to emotion theory that stem from early philosophical works within 
the history of Western thought, from the ancient Greeks up until the end of the 18th 
century. The review will explore the positions that these theories take regarding the 
role of cognition and feeling/physiology in emotion. The examination of the theories 
will also focus on the value that is placed on emotion, since the theories contain 
judgements about how useful or desirable emotion is considered to be. The study of 
emotion appears to be an area that has invited a lot of value judgements, and in 
considering the historical context of contemporary theory it is important to be aware 
of these influences. The specific theories of emotion that the review focuses on are the
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theories of Aristotle, the Stoics, Descartes, Spinoza, and Hume. By examining these 
historical antecedents of modem emotion theory, it is possible to gain a deeper 
understanding of the origin of themes that are central to contemporary theory.
Aristotle
The writings of Aristotle had a long-lasting impact on Western philosophy and his 
theory of emotion was no exception to this; later thinkers continued to refer to it in 
their arguments whether they were in agreement or sought to dispute his views 
(James, 1997). The theory of emotion that Aristotle presented is often interpreted as 
being cognitive in nature. Power and Dalgleish (1997) describe the Aristotelian view 
of emotion as a strong cognitive theory in that it presents cognition as both necessary 
for emotion and causal. In Aristotle’s conception of emotional reactions, the sequence 
that leads to an emotion involves an event as well as some form of thought about the 
event. Individuals could have different thoughts about an event and depending on 
those thoughts their subsequent reactions would differ. Therefore the emotion was 
determined by the thought or belief (Fortenbaugh, 1975). The fact that Aristotle 
explained emotion as caused by cognition meant that an emotion could be 
distinguished from other emotions by the thought that preceded it. In the Rhetoric 
Aristotle defines emotions in this way; so that fear is experienced due to the 
appearance of future evil, as well as the expectation of suffering (Sorabji, 2000). 
While thoughts and beliefs are viewed as causal for the emotional reaction, they are 
never described as being part of the emotion in this theory (Price, 2010). In fact the 
emotion itself was not seen as rational, rather, Aristotle associated emotion with the 
sensitive soul, an aspect of the psyche that was not rational (Gill, 2010; James, 1997).
While Aristotle did describe emotion in cognitive terms, he was also interested in 
physiological aspects of emotion. According to Aristotle, emotion belonged to both 
the body and the soul (Harris, 2001; Price, 2010), and therefore he described emotions 
both in terms of feelings and in tenns of beliefs or judgements (James, 1997). In the 
Rhetoric and the Poetics Aristotle distinguishes between different emotions by way of 
the content of the thoughts that precede them, but in De Anima these distinctions are 
also made based on the underlying physiological changes that accompany each 
emotion (Sorabji, 2000). Aristotle describes anger according to two different
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perspectives: according to the dialectitian, anger would be defined as a desire for 
revenge, and according to the natural scientist it would be described as the boiling of 
blood or heat around the heart (Harris, 2001). Aristotle held that there was a 
physiological basis for all emotions. The belief or thought of the emotion constituted 
its form and the physiological process of the emotional reaction was the matter of the 
emotion (Sorabji, 2000).
Since Aristotle described emotion as caused by the beliefs of the individual, this opens 
the possibility of affecting emotional reactions through reasoned argumentation and 
persuasion (Fortenbaugh, 1975). However, while he did posit beliefs or imaginings as 
the cause of emotion, Aristotle did not think that our emotions are entirely under our 
control. Aristotle believed that to a certain extent our emotions are difficult to control 
once they have begun, and that we are not able to stop ourselves from experiencing 
the physiological symptoms of emotion (James, 1997). Aristotle also described the 
emotions as passive responses pertaining to the sensitive soul which was passive. He 
contrasted the passive ability to respond to external things, which was typical of the 
emotions and sensations, with the active ability to start an activity without needing an 
external provocation, which was characteristic of thought (James, 1997). This 
description of emotion, as a passive response that is hard to stop once it has started, 
does not seem to correlate with a sense of control of emotion. According to Sorabji 
(2000), the Aristotelians even went so far as to regard emotions as unavoidable. 
However, Aristotle advocated moderation in emotional expression, and it would be 
hard to see how he could have expected any kind of moderation of the emotions if he 
regarded them as entirely unavoidable and beyond any form of control. According to 
Price (2010), Aristotle believed that the ethical education of individuals was the 
method required to persuade the individual toward moderate emotional responses, and 
that this process should start with the teachings of a beloved mentor or father and 
continue with the enforcement of laws. Therefore it seems that although emotions 
were seen as natural responses that were hard to control, there was still the possibility 
of moderation.
In general, Aristotle found emotional reactions to be natural responses to certain 
situations and a normal part of being human (Gill, 2010). He believed that tragedy and
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comedy were important since they allowed for the catharsis of emotions that could 
otherwise become too strong (Sorabji 2000). This can be understood as advocating the 
ventilating of emotions, but his theory of emotion was not generally concerned with 
ventilation (Harris, 2001). Aristotle’s position was to advocate moderation in regard to 
emotion (Sorabji, 2000). He believed that the ideal would be for emotional reactions 
to be felt and expressed in moderate amounts so that one was neither devoid of 
appropriate emotional responses nor overcome by excessive emotion (Sorabji, 2000). 
In the political arena Aristotle generally held that emotion was undesirable, but he also 
defended the expression of anger in other parts of life and thought that habitual 
absence of anger was as bad as being too irascible (Harris, 2001). In general, Aristotle 
viewed emotion as natural but held that it must be expressed at the right time, in the 
correct direction and in the appropriate amount. What was considered appropriate 
would depend on the situation and the person in question (Sorabji, 2000).
Aristotle’s theory of emotion is related to all the modem theories that afford cognition 
a vital role in the creation of emotion. Theories such as those of Arnold (1960) and 
Lazams (1991) assume that appraisals of situations cause emotional reactions but are 
not part of the emotions themselves, a position which is very similar to the 
Aristotelian view. The similarity with Aristotle is also found in that these theories 
include a physiological reaction as part of the emotion. The moderation of emotion 
that Aristotle advocated can be found in many psychological theories, such as the 
cognitive behavioural approach, as well as psychoanalytic theory in which the ego’s 
role is to reign in the forces of the id (Freud, 1962). Another similarity with the 
psychoanalytic theory is that Aristotle regards emotion as basically irrational. The 
Aristotelian notion that emotions are natural and even desirable was very clearly 
present in the Renaissance critique of Stoicism that came from both humanist and the 
Reformation traditions, so that the defence of emotion was evident in the writings of 
Erasmus, Luther and Calvin (Strier, 2004). The view of emotions as useful and natural 
can also be found in the theory of Darwin (1999) and is widespread among 
contemporary emotion theorists such as Damasio and De Sousa (Tappolet, 2010).
71
Stoicism
The Stoic theory of emotion presents a particular dilemma since it is not the theory of 
one philosopher but rather belongs to a tradition of thought. However, while it is 
certain that there were variations within Stoicism (Edelstein, 1966), there can still be 
said to have existed a strand of thought that was the standard Stoic theory (Sorabji, 
2000) even if slightly different interpretations are possible. According to Sorabji 
(2000), the standard Stoic account of the nature of emotion was developed by 
Chrysippus. According to this theory any emotion consists of two separate 
judgements. For an emotion to exist there must first be a judgement about the situation 
as good or bad, and then a judgement that it is appropriate to react to this perceived 
state. However, whereas Aristotle holds that the evaluation of a situation causes the 
emotion, according to Chrysippus the judgements in themselves constitute the 
emotion. In this description of emotion physiological changes are not included as part 
of the emotional response. Bodily reactions are regarded as separate from the actual 
emotion so that the emotion itself is entirely rational and non-physical (Sorabji, 2000). 
However, before this view of emotion became widespread, another Stoic thinker, 
Zeno, held a different view of emotion, in which emotions were caused by judgements 
and the emotions themselves consisted of internal contractions or expansions that 
were felt in the body. Sorabji argues that Chrysippus rejected Zeno’s view in which 
the physiological changes were part of the emotion, and turned the judgement that 
Zeno regarded as the cause of the emotion into the emotion itself, whilst still 
accepting that emotion would be accompanied by felt bodily changes. A different 
interpretation is that of Graver (2007) who argues that both Zeno and Chrysippus 
viewed emotion as consisting of judgement together with bodily feeling, and that 
Clirysippus merely emphasized the crucial importance of the judgement as 
characteristic of the emotion. Graver’s position would change the Stoic theory of 
emotion from one that views emotion as consisting solely of judgements to one that 
incorporates both judgement and bodily feeling into the definition of emotion. 
However, while there is a significant difference between these interpretations, both 
retain the main point that the Stoic tradition views emotion as consisting of and 
defined by, judgements about present or future circumstances. The Stoic theory is 
therefore a cognitive theory of emotion, which has gone further than merely regarding 
emotion as being caused by cognition, and instead equates emotion with cognition.
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Since emotion consisted of judgements, the Stoics regarded emotion as an entirely 
rational process. However, the Stoics also regarded most emotions as irrational. The 
explanation for this apparent contradiction can be found in their theory of value, 
according to which the only true value lies in attaining virtue. Value judgements about 
health or material things are mistaken since such matters are actually unimportant and 
should be regarded with indifference. Therefore, according to the Stoic theory, most 
of our everyday emotions are based on false beliefs and are, in that sense, irrational 
(Gill, 2010). This theory of value was the basis for the Stoic ideal of impassivity, the 
state in which the Stoic sage exists. The sage has eradicated all emotions that are 
based on false beliefs and only experiences those emotions that are based on true 
beliefs (Graver, 2007). These emotions, which were regarded as appropriate beliefs 
about present or future circumstances, were various forms of friendship, love and joy 
(Graver, 2007), as well as caution (Sorabji, 2000). Most of the emotions that can be 
described as more negative were thought to be based on a mistaken attitude toward 
life and hence irrational. Ordinary emotions such as fear, anger and sadness were not 
included among the emotions that were acceptable for the sage, such emotions were 
all deemed to be based on false beliefs and therefore they should be eradicated 
(Sorabji, 2000).
According to the Stoic view, people are responsible for their emotional reactions since 
emotion involves mental judgements and is therefore essentially a cognitive process. 
One can therefore choose to suspend judgement and thereby avoid emotion (Sorabji, 
2000). In order to maintain this theory the Stoics held that infants and animals did not 
experience real emotions since they did not possess the language necessary for making 
evaluations (Deigh, 2010). In addition, immediate physiological responses such as 
shuddering were regarded as separate from the actual emotion. Such reactions were 
described as occurring before the emotion as a physical response to shock. By 
maintaining that these physiological responses were not part of the emotion itself, it 
was possible to argue that emotions are rational processes that can be controlled and 
avoided (Sorabji, 2000). Although the emphasis on the rationality of the emotions was 
criticized from within the Stoic school as ignoring the irrational forces in humans, the 
general theory of the Stoics viewed emotion as mental judgements and hence as a
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form of cognition (Sorabji. 2000). The list of emotions which were considered to be 
appropriate and good is very short and most of the emotions fall into the undesirable 
category. This is therefore a theory that advocates the eradication of most forms of 
emotion by adopting a different view of the world, one that regards virtue as the only 
matter of importance. The Stoic theory contrasts markedly with the Aristotelian view 
of emotion as a natural aspect of life that should be moderated but still preserved.
The standard theory of emotion held by the Stoics has survived until the present day in 
various forms. The extreme position of equating emotion with evaluative judgement is 
still held today, notably by Solomon (1976). Nussbaum (2001) also views emotions as 
being essentially judgements, and she explicitly acknowledges the similarities 
between her theory and that of the Stoics. The Stoic attitude toward emotion as 
generally inappropriate and in need of control has successors in behaviourism. Kantor 
(1921) provides an example of this view in that he believed emotion to cause chaos 
and disrupt normal behaviour. The idea of training people to control their emotional 
reactions is currently widespread in the form of cognitive behaviour therapy, which in 
many ways is very similar to the training of the Stoics (Sorabji, 2000). Beck (1976) 
specifically refers to the Stoic tradition as a forerunner of cognitive therapy in that the 
Stoics saw misconceptions of events as the basis of faulty emotional reactions.
Descartes
Descartes presented a very ambitious theory of emotion, the main body of which is to 
be found in his work Passions o f the Soul. The body is distinctly separate from the 
soul in this theory, as the soul is spiritual and the body is material, and the conception 
of the body is very mechanical so that the body is likened to a “machine that moves of 
itself’ (Descartes, 191 la, p. 333). According to this theory, the only function that the 
soul performs is that of thinking (Descartes, 1911a). Descartes divided the different 
types of thinking into two categories, the actions and the passions (Descartes, 1911a). 
The actions are those activities that originate in the soul and do not depend on any 
other source; these are mainly willing and abstract thinking, the more intellectual of 
the activities. The passions are those thoughts that originate in other sources and are 
received by the soul; these include perceptions, sensations, experiences of passions
74
and some imaginings. Among the passions are the ‘passions of the soul’, which 
correspond to the modem term emotions (Descartes, 1911a).
The passions of the soul are felt as if they are in the soul itself (Descartes, 1911a) and 
are defined as “The perceptions, feelings or emotions of the soul which we relate 
specifically to it, and which are caused, maintained, and fortified by some movement 
of the spirits” (Descartes, 191 la, p. 344). The spirits referred to are the animal spirits 
which are “the most animated and subtle portions of the blood which the heat has 
rarified in the heart” (Descartes, 1911a, p. 335). These spirits flow along the same 
passages as the blood but are finer and can therefore enter the most narrow passages in 
the brain which the rest of the blood cannot enter (Descartes, 191 la). The animal 
spirits are vital to Descartes’ theory, since they allow him to explain the 
communication between the body and the soul which is involved in the experience of 
the passions of the soul; the emotions. Descartes states that the communication 
between the body and the soul occurs through a gland in the brain, since this is the 
place in the body where the soul “exercises its functions immediately” (Descartes, 
1911a, p. 345). The passions are felt in the soul due to the movement of the gland by 
the animal spirits when they msh to the brain (Descartes, 1911a). The emotions are 
therefore experienced due to the effects of the body on the soul. The most typical 
cause of the passions of the soul is an external object that we perceive with our senses 
and that is harmM or beneficial to us (Descartes, 1911a). The perception of the object 
will cause the animal spirits to excite the gland in the brain and thus cause the soul to 
experience the passion (Descartes, 1911a). However, emotions or passions can also be 
experienced in the soul without there being a clear object that causes them, due to 
“impressions which are fortuitously met with in the brain” (Descartes, 1911a, p. 357) 
or due to the temperament of the body. Despite the variation in the origin of the 
emotions, with these other causes the pattern of communication is still the same in that 
the body causes the soul to experience the passions. The body is also responsible for 
individual differences so that variations in the experience of emotion depend on the 
shape of the brain and the constitution of the body (Descartes, 1911a). The theory 
generally gives the body a prominent role in the creation of emotion, contrasting 
sharply with cognitive theories such as that of the Stoics.
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There is an exception to the general rule that the creation of emotion is dependent on 
the body. According to the theory, there are some emotions that are caused by 
thoughts that originate in the soul (Descartes, 1911a). These passions are still 
dependent on the body as the intermediary for them to be felt by the soul, but they are 
caused by thoughts, not by bodily sensations or perceptions of external objects. 
Descartes gives the example of a situation where news is received and judged to be 
good, and this in turn causes the process to start which leads to an experience of 
passion (Descartes, 1911b). In this example there is an evaluation that precedes and 
directly causes the bodily process that then eventually causes the emotion to be 
experienced in the soul. This example seems to fit the criteria for a cognitive theory of 
emotion. It appears that while Descartes explains the majority of the passions of the 
soul as being physical in origin, there are some cases where he would assume, in 
Aristotelian fashion, that an evaluation of an external event could give rise to an 
emotion.
There is still another category of emotion in Descartes’ theory. The “interior 
emotions” of the soul are those which are always caused by the soul and experienced 
in the soul itself, without the body and its animal spirits playing any part in the 
process (Descartes, 191 la, p. 398). The interior emotion is described as separate from 
the other passions of the soul which are dependent on the body, and seems to be a 
form of intellectual and spiritual emotion. In the previously mentioned example of 
receiving good news, the mind’s first judgement of the news as good is described as 
causing “intellectual joy which is independent of any emotion of the body”
(Descartes, 191 lb, p. 290) before this joy moves on to become an imagination and 
thereby cause the form of emotion that involves the body as well. This special 
category of emotion could be said to be entirely cognitive in that it does not have any 
connection to the physical. It can therefore seem that Descartes manages to entertain 
both the possibility of emotions that are entirely cognitive in nature and that of 
emotions that are caused by the body, within his one theory of emotion.
Descartes describes the function of the passions of the soul as to “dispose the soul to 
desire the things which nature tells us are of use” (Descartes, 191 la, p. 358). With this 
definition Descartes describes the passions as helpful guides that are naturally
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adjusted to desire the right things. However, Descartes also seems to have a more 
negative view of the passions as disturbing to the tranquillity of the soul (Descartes, 
1911a) and as potentially damaging in that they may strengthen and help to preserve 
thoughts that should not be dwelled upon (Descartes, 1911a). Different emotions are 
described as more or less acceptable and some are totally condemned; in his 
discussion of fear Descartes is unable to think of any way in which that particular 
emotion can be useful at all (Descartes, 1911a). These aspects of Descartes’ view are 
reminiscent of the Stoic theory, although the Stoic criticism is stronger and applies to 
a greater number of emotions. However, Descartes’ general attitude toward the 
emotions seems to be that they are natural and potentially beneficial but that they need 
to be controlled (Blom, 1978). Therefore, like Aristotle, Descartes has a much greater 
acceptance of emotion than the Stoics.
Descartes writes at length about controlling the passions. According to his theory, 
emotional control is not a simple matter since the passions that depend on the body are 
not directly under the control of the soul (Descartes, 1911a). The passions are 
generally accompanied by some physiological changes, and as long as the disturbance 
in the body is still present the passion is also present in the soul (Descartes, 1911a). 
Descartes states that those who do not use their will to fight their passions are those 
with feeble souls who will only combat one emotion with another, contrary emotion, a 
method that only serves to enslave the soul and render it unhappy (Descartes, 1911a). 
hi his view then, if the passions are followed without resistance, the result is slavery 
under passion’s rule. The control of the passions therefore becomes very important, 
and Descartes states that everyone is capable of controlling their emotions so that they 
can have “a very absolute dominion over all their passions” (Descartes, 1911a, p.
356). The mastery of passion is connected to virtue, in that the pursuit of virtue, 
defined as always doing what one judges to be the best, gives the soul a satisfaction 
that originates in itself and will immunize it against any disturbances of the passions 
that arise from the soul-body union (Descartes, 1911a). This emphasis on virtue is 
similar to the Stoic view of virtue as the only true value in life.
Descartes’ strong emphasis on the need for control of the passions appears to 
contradict his idea of the function of the passions; that the passions help to guide the
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soul to the things that are useful. Suddenly the passions are not helpers but powers that 
need to be controlled or they will enslave their host. Descartes does not address this 
contradiction directly, and his final words in the Passions o f the Soul maintain that the 
passions both are responsible for the greatest enjoyment but also potentially for 
bitterness and evils (Descartes, 191 la). It seems that except for in the case of fear, 
Descartes does not advocate the eradication of emotion; on the contrary, he 
acknowledges the power of the emotions to make life enjoyable. However, he does 
emphasize the importance of mastery of the emotions as the key to a good life. This 
makes it difficult to determine whether Descartes has created a theory that depicts 
emotions as beneficial or harmful, because it appears to portray them as both.
Descartes seems to waver between the Aristotelian view of emotion as natural and the 
Stoic view of emotion as harmful. However, his emphasis on the need for control is 
more in line with the Stoic theory, although he does not advocate eradication of 
emotion.
The focus on physiological processes in the creation of emotion can be found in a 
slightly different form in the theory of William James (1983). This type of theory also 
exists in modem versions such as that of Zajonc (1984) in which emotion is regarded 
as arising from fast automatic processing independently of cognitive evaluation. 
Descartes’ explanation of emotion as arising directly from the perception of an 
external object, without the intervention of thought, is also present in modem 
neurological theories of emotion such as that of Le Doux (1998). Aspects of 
Descartes’ theory where cognition is given a more prominent role resemble Aristotle’s 
theory and would therefore also have similarities with theories such as those of Amold 
and Lazams. The notion that emotion is valuable has been held by numerous other 
thinkers, a contemporary example would be Solomon (1976) who describes emotion 
as the meaning of life. The contrary position, that emotion needs to be controlled by 
reason, is evident in both cognitive and psychodynamic theory. The strong emphasis 
on control of emotion has a flavour of the Stoic perspective and can similarly be found 
in later behaviourist perspectives on emotion (Kantor, 1921).
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Spinoza
Spinoza’s theory of emotion is intimately connected with his philosophy in general. 
Fundamental to Spinoza’s conception of man is his theory of the relationship between 
the mind and the body, those two entities that Descartes so emphatically distinguished 
as separate from each other. According to Spinoza, mind and body are not separate 
substances in the way that Descartes envisioned; rather they are one and the same.
This position is expressed very clearly in the third part of the Ethics: “mind and body 
are one and the same thing, conceived first under the attribute of thought, secondly 
under the attribute of extension” (Spinoza, 1909, p. 131). From this equating of mind 
with body and vice versa, Spinoza continues to draw the necessary conclusion that all 
states of the mind and the body have a counterpart in the other. He states that “a 
mental decision and a bodily appetite, or determined state, are simultaneous, or rather 
are one and the same thing” (Spinoza, 1909, p. 134). On this basis Spinoza asserts that 
the mind and the body cannot act on each other; “Body cannot determine mind to 
think, neither can mind determine body to motion or rest or any state different from 
these” (Spinoza, 1909, p. 131). This follows by necessity since he has stated that 
mind and body are the same substance and the same thing. In such a scenario it 
becomes impossible to envision any form of causal relationship between body and 
mind.
Spinoza defines an emotion as “the modifications of the body, whereby the active 
power of the said body is increased or diminished, aided or constrained, and also the 
ideas of such modifications” (Spinoza, 1909, p. 130). In this definition Spinoza 
contains both the change of the body to a greater or lesser power of activity, and the 
idea of this change, which is the mind’s idea of the body. Spinoza recognises three 
primary emotions, desire, pleasure, and pain, from which all other emotions arise 
(Spinoza, 1909). The emotions of love and hate are defined as respectively pleasure 
and pain, “accompanied by the idea of an external cause” (Spinoza, 1909, p. 140). As 
with the general definition of emotion, these definitions include a felt sensation as 
well as a thought. Cognition is part of the emotion as an accompaniment of feeling; 
the cognitive element does not cause emotion as it does in Aristotelian theory and it is 
not the only ingredient as in Stoic theory. However, according to Bennett (1984) 
Spinoza actually leans toward the Aristotelian view of cognition as causal in emotion
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but does not fully express it. This interpretation does not seem to fit with the Spinozist 
conception of mind and body as one. If mind and body cannot act on each other, and 
emotion is defined as a bodily change, then cognition cannot cause emotion. That 
being said, Spinoza does define other emotions in terms that suggest a more causal 
relationship. Hope, fear, confidence and despair, are some of the emotions that 
Spinoza defines as pleasure or pain “arising from the idea of something past or future” 
(Spinoza, 1909, pp. 176-77). These definitions support Bennett’s interpretation since 
cognition is described as causing the emotion. The causal relationship could 
potentially also be accommodated within Spinoza’s general philosophy since all 
emotions are defined as consisting of both a bodily change and an idea of some sort. 
The mind could then cause an emotion since the emotion is in part a thought. While 
different interpretations are possible, cognition is involved in emotion even if it is not 
always described as the cause.
The purpose of Spinoza’s exploration of the emotions is to enable their control 
(Spinoza, 1909). Spinoza’s general attitude toward emotion seems to be well captured 
in the introduction to part IV of the Ethics, where he describes a lack of control of 
emotion as “bondage” and states that “when a man is a prey to his emotions, he is not 
his own master, but lies at the mercy of fortune” (Spinoza, 1909, p. 187). This is 
certainly not a celebration of the emotional life; rather it portrays emotion as that 
which preys on men and as something that needs to be mastered. Spinoza continues by 
stating that the man who is ruled by his emotions will often choose the wrong path and 
do things that are harmful for himself: “he is often compelled, while seeing that which 
is better for him, to follow that which is worse” (Spinoza, 1909, p. 187). So Spinoza 
holds that the effects of emotion can be negative for the individual. Being ruled by 
emotion also leads to social discord: “In so far as men are a prey to passion, they 
camiot, in that respect, be said to be naturally in harmony” (Spinoza, 1909, p. 207). 
Spinoza then contrasts the discord that is the effect of men being controlled by 
emotion, with the effect that reason has on them, and concludes that “men in so far as 
they live in obedience to reason, necessarily live always in harmony one with another” 
(Spinoza, 1909, p. 209). Continuing his argument in favour of the rule of reason rather 
than emotion, Spinoza asserts that we do not really need emotion as motivation for 
any of our actions, since reason would motivate us equally well (Spinoza, 1909).
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Spinoza clearly argues in favour of reason and against the rule of emotion, and he 
goes so far as to make emotion unnecessary. There is an exception to this critical 
depiction of the emotions, and that is the type of emotion that Spinoza describes as 
active, which can only be pleasurable (Spinoza, 1909). Apart from this special case 
Spinoza follows the Stoic example of vilifying emotion.
Spinoza advocates following reason rather than emotion, but he considers this to be a 
difficult task to accomplish. He views emotion as an inevitable aspect of human life 
and states that “man is necessarily always a prey to his passions” (Spinoza, 1909, p. 
194). While this statement appears to indicate that Spinoza thinks it is impossible to 
control and conquer the emotions, other passages in the Ethics reveal a different 
perspective, wherein the control of emotion is seen as possible but difficult. Spinoza 
criticizes the Stoic view that emotion could be completely controlled by the will and 
states that the Stoics were forced to admit regarding the emotions “that no slight 
practice and zeal is needed to control and moderate them” (Spinoza, 1909, p. 244), 
and he also criticizes Descartes for his description of how the emotions could be 
controlled by the soul (Spinoza, 1909). The Ethics contains both these perspectives of 
emotional control which seem to be irreconcilable; on the one hand emotion is seen as 
inevitable and on the other hand control is presented as an option albeit a difficult one. 
The former view is illustrated further by Spinoza’s assertion that emotions can only be 
controlled or eradicated by other emotions that are contrary to and stronger than them 
(Spinoza, 1909). He thereby presents as the only way to combat emotions, the very 
method that Descartes described as a useless method that would enslave the soul 
(Descartes, 1911a). This statement by Spinoza contrasts profoundly with his examples 
in the fifth part of the Ethics, where he presents five methods for controlling the 
emotions with the help of the mind (Spinoza, 1909). Among these is the remedy of 
gaining a clear understanding of one’s emotions (Spinoza, 1909) and that of removing 
the thought of an external cause, which is by definition a part of the emotion, so that 
the emotion will cease (Spinoza, 1909). While it is difficult to comprehend exactly 
how the second of these remedies is supposed to be administered, it is evident that 
Spinoza is presenting cognitive methods for controlling emotion. However, the 
ultimate method for controlling emotion is the form of intuition that is more elevated 
than reason, the intellectual love of God (Spinoza, 1909). The more the mind indulges
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in this intellectual love, the more it understands and therefore the more it can control 
emotion (Spinoza, 1909). The importance of understanding the emotions is thereby 
emphasized as the method to gain control of them. Spinoza thus concludes the Ethics 
with a celebration of the mind and its eternal love of God. His opinion of reason and 
emotion is captured well in one of the final passages: “how potent is the wise man, 
and how much he surpasses the ignorant man, who is only driven by his lusts” 
(Spinoza, 1909, p. 270).
Spinoza’s theory of cognition as an accompaniment of emotion exist in various forms 
of contemporary emotion theory, notably Greenspan (1988) regards emotion as the 
combination of an evaluative judgement and an affective state. The theory of 
Schachter and Singer (1962) could also be understood as a similar theory since it 
includes both physiological arousal and cognition as part of the emotional reaction. 
The forms of therapy that Spinoza advocated are similar to some forms of cognitive 
therapy, but his general emphasis on gaining an understanding of emotion is central to 
other forms of therapy as well, for instance the psychoanalytic approach (Neu, 1977).
Hume
Hume presents his theory of emotion in his Treatise o f human Ttature. Hume divides 
all the perceptions of the mind into impressions and ideas, a division that roughly 
corresponds to a distinction between feeling and thinking (Hume, 1978). Hume then 
imposes a further division of impressions into impressions of sensation and of 
reflection. The former seemingly correspond to any sensory perceptions or sensations: 
“all the impressions of the senses, and all bodily pains and pleasures” (Hume, 1978, p. 
275), and the latter are the sentiments and passions. The impressions of sensation are 
considered to be original in that they arise in the soul “from the constitution of the 
body, from the animal spirits, or from the application of objects to the external 
organs” (Hume, 1978, p. 275). In contrast the impressions of reflection are regarded as 
secondary since they arise from the impressions of sensation either directly or via 
some form of idea. In a manner similar to Descartes, Hume therefore views emotions 
as arising from our sensations or perceptions, and sometimes also from thoughts 
related to these sensations.
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Hume begins his analysis of specific emotions with pride and humility (Hume, 1978), 
and his treatment of them is illuminating in that it reveals his focus on the felt quality 
of emotions. Hume states that essentially pride and humility constitute a pleasant and 
a painful sensation respectively. He remarks that an original quality of the emotions is 
“their sensations, or the peculiar emotions they excite in the soul, and which constitute 
their very being and essence” (Hume, 1978, p. 286). Hume continues by removing any 
doubt that there should be any other quality that pertains to emotions than their 
sensation: “upon the removal of the pleasure and pain, there is in reality no pride nor 
humility” (Hume, 1978, p. 286). In this description Hume very clearly emphasizes the 
felt quality of the emotion as its essence, since any removal of the sensation would 
extinguish the emotion altogether. Hume further establishes his focus in the following 
sentence regarding the disappearance of an emotion when its sensation is gone: “Of 
this our very feeling convinces us; and beyond our feeling, ‘tis here in vain to reason 
or dispute” (Hume, 1978, p. 286). The inner feeling of an emotion is therefore the 
main aspect for Hume, and he thereby presents a theory of emotion that is less 
concerned with the role of cognition in emotion. His theory thereby contrasts with the 
cognitive focus of the theories of Aristotle, Spinoza and the Stoics.
While Hume focuses more on sensation than cognition in his description of emotion, 
he similarly highlights the role of emotion vis-à-vis reason in the motivation of action. 
Hume describes the typical view of Western philosophy, that reason and passion are in 
opposition and that the virtuous should allow reason to guide their actions. He then 
states that this philosophy is false and that his ambition is to prove “first, that reason 
alone can never be a motive to any action of the will; and secondly, that it can never 
oppose passion in the direction of the will” (Hume, 1978, p. 413). According to Hume 
all actions are motivated by emotion, because if we are indifferent to the effects of our 
actions we will not be moved to act (Hume, 1978). Since emotion is the motivating 
force of action, Hume states that “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the 
passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them” 
(Hume, 1978, p. 415). This view of the relationship seems to contradict the opinions 
of all the philosophers previously discussed, since Hume not only contends that reason 
is the slave of passion but also that this should be the case. With this statement Hume
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has dethroned reason from its usual position as the epitome of human ability and hope 
of salvation for mankind.
Hume’s theory of emotion includes a considerable theory of morality since that is his 
main subject of interest (Hume, 1978). Hume criticises the view that morality and 
virtue should be based on reason and rationality (Hume, 1978). He argues that virtue 
and morals could never be the product of reason since morality has the power to affect 
action and emotion, and reason has already been found to be incapable of that kind of 
influence: “Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is 
utterly impotent in this particular” (Hume, 1978, p. 457). Hume concludes that if 
morality cannot be based on reason it must be based on emotion instead and states: 
“Morality therefore, is more properly felt than judged o f’ (Hume, 1978, p. 470).
Hume takes the position that morality consists of feeling, and specifies it further so 
that humans distinguish virtue and vice by the pleasurable or uneasy feeling that they 
give rise to (Hume, 1978). Thus Hume has removed reason as the motivating force of 
both action and morality and in both cases replaced reason with emotion.
It would seem that Hume regards emotion as absolutely vital to human life since his 
theory places emotion as the driving force behind all action and as the basis of 
morality. Hume regards reason as impotent compared to emotion, an argument that is 
illustrated by his statement that reason cannot control or alter emotion; an emotion can 
only be changed by an opposing emotion (Hume, 1978). Hume’s opinion is therefore 
that emotion is the more powerful and vital force, and also that emotion can provide 
the basis for virtue because of its role in morality. While there are exceptions to this 
rosy picture of emotion in Hume’s theory, this is his general view. This is radically 
different from all the theories previously discussed, since none of the other theories 
have such a strong emphasis on the usefulness of emotion. The assertion that emotion 
should rule over reason is particularly significant since the value of intellect and 
rationality is emphasized in all the other theories.
While Hume does state that cognition will sometimes be involved in emotion, he 
emphasizes the dominance of emotion over reason. His argument that we are 
motivated by emotion and not reason in regards to action and morality indicates the
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relative power of emotion over reason in his theory. The contemporary equivalent of 
this would be the theory of Zajonc (1980), who holds that feeling can precede 
thinking. Hume’s theory that emotion is the basis of morality is found in various 
forais in the writings of Adam Smith and Darwin (Greenspan, 2010). hi contemporary 
theory, there are conceptions of innate moral instincts (Hauser, 2006), or of a general 
moral sense (Wilson, 1993), or of morality being based on emotion (Nichols 2008), 
that have a flavour of Hume’s sentimentalism.
Conclusion
As this review illustrates, theories of emotion are continually recycled and emerge 
again in slightly altered form. Thus the three versions of cognitive theory of Aristotle, 
the Stoics and Spinoza, can be found in similar versions in contemporary emotion 
theory. The emphasis on physiology and feeling in emotion has been less prominent 
throughout Western history. However, while no previous theory seems to hold the 
radical position of the James/Lange theory (Deigh, 2010), the theories of Descartes 
and Hume give cognition a diminished role in emotion and have a greater focus on 
physiology and the sensation of emotion. It seems that although different philosophers 
present different versions of emotion theory, in Western philosophy emotion has 
continually been conceptualised in terms of the cognitive or the somatic. The analysis 
shows that these dimensions are very relevant to emotion theory in that they explain a 
lot of the variation between theories.
The question of the role of cognition in emotion has still not been resolved in 
contemporary theoretical debates. Although neurological evidence has shown that 
emotional processes can occur prior to any cognitive evaluations (Prinz, 2004), the 
role of cognition in emotion is still debated. This review shows that cognition has 
been associated with emotion in philosophical theories throughout Western history. It 
therefore appears that there may be a motivation for the inclusion of cognition in 
emotional theory that could explain why the recent neurological evidence has not put 
an end to the debate about cognition in emotion. This motivation could be the desire to 
give some rationality to emotions in order to minimise their power to overwhelm. Of 
the reviewed theories the Stoic theory gives cognition the strongest role in emotion, 
and is also the theory that most clearly condemns the majority of emotions and
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advocates their eradication. Spinoza’s theory resembles the Stoic theory in that 
cognition is regarded as part of the emotion itself, and this theory also presents a 
strong argument against emotion and for intellect. In contrast the theory of Hume, 
which focuses on the sensational qualities of emotion, presents emotion as the basis of 
ethical behaviour and rejects the control of emotion by reason. The theories of 
Aristotle and Descartes give cognition a role in emotion to a varying degree, but they 
also emphasize the role of the body. The emphasis on cognition that accompanies 
those theories that vilify emotion may reflect a fear of uncontrollable passion. With 
the exception of Hume’s theory, all the reviewed theories advocate the control of 
emotion, even though the degree of control varies from Aristotle’s permissive position 
of moderation to the extreme control of the Stoics. This indicates that the issue of 
control is intimately linked with emotion in Western thought. The importance of 
control regarding emotion can therefore be part of the reason for including cognition 
in the emotional process. If emotion is rational it can be controlled and managed. This 
desire for control could possibly explain the continued powerful presence of cognition 
in contemporary emotion theory.
Wliile the exultation of reason over passion is strongest in the theories of the Stoics 
and Spinoza that to varying degrees equate emotion with cognition, there is a 
judgement about the value of emotion in each of the theories reviewed. The inherent 
moral positions become especially visible in the criticisms of emotion and in the 
condemnation of some emotions and the acceptance of others. Typically the ‘positive’ 
emotions are more acceptable than their ‘negative’ counterparts of anger, fear and 
sadness. Judgements about the desirability and acceptability of emotions can be found 
in all these theories, indicating that while theories with a more cognitive emphasis 
may be especially focused on the vilification and control of emotion, the phenomenon 
is not tied to a specific theoretical tradition, but rather the tendency to impose moral 
evaluations exists in all camps. It could be argued that moral judgements still exist in 
contemporary theory as well; for instance the coping theory of Lazarus (1999) could 
be seen to include evaluations about good or bad coping. This type of analysis could 
also be extended to psychoanalytic theory in which various defences are portrayed as 
more or less primitive (McWilliams, 1994).
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This review has shown that the themes of modem emotion theory have existed in 
earlier philosophical theory since the ancient Greeks. The reviewed theories are 
enlightening in that they reveal that the historical context of modem emotion theory is 
characterized by moral judgement about the desirability of emotion. This seems to 
indicate that emotion is a subject that is particularly vulnerable in this respect. 
However, while different perspectives regarding the roles of cognition and physiology 
in emotion are still explicit in contemporary theories, modem theorists do not present 
their value judgements about emotions in such straightforward terms as previous 
theorists have done. Based on this review it appears that it would be desirable for 
future research to examine modem theories from a similar perspective, to ensure that 
practitioners are made aware of any value judgements that are implicit in the theories 
of emotion that they rely on to explain and understand the experiences of their clients.
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Appendix 1: Reflections on the use of self
My personal investment in the subject of this review stems from a combined interest 
in theories of emotion and in history. Emotional reactions are a central aspect of 
human existence that affect our lives from the cradle to the grave. In my opinion the 
metaphors of emotion as the colour of life, or that which lends spice to an otherwise 
dull existence, are entirely appropriate. In some ways my interest in emotion is the 
connection between my other interests in psychology as well. I have long had an 
interest in early development and even in this area it is the emotional development of 
the child that I am most interested in. I am also interested in the psychology of close 
relationships and the communication between partners. Emotion is an important factor 
in all close relationships and significantly affects issues of communication and 
behaviour in general. My interest in attachment theory derives from its connection 
with both development and relationship and specifically the emotions that are 
involved in both processes.
Related to my fascination with the study of emotion is my interest in the history of 
psychology. The historical context of modem psychological theory is of profound 
importance since it is impossible to separate any contemporary theory from the 
centuries of related thought that precedes it. I find it fascinating to learn about the 
emergence of the science of psychology and the early attempts to free psychology 
from the philosophy that it sprang from. For me it is important to acknowledge these 
philosophical roots and be aware of the relationship that psychology has with this 
sister discipline. While it can be tempting to make psychology a very scientific and 
objective science, it is also important to remember that no research is ever entirely 
devoid of the influence of the person who conducts the research. History is full of 
examples of people who have researched areas that they were interested in for 
distinctly personal reasons. Wlien motivation is personal then it is likely that 
interpretations and choices made along the way are also influenced by personal values 
and opinions. The entirely objective research within social science has been shown to 
be an illusion. With this acknowledgement it becomes relevant to examine the 
historical context of modem psychological theory as well. The discourse of earlier 
theory will inevitably have an influence on modem theory even if that influence is 
seldom linear and straightforward. For me it is fascinating to examine the theories of
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emotion of influential philosophers and recognise how aspects of their thought 
continue to exist in contemporary theory.
The most interesting aspect of conducting this review has probably been the process 
of becoming familiar with the writings of influential philosophers such as Spinoza and 
Descartes. Philosophers of this calibre are often mentioned in historical literature and 
in the past I have often read about their work but I have never read any of their 
original writing. I have found it fascinating to read the original works and to find their 
exact formulations of thoughts that otherwise I have only read about in the words of 
other writers. Getting to know the theories of these great philosophers first-hand has 
been very interesting. At the same time it was also a considerable struggle to become 
acquainted with some of these works because they are quite unwelcoming in their 
style. Especially Spinoza proved to be a considerable challenge, but he is also famous 
for his being difficult to understand. Despite spending an inordinate amount of time 
trying to follow his ‘logical’ arguments through the various propositions of the Ethics 
I am still not sure whether I have actually fully understood his theory of emotion. Still, 
as with Descartes and Hume, it was a fascinating challenge to face, and when I 
thought that I had grasped some central idea it was very rewarding. I found that 
reading the original works made it possible for me to contrast my own interpretation 
with that of others and this would often present interesting puzzles when there were 
any significant differences. From exploring these philosophical theories and finding 
their similarities with contemporary versions it has become evident that ideas are 
continually recycled and emerge in slightly different forms much later. While some 
aspects of theory, such as animal spirits flowing in the blood, clearly belong to a 
specific point in history; other aspects, as the value of moderation in emotional 
expression or the role of cognition in emotional processes, are more timeless and will 
reappear in later theories. I find that this emphasizes the importance of being aware of 
the historical context that theory exists in and not assuming that theory can be 
objective and free of influence.
My own review of these theories is naturally influenced by my personal opinions 
about theories of emotion and the values placed on different emotions or on emotional 
expression. My investment in the importance of being aware of value judgements in
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theory stems from my own reactions to theories where certain forms of emotional 
behaviour appear to be valued more highly than other forms. I also recognise that 
although I can understand the longing for an existence free from difficult emotions, I 
am still very critical of the Stoic ideal of the impassive sage and the associated 
condemnation of emotions that I would regard as natural. Emotions are personal and 
therefore the topic invites personal opinions that are affected by history, culture and 
life experience; I am no exception to this rule and neither are researchers within 
psychology.
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Appendix 2: Specific references for the sections on Descartes and Spinoza
There are several different editions of the writings of Spinoza and Descartes. Due to 
variations in font and page size the same passage will be found on different pages in 
different versions of the works. In order to give the reader a clear reference that does 
not change depending on the edition, this appendix gives the various references in 
terms of the specific sections of the works instead of in terms of page numbers. Due to 
the requirements of the APA referencing style these specific references could not be 
included in the text. The references below are presented in the order that they appear 
in this review.
References to The Passions o f the Soul and The Principles o f Philosophy by Rene 
Descartes:
Page Number in 
Review
Reference in Text Specific Reference to Work
7 (Descartes, 1911ap.333) Article 6
(Descartes, 1911a) Article 17
(Descartes, 1911a) Article 17
8 (Descartes, 1911a) Article 17-25
(Descartes, 1911a) Article 25
(Descartes, 1911ap.344) Article 27
(Descartes, 191 la p.335) Article 10
(Descartes, 1911a) Article 10
(Descartes, 1911ap.345) Article 31
(Descartes, 1911a) Article 36-38
(Descartes, 1911a) Article 51
(Descartes, 1911a) Article, 36
(Descartes, 1911ap.357) Article 51
(Descartes, 1911a) Article 39
(Descartes, 1911a) Article 51
9 (Descartes, 1911b) Part IV principle 190
(Descartes, 1911ap.398) Article 147
(Descartes, 1911b p.290) Part IV principle 190
(Descartes, 1911ap.358) Article 52
(Descartes, 1911a) Article 28
(Descartes, 1911a) Article 74
(Descartes, 1911a) Article 176
10 (Descartes, 1911a) Article 41
(Descartes, 1911a) Article 46
(Descartes, 1911a) Article 48
(Descartes, 1911ap.356) Article 50
(Descartes, 1911a) Article 148
(Descartes, 1911a) Article 212
94
References to The Ethics by Benedict de Spinoza:
Page Number in 
Review
Reference in Text Specific Reference to Work
11 (Spinoza, 1909p.l31) Part III, proposition 2 note
(Spinoza, 1909 p.134) Part III, proposition 2 note
(Spinoza, 1909 p.l31) Part III, proposition 2
(Spinoza, 1909 p.l30) Part III, definition 3
(Spinoza, 1909) Part III, proposition 11
(Spinoza, 1909 p. 140) Part III, proposition 13 note
12 (Spinoza, 1909 p. 176-77) Part III, definitions of the emotions 12- 
15
(Spinoza, 1909) Part HI, proposition 56 note
(Spinoza, 1909 p. 187) Part IV, preface
(Spinoza, 1909 p. 187) Part TV, preface
(Spinoza, 1909 p.207) Part IV, proposition 32
(Spinoza, 1909 p.209) Part rv, proposition 35
13 (Spinoza, 1909) Part IV, proposition 59
(Spinoza, 1909) Part III, proposition 58
(Spinoza, 1909 p. 194) Part rv, proposition 4 corollary
(Spinoza, 1909 p.244) Part V, preface
(Spinoza, 1909) Part V, preface
(Spinoza, 1909) Part IV, proposition 7
(Spinoza, 1909) Part V, proposition 20 note
(Spinoza, 1909) Part V, proposition 4 note
(Spinoza, 1909) Part V, proposition 2
(Spinoza, 1909) Part V, proposition 32 corollary
(Spinoza, 1909) Part V, proposition 42
14 (Spinoza, 1909 p.270) Part V, proposition 42 note
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Appendix 3: Notes for Contributors for the Journal Emotion Review
Extract from:
http://mc.manuscriptcentraLcom/societyimages/emotion-
review/EMR%20MS%20Submission%20Guidelines.pdf
Manuscript Submission
Emotion Review has a fully Web-based system for the submission and review of manuscripts.
All submissions should be made online at the Emotion Review S AGETRACK Web site 
http://mc.manuscripteentral.com/EMR
Note: Online submission and review of manuscripts is now mandatory for all types of papers, 
including commentaries.
New User Account
Please log on to the Web site. If  you are a new user, you must first create an account. Tliis is 
a three-step process that takes a matter of minutes to complete. When you have finished 
creating your account, your User ID and password will be sent to you immediately via e-mail.
Return to the Web site, and please edit your User ID and password to something more 
memorable by selecting ‘Edit Account’ at the top of the screen. If  you have already created an 
account but have forgotten your details, type your e-mail address in the ‘Password Help’ box 
to receive an e-mail reminder. Full instructions for uploading the manuscript are provided on 
the Web site.
New Submission
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If you would like to seek advice on the submission process please contact Beatriz Valdes, at 
the following e-mail address: emotionreview@bc.edu.
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Authors submitting revised manuscripts should follow the instructions above to submit through 
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Content
Emotion Review will focus on ideas about emotion, with emotion broadly defined. The Review 
will publish articles presenting new theories, offering conceptual analyses, reviewing the 
literature, and debating and critiquing conceptual issues. It will publish reports of empirical 
studies and method only when they make a substantial theoretical contribution.
Emotion Review invites the submission of articles irom researchers in any discipline. These 
disciplines include, but are not limited to, anthropology, biology, computer science, economics, 
history, humanities, linguistics, neuroscience, philosophy, physiology, political science, 
psychiatry, psychology, and sociology. The Review also invites the submission of 
commentaries on previously published articles. Both original articles and commentaries on 
previous articles are treated as manuscripts and submitted in the same manner. All 
submissions are reviewed with respect to their scholarly merit.
Emotion Review invites articles from the entire international community. We encourage 
authors to make their articles as accessible as possible to a wide audience of fellow emotion 
researchers from other disciplines.
Manuscript Preparation
Use a word processor to prepare your manuscript. Files in Word or rich text format are 
preferred. All components of the final version of your manuscript should be double spaced and 
should conform to the formatting and style conventions of the Publication Manual of the 
American Psychological Association (5th edition). We recommend the following Web sites for 
helpful information on APA style: 
http://apastyle.apa.org/
http://owl.english.purdue.edu/owl/resource/560/01/
http://www.wisc.edu/wTiting/Handbook/DocAPA.html
http://www.dianahacker.eom/resdoc/p04_c09_o.html.
Copyright
It is a condition of publication that authors assign copyright in their articles and abstracts to 
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are responsible for obtaining copyright permission for the reproduction of any illustrations, 
tables, figures, or lengthy quotations previously published elsewhere.
Format
Title page: On page 1, include (a) the article title no longer than 50 words, (b) the names, 
affiliations, and contact information for all authors, and (c) a running head containing no more 
than 40 characters and spaces.
Abstract: On page 2, type an abstract of no more than 120 words in length.
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Reference citations within the text: Use authors' last names, with the year of publication in 
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by the same authors), starting on a separate page, and typed double spaced. Titles of journals 
and books should be given in full. Please consult the most recent edition of the Publication 
Manual of the American Psychological Association (APA).
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Abstract
CBT is increasingly being promoted in the mental health sector as the preferred form 
of treatment for a large number of psychological problems, and CBT self-help books 
have a widespread readership. This article presents research that examines how 
emotion is constructed in contemporary CBT self-help literature. The approach to 
research is social constructionist and the method used is Foucauldian discourse 
analysis. The analysis revealed a portrayal of emotion as needing to be controlled, as 
the outcome of a cognitive process, as something that can be evaluated as good or bad, 
as more mental/psychological than physical, and as irrational. These constructions of 
emotion support the need for and possibility of, CBT. This portrayal of emotion also 
marginalises alternative descriptions of emotion.
Ke ’^words
Emotion, CBT, self-help, discourse analysis
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Introduction
Emotion is fundamental to human experience. The subjective experience of the 
individual is central to counselling psychology (Strawbridge & Woolfe, 2010), and 
therefore it is necessary to have theories of emotion to support and guide practice. In 
considering the theories of emotion that pervade contemporary practice, it is important 
to recognise that they have not emerged from a vacuum. The study of emotion in 
psychology was originally inherited from the field of philosophy, so that earlier 
influences on contemporary theories of emotion can be found in the history of 
philosophy (Lyons 1980). Some of the major contributions to emotion theory in 
Western history stem from philosophical works, and reviewing these theories of 
emotion reveals that each theory contains judgements about the value of emotion 
(Johansson & Draghi-Lorenz, 2011).
The Aristotelian theory of emotion is notable for advocating moderation in regard to 
emotion, so that one is neither devoid of appropriate emotional responses nor 
overcome by excessive emotion (Sorabji, 2000). The Stoic theory of emotion is 
radically different since it regards emotion as generally inappropriate and in need of 
control. The Stoics advocate the eradication of almost all forms of emotion except for 
various fornis of friendship, love and joy (Graver, 2007). Descartes (1911) presents a 
theory of emotion that appears to waver between the Aristotelian and Stoic views. The 
function of the emotions is described as helping to guide the soul toward the things 
that are useful for it. However, Descartes also believes that the emotions need to be 
controlled or they will enslave their host. This latter part is in accordance with the 
general view of Spinoza (1909), who regards emotions as entirely destructive and 
emphasizes the importance of mastery over emotion. In contrast to this, Hume (1978) 
paints a very rosy picture of emotion. According to his sentimentalist theory, emotion 
can provide a basis for morality and should rule over reason.
The reviewed theories are enlightening in that they reveal that the historical context of 
modem emotion theory is characterized by moral judgement about the desirability of 
emotion (Johansson & Draghi-Lorenz). According to a social constmctionist 
perspective, the way that emotion is written about in texts is indicative of how 
emotion is understood as well as how it is dealt with in society (Willig, 2008). It
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would thus be desirable to examine contemporary texts on emotion within the field of 
psychology and psychotherapy, in order to gain insight into how emotion is currently 
being portrayed and how this may contribute to clinical and social practices and ways 
of dealing with emotion.
In current practice in the UK, the psychotherapeutic tradition of cognitive behavioural 
therapy (CBT) is being promoted as the preferred form of treatment for a large 
number of psychological problems. CBT is the form of therapy that is most often 
recommended for mental health problems by the National Institute for Health and 
Clinical Excellence (NICE) (Sanders, 2010). Notably such common psychological 
problems as anxiety and depression are recommended to be treated using CBT (NICE, 
2009; NICE, 2011). Due to the government’s economic interest in addressing mental 
health problems on a large scale, the Improving Access to Psychological Therapies 
(lAPT) programme has been heavily funded and is currently delivering CBT to the 
masses (Sanders, 2010). Due to the powerful position that this gives CBT in 
contemporary mental health in the UK, and the widespread use of CBT that this 
results in, it seems that CBT literature is an appropriate choice for an exploration of 
the way that emotion is constructed in psychotherapy today.
Self-help books are an important channel through which the general public gain access 
to psychological therapies (Bergsma, 2008); their widespread use being due to their 
low cost, accessibility, and the privacy that they allow (Starker, 1989). Aside from the 
general popularity of self-help books, the use of these resources is also increasingly 
being supported by the mental health sector (Starker, 1988). Due to the excessive 
demands placed on primary care in the UK, self-help books are increasingly being 
recommended to people with mental health problems as an alternative or a supplement 
to therapy (Farrand, 2005; Pardeck, 1991). The publication of NICE guidelines that 
recommend guided self-help based on CBT for mild to moderate anxiety and 
depression (NICE, 2009; NICE, 2011), also serves to support the trend toward self- 
help and in particular self-help based on CBT. In recent years an increasing number of 
self-help books have adopted a cognitive-behavioural approach (Farrand, 2005), 
which leads to CBT being spread to a wider audience in the form of self-help 
literature. The effect is that the portrayal of emotion that is being presented in CBT
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self-help books is being consumed by a large number of readers. This widespread 
readership, that is being supported by the mental health sector, is what makes CBT 
self-help books interesting to examine. Therefore, the present research aims to 
examine how emotion is constructed in contemporary CBT self-help literature. To this 
end the research adopts a discourse analytic method, since this allows for the 
exploration of how different ways of portraying the world through language make 
available different ways of perceiving the world and existing in the world, as well as 
how they legitimate various social practices (Coyle, 2007; Willig, 2008).
Discourse analysis is based on the epistemological position of social constructionism 
(Coyle, 2007), according to which it is impossible to gain objective knowledge of 
reality through observation and research (Burr, 2003). Discourse analysis is also based 
on the ontological position that there is no one single reality that is available to be 
discovered (Taylor, 2001). Discourse analytic research therefore involves the view 
that there are multiple realities and any account of them is inevitably only the 
interpretation of the researcher. Therefore the researcher does not aspire to 
discovering the one ‘truth’ but to producing knowledge that is by necessity partial, 
relative and situated (Taylor, 2001). According to social constructionism reality is 
constructed through social interactions between people. Discourse analysis focuses 
primarily on the function of language and communication in this process of 
construction (Burr, 2003). Discourses manifest themselves in texts and language 
(Burr, 2003) and construct the objects and concepts of the world by giving them 
meaning. Discourses are historically located since the objects they refer to have been 
constructed at other points in time by the same discourse or by a similar discourse. 
Earlier instances of the discourse are relevant to the current discourse, since the 
current discourse always refers to past discourses referring to the same object (Parker, 
1992).
The social construction of reality through language refers to a process whereby people 
represent their experiences to themselves and others through the concepts that are 
available to them in their language (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). For example, in 
English-speaking cultures emotional experience is constructed in terms of separate 
categories of emotions, such as anger and sadness. This means that individuals are
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pressed to understand themselves in terms of these concepts (Burr, 2003). The 
possibilities available to the individual to construct his personal and social experience 
in a given time and a given culture, are therefore limited by the discourses available 
(Edley, 2001). In this way discourses can be seen to create subject positions that are 
essentially ways of experiencing self and the world (Burr, 2003). The subject positions 
made available by discourses also involve limitations and offer possibilities in terms 
of action and speech (Parker, 1992). Discourses thereby influence not only what can 
be felt and thought but also what can be said and done.
Despite the limiting power of discourses, objects and concepts ean be constructed in a 
variety of different ways since there are numerous different discourses surrounding 
every object (Burr, 2003). Different discourses compete in the construction of any 
given object or concept, and the discourses that become dominant evolve into a form 
of common sense or generally held ‘truth’. These are the discourses that are at some 
point widely held as being ‘reality’ and that contribute to the marginalisation of other 
competing discourses (Wetherell, 2001a). An analysis of the constructions of emotion 
that can be found in contemporary CBT self-help literature would allow for the 
exploration of what type of reality is currently being created in the field of psychology 
and psychotherapy.
Method 
Data collection
The texts that were analysed are chapters from books selected from Amazon’s UK 
website (amazon.co.uk), by searching for “CBT”. The website was chosen for its 
popularity since this would indicate that books that were produced by its search 
engine would be widely read. The chapters that were analysed are the following;
“Chapter 4: Cognitive behaviour therapy theory of emotional upset” in Cognitive 
behaviour therapy: A practical guide to helping people take control. (Lam, 2008)
“Chapter 1 : Understanding CBT for goal achievement” in Cognitive behaviour 
therapy: Your route out o f perfectionism, self-sabotage and other everyday habits. 
(Joseph, 2009)
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“Chapter 1: You feel the way you think” in Cognitive behavioural therapy for  
dummies. (Branch & Willson, 2010).
The books were chosen from among the first ten books shown on the first page of 
results that was generated by the search. The selection focused on books that were 
published in the last five years so that any discourses surrounding emotion that would 
emerge from an analysis would be contemporary. The choice of the speeific chapter 
fi*om each book was based on finding chapters that specifically addressed the topic of 
emotion.
Analysis
The method used for this discourse analysis is that outlined by Willig (2008) as a form 
of Foucauldian discourse analysis (FDA). The focus in the analysis is on the 
discourses that manifest themselves in the texts and how the different constructions of 
the object that the discourses entail make available various ways of seeing the world 
and ways of being in the world (Willig, 2008). Foucault was concerned with the ways 
in which discourses limit or enable what can be said, felt, thought or done. This 
emphasis on the power of discourses to create reality is very evident in Foucauldian 
analyses (Wetherell, 2001b). Foucault’s influence in the field of discourse analysis has 
also involved a focus on how dominant discourses become so established that they 
cease to be noticed and are just accepted as being common sense or truth (Willig, 
2008).
The analysis was concerned with how the discursive object, emotion, is constructed in 
the various texts, as well as with how the discourses that are involved in this 
construction limit and facilitate possibilities for speech, thought, action and 
experience. The analysis initially involved identifying the various ways that emotion 
is constructed in the texts, noting both explicit and implicit references to emotion. The 
various constructions of emotion were then examined in order to locate them within 
wider discourses. This stage of the analysis was based on identifying differences 
between the constructions of emotion that were located in the texts. Once wider 
discourses had been identified, the analysis proceeded with an examination of what
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the various constructions of emotion achieved within the texts. This meant attempting 
to elucidate possible fiinctions of the different constructions as well as exploring the 
connections between different constructions in the text and the nature of how they 
relate to each other. Another aspect of the analysis was the examination of how the 
identified discourses construct subjects. This involved attempting to identify the 
subject positions that are made available by each discourse as ways of constructing the 
self. Through these subject positions and the various constructions of emotion, the 
discourses in the texts enable and limit what can be said and done. This aspect of 
discourse was the focus of another stage of the analysis, which aimed to uncover the 
ways in which the discursive constructions and the subject positions associated with 
them allow certain forms of action and constrain other forms. Finally, the subject 
positions that had been identified were also explored to gain an understanding of their 
consequences for subjective experience. The focus was on what can be thought and 
felt from within the subject positions; on the nature of the experience of the world that 
they entail (Willig, 2008).
Credibility of the research
Due to the social constructionist epistemology that underpins discourse analytic 
research (Burr, 2003), evaluating this form of research in terms of its validity and 
reliability, as is done within the positivist tradition, is not appropriate (Lyons & Coyle, 
2007). The social constructionist epistemology does not assume the existence of an 
objective reality, and therefore the kind of relationship between the analysis of 
research data and reality that allows for checking the ‘truth’ of an analysis against the 
real world is not possible (Coyle, 2007; Taylor, 2001). This position also holds that 
any analysis can only presume to offer the subjective perspective of the researcher, 
and the researcher can never be independent of the research, wherefore objectivity 
cannot exist (Coyle, 2007). According to Coyle (2007), the problem of legitimizing 
discourse analytic research can be approached by establishing credibility through 
transparency. By presenting the reader with as much of the original text that was 
analysed as possible, the researcher can demonstrate how analytic conclusions were 
reached and the reader is able to evaluate the soundness of the analysis for themselves. 
This criterion of credibility has been fulfilled in this report in that effort has been 
made to provide citations from the texts to illustrate the basis for the analysis.
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Credibility can also be established through transparency regarding the impact of the 
researcher’s personal views and affiliations that may influence the research process 
and in particular the analysis (Coyle, 2007; Taylor, 2001). This criterion has been 
fulfilled through the reflections on the effect of the researcher that are presented 
below.
Reflections on the role of the researcher
The author comes from a Counselling Psychology background which emphasizes the 
value of a pluralistic attitude to practice, by entertaining different theoretical 
perspectives and considering the subjective needs of the individual client in the choice 
of therapy (McAteer, 2010). The increasing domination of CBT among the 
psychological therapies is currently a potential threat to the range of care provided in 
the mental health sector, and thereby in opposition to the pluralist approach that is at 
the core of Counselling Psychology. The author’s concern regarding this development 
stems from an appreciation of the stance of Counselling Psychology. This attitude 
toward the current direction of the mental health sector doubtlessly has inspired an 
interest in the nature of this particular psychological therapy, which is assuming such 
a central role in contemporary mental health care. This interest has been a contributing 
factor in the choice of research area and will inevitably also have informed the process 
of analysis of the texts.
Ethical issues
The present study does not raise any ethical issues since the data that was selected for 
analysis consists of publicly available texts.
Results
Within the discourse analysis of the chapters five different discourses were found to 
be present: emotion and the discourse of control, emotion as the output of a 
mathematical and scientific process, emotion and the discourse of evaluation, emotion 
as mental or physical, and emotion as irrational.
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Emotion and the discourse of control
A very prominent discourse is that which portrays emotion as something that can be 
controlled. In the data, evidence of the discourse of control can be found in a passage 
from Lam (2008): “Wlien clients are experiencing a high level of emotional upset, it 
often helps to question or challenge their (irrational) thoughts about the upsetting 
event” (p. 44). Implicit in this sentence is the possibility of effecting some sort of 
change in regard to the emotional upset that people are experiencing. Emotion is 
constructed as something that can be ‘helped’ by changing thinking. Similarly, Branch 
and Willson (2010) construct emotion as something that can be controlled by 
describing the process of how more desirable emotions can be experienced: “If you 
assign less extreme, more helpful, more accurate meanings to negative events, you are 
likely to experience less extreme, less disturbing emotional and behavioural 
responses” (p. 14). This passage presents a formula for how emotional experience can 
be controlled and transformed. The individual is not at the mercy of emotion but can 
mould his own experience. The advantage of portraying emotion as an experience that 
can be controlled is that it allows for the practice of CBT. If emotional experience is 
driven by unknown forces and lies beyond the control of the individual, then people 
are at the mercy of their emotions and the entire enterprise of CBT would be without 
basis. Therefore emotion must be constructed as controllable in order to fit with the 
notion of a therapy that teaches the methods for exercising this control.
The portrayal of emotion as something that can be controlled also has implications for 
the subjective experience of the individual:
You cause your feelings and reactions by the way you think, the attitudes
you’ve formed, the habits you no longer question and the beliefs you hold.
This is the principle of emotional responsibility: You are largely responsible
for the way you feel and act (Joseph, 2009, p. 6)
Here the responsibility for emotional experience is clearly placed with the individual. 
This passage thereby positions the reader as someone who is in control and therefore 
responsible for his own emotional reactions. In practice this means that emotional 
restraint is possible and should be exercised. It also implies that anyone who suffers as 
a result of their emotions is simply not exercising the proper control that is available
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to them. Individuals with emotional difficulties can therefore be blamed for their own 
suffering. Lam (2008) states that:
clients with mental health problems often believe that they do not have control 
over their moods and behaviour. Whether or not they feel all right depends on 
external forces. That is: everybody must be nice, supportive, helpful, fair, 
considerate, kind and generous; people should not be critical of me, dislike me 
or reject me; terrible, bad and upsetting things and events should not happen. 
Since they do not have control over external forces, what does it mean? It 
means that clients will continue to live a miserable, unhappy and struggling 
life, and that their mental health problems will continue or may even get worse 
(p. 44)
This extract describes people with mental health problems as holding the wrong 
beliefs and making unrealistic demands on life. The discourse of control thereby 
allows for passing judgement and making greater demands on those who suffer 
emotionally, and closes down the opportunity for acceptance and tolerance. By 
constructing emotion as something within our control, a subject position is created 
from which it is possible for those who are not termed mentally ill to feel superior due 
to their ability to control their emotional experience.
Emotion as the output of a process
As implied in previous extracts, emotion is portrayed as the output of a logical 
process. This is made explicit in the CBT formula of emotional problems that is 
presented by Branch and Willson (2010): “A (actual or activating event) + B (beliefs 
and meanings about the event) = C (emotional and behavioural consequence)” (p. 13). 
In this formula there is a simple process of cause and effect. Branch and Willson refer 
to this as “the formula or equation that CBT uses to make sense of your emotional 
problems” (p. 13). In this description the formula is likened to a mathematical 
equation, reinforcing the sense of a process of input and output via an internal 
transformation. The allusion to mathematics through the term ‘equation’, and the 
construction of an additive relation between A and B, implies precision and logic. The 
use of the term ‘formula’ alludes to the rigours of scientific method. The CBT 
explanation of emotional experience is thus being given a cloak of positivistic
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objectivity, thereby giving the formula the air of indisputable truth that generally 
accompanies the ‘objective’ conclusions of the natural sciences.
Bolstered by this veneer of science, the portrayal of emotion as the output of a process 
reduces the complexity of emotional life to a simple formula of cause and effect. The 
simplicity of the model is illustrated by a passage from Joseph (2009):
According to the ABC model, unhealthy beliefs cause unhealthy negative 
emotions and self-damaging or destructive behaviours. Depression, anxiety, 
guilt and rage are examples of unhealthy negative emotions caused by 
unhealthy irrational beliefs (p. 18)
The causal relationship between the nature of beliefs and the nature of the resulting 
emotions is here presented as an absolute truth. The simplicity of this formula is 
reminiscent of the computer programmes that inspired the cognitive theory of mind 
(Lyons, 2001). The input-output of information processing that became an integral 
metaphor of cognitive science meshed well with the behaviourist language of stimulus 
and response to create a combined model of CBT (Bruner, 1990). In the construction 
of emotion as the output of a process, vestiges of both traditions, the cognitive and the 
behavioural, can be discerned.
The connection of both cognitive theory and behaviourism to the portrayal of emotion 
as output is also evident in this extract from Branch and Willson (2010):
CBT encourages you to understand that your thinking or beliefs lie between 
the event and your ultimate feelings and actions. Your thoughts, beliefs and the 
meanings that you give to an event, produce your emotional and behavioural 
responses (p. 13)
Here the black box of behaviourism has been filled with cognition so that the thinking 
that is done explains the emotional and behavioural output. Yet the language of 
behaviourism remains in the mention of ‘responses’. This construction of emotion 
creates simplicity where there could be complexity. It allows for a simple mechanical 
view of emotional experience and it ignores the subjective experiential aspect of the 
human condition in favour of a mathematical equation. Emotion can therefore be 
explained and understood, and based on this understanding one can create the hope of
110
affecting this logical process of cause and effect. This discourse therefore can be used 
to give credence to the discourse of control of emotion. If there is a simple and logical 
explanation of the process that causes emotion, then it becomes possible to construct 
emotion as something that can be controlled. The portrayal of emotion as the product 
of a cognitive process also specifies the need for a therapy that is aimed particularly at 
changing cognitions. By bolstering the CBT formula with allusions to mathematical 
and scientific knowledge, the power of the explanation is further amplified.
This portrayal opens the subject position of the individual whose emotional life is 
scientifically understandable and explainable. The mystery of emotionality is removed 
and instead the mechanical human can have a rational explanation for his/her 
emotional experience. This means that from this subject position one can have a sense 
of safety in that the strange and complex workings of the emotions have been rendered 
simple and known. Having a formula for emotion also allows therapists to explain 
people’s emotions as is done in CBT. The psychological theory of the cause and effect 
relationship provides the basis for supporting a form of therapy that can be packaged 
as scientific and logical.
Emotion and the discourse of evaluation
Emotion is portrayed as something that can be evaluated as falling along a spectrum 
ranging from natural to unnatural, normal to abnormal, healthy to unhealthy. In the 
data a distinction is made between normal and abnormal emotions, and this dimension 
is connected to the strength of the emotional experience. This is illustrated in an 
extract from Lam (2008):
There is a crucial difference between low and high levels of emotional upset.
Many negative feelings, particularly at a low level, are normal and appropriate
under the circumstances. For example, if you’re having an argument with your
parents, it is natural to feel angry and upset (p. 44)
In this extract there are numerous examples of evaluations of emotion. Feelings are 
described as having a positive or negative valence, and feelings are evaluated 
according to their normality and appropriateness as well as their naturalness. Apart 
from the mention of negative feelings, which appears to refer to what is described as
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an intrinsic evaluative component of emotion (Ben-Ze’ev, 2010), these are all 
evaluations of the acceptability and desirability of emotion. The mention of a crucial 
difference between low and high levels of emotion particularly associates stronger 
emotion with lower desirability, since only emotional upset at a low level is described 
as being normal and appropriate. Intense emotion is therefore evaluated as less 
acceptable and natural.
The discourse of evaluation of emotion also involves judgements regarding when 
emotion is acceptable and natural and when it is not. This prescriptive element is 
evident in an extract from Joseph (2009):
It’s natural to feel angry, sad, depressed or hurt in response to accidents, illness 
and other challenges in life, but you can change your reactions after the initial 
feelings have passed (p. 6)
Implicit in this statement is the message that while emotional reactions are natural in 
an initial stage, after that first stage has passed it is no longer natural to feel these 
emotions. The presentation of the possibility of changing the emotions after the initial 
stage implies that the emotional reaction should no longer be allowed to continue 
unchecked, meaning that it is no longer desirable. There is therefore a prescriptive 
element to the evaluation since the parameters that define when an emotion is natural 
are being laid down.
Another aspect of this discourse is the evaluation of emotion as healthy or unhealthy. 
Joseph (2009) presents a table of healthy negative emotions and their unhealthy 
counterparts. The dimension of health is also connected to the dimension of morality 
since there is clear evidence of moral evaluation in the descriptions of the various 
emotions. For example in the case of annoyance, which is defined as the ‘healthy’ 
form of anger/rage, one aspect of the associated thought pattern is “you don’t see 
malice” (p. 21). This implies a form of selective inattention that denies any malicious 
intent in others. For the same emotion one aspect of associated action is described as 
“you talk and behave in an assertive manner but with the right intent” (p. 21). The 
description of having the ‘right’ intent conveys the image of virtuous behaviour. 
Annoyance, which is defined as the healthy emotion, is thereby presented as a more
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moral emotion than anger. Similarly to the previously mentioned extract from Lam 
(2008), the choice of terms also indicates an evaluation of strong emotion as less 
healthy since ‘anger/rage’ signifies a higher intensity than ‘annoyance’.
By creating a distinction between the acceptable emotions and the rest, this discourse 
allows for the subject positions of the emotionally healthy individual and the 
individual who experiences ‘unhealthy’ emotions and who may therefore be described 
as ‘ill’. The moral distinction between natural and unnatural fuses with the distinction 
between emotional health and sickness to create a subject position of the individual 
who is at once emotionally ill, morally wrong and unnatural. This discourse thereby 
provides justification for a hierarchy of emotional experience in which the ill are 
placed at the bottom.
The portrayal of emotion as something that can be evaluated as more or less natural, 
desirable or healthy, allows for the denunciation of some forms of emotional 
experience. The specifics of which emotions are described as unhealthy is really 
irrelevant, the principal function of the discourse is to enable the distinction of the 
healthy from the unhealthy. If some emotional experience is good and some is bad, 
then it is also possible to argue that one should strive to experience more of the 
healthy emotions and less of the unhealthy ones. There is therefore a reason to try to 
influence emotional experience, and thereby the need for a therapy that allows one to 
do so is naturally created. This discourse thereby legitimizes the need for treatment to 
change the emotional experiences of those whose emotions can be deemed unhealthy, 
thereby providing strong support for the discourse of control of emotion. Basically the 
entire enterprise of psychological therapy is given a reason for existence.
Emotion as psychological
Emotion is portrayed as an entity that is more psychological than physical. This is 
illustrated in a passage from Branch and Willson (2010) which gives an example of 
the ABC model of anxiety:
A: You imagine failing a job interview.
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B: You believe: TVe got to make sure that I don’t mess up this interview, 
otherwise I’ll prove that I ’m a failure’.
C: You experience anxiety (emotion), butterflies in your stomach (physical 
sensation), and drinking to calm your nerves (behaviour) (pp. 16-17)
The emotion of anxiety is distinguished from the physical sensation of butterflies and 
is also separate from the preceding belief. Emotion is thereby constructed as a separate 
entity that is neither thought nor physical sensation. This could be understood as 
constructing emotion as neither mental nor physical, thereby superseding the 
Cartesian dualism of body and mind. However, while emotion is clearly distinguished 
from thought, emotion could still be understood as residing in the mental realm, since 
this is considered to encompass more than just beliefs. The distinction between 
emotion and physical sensation appears to be more definitive since this clearly 
constructs emotion as non-physical.
While emotion generally seems to be portrayed as belonging to a greater extent to the 
psychological domain than the physical, there are also instances where this is less 
clear. An example of this is where emotion is equated with feeling: “When clients are 
emotionally upset, they tend to blame others (e.g. ‘She criticised me’) or an event (e.g. 
redundancy or presentation) for their negative feelings (e.g. anger, hurt and 
resentment)” (Lam, 2008, p. 44). In this extract the emotional upset is treated as being 
composed of negative feelings. Although the use of the term ‘feeling’ implies that 
emotion is something that can be felt, a feeling typically refers to a psychological 
experience. According to Ben-Ze’ev (2010), although the feeling dimension has no 
meaningful cognitive content, it is a primitive mode of consciousness. Therefore 
feeling could be taken to signify a mental rather than a physical state. A feeling can 
therefore be understood to be a psychological entity. To steer the meaning of the term 
feeling in the direction of physical sensation, it would need to be preceded by the 
terms ‘bodily’ or ‘physical’. However, the relation between feeling and emotion is the 
subject of intense debate (Cowie, 2010), and therefore it is difficult to arrive at a clear 
understanding of the possible meanings of equating emotion with feeling. The legacy 
of William James, and his theory of emotion as being purely bodily feeling, still 
remains (Deigh, 2010), and could therefore nudge the meaning of the word feeling in
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the direction of sensations that are felt in the body, and thus as belonging to the 
physical realm.
Although emotion is never definitively assigned to either the mental or physical realm, 
a portrayal of emotion that is prevalent in the texts is that of emotion as psychological. 
This is illustrated by a passage from Branch and Willson (2010):
The effectiveness of CBT for various psychological problems has been 
researched more extensively than any other psychotherapeutic approach.
CBT’s reputation as a highly effective treatment is growing. Several studies 
reveal that CBT is more effective than medication alone for the treatment of 
anxiety and depression (p. 9)
Emotion is here being presented as belonging to the realm of psychology, since 
anxiety is being labelled a psychological problem. This allows for the positioning of 
people as having emotional problems that belong to the mental or psychological 
realm. The advantage of this portrayal is simultaneously revealed in the passage, since 
psychological or mental problems naturally can be thought to be best treated with 
psychological methods. By distinguishing emotion clearly from the physical realm 
and instead placing it within the psyche, emotion can be treated with a therapy that 
aims to intervene at a psychological level. Defining emotion as physical would make 
the role of psychotherapy less natural since psychotherapeutic methods and theories 
are directed at the psyche. A portrayal of emotion as non-physical therefore gives 
greater power, in terms of the freedom to create theory and definitions as well as 
prescribe treatments, to actors within psychology and psychotherapy. This discourse 
thereby interacts with the discourse of control by enabling control of emotion to 
remain a task related to the psyche.
Emotion is thus portrayed as mainly psychological, although this designation is never 
entirely complete. The ambiguity of emotion being equated to feeling remains, and 
thereby emotion is never definitively divorced from the physical realm. However, the 
emphasis on the psychological nature of emotion is clear and allows for the treatment 
of emotion with psychotherapy rather than medication. Thereby CBT can be given a 
more prominent role in the treatment of emotional problems.
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Emotion as irrational
Emotion is portrayed as being generally irrational. This construction is evident in the 
data in passages where emotion is presented as driving behaviour that is unhelpful or 
irrational:
While clients are emotionally upset, they tend to think about the event(s) over 
and over again. It is inevitable that they will find some evidence to support 
their negative, biased thoughts, including evidence from the past.. .What it 
means is that they can be stubbornly holding on to this evidence and changing 
them can be difficult (Lam, 2008, p. 45)
Emotion is constructed as influencing people to engage in rumination and in negative 
biased thinking, as well as producing a stubborn opposition to change. This 
presentation depicts emotion as involving faulty and illogical ways of thinking that are 
unhelpful to the individual. In the chapter by Joseph (2009) the irrational aspects of 
emotion are similarly evident in the descriptions of the influence of emotional states. 
Joseph describes the effects of experiencing shame and embarrassment when 
something shameful has been revealed about you: “You exaggerate the shameful 
information revealed. You exaggerate the likelihood of negative judgement. You 
exaggerate the degree of negative judgement” (Joseph, 2009, p. 24). The use of the 
term ‘exaggerate’ implies that the perception is not in accordance with reality and 
therefore not reasonable. Thus the emotion of shame or embarrassment is constructed 
as inherently irrational since it involves a distorted view of the world.
The construction of emotion as irrational is also evident in passages which contrast 
emotion with that which is more reasonable and dependable: “Rather than using 
feelings to support your negative beliefs, we should use evidence instead. It is 
scientific, more reliable and believable” (Lam, 2008, p. 48). Here emotion is portrayed 
as being unreliable as a support for beliefs. Emotion is contrasted with the solidity of 
‘evidence’ that is given further weight by being cast as ‘scientific’. The contrasting of 
objective science and subjective emotion is being used to discredit emotion as a less 
reasonable form of knowledge.
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The portrayal of emotion as irrational is functional, since it justifies intervention in 
order to curb the unreasonable emotionality. This portrayal of emotion thereby 
interacts with the discourse of control of emotion by emphasizing the need for control. 
Interventions such as CBT are thereby made necessary by the irrationality of emotion. 
Interestingly this portrayal of irrational emotion also contradicts the notion of emotion 
as the output of a process involving cognition, which is the basis for the possibility of 
exercising control. The combination of the discourse of irrational emotion and the 
discourse of emotion as output would mean that any thought that led to an emotion 
must by definition be irrational. Either that or rational thoughts cause irrational 
emotions, hi both cases there is a contradiction between these discourses. The 
portrayal of emotion as irrational also seems to sit uneasily alongside the construction 
of emotion as natural or unnatural, good or bad, since the former discourse condemns 
all emotion while the latter is selective in its condemnation.
The portrayal of emotion as divided from reason means that to the extent that an 
individual is emotional he is by definition also irrational. This discourse therefore 
allows for the positioning of individuals as overcome by a passionate emotionality that 
renders them irrational and therefore not accountable for their actions. However, 
through the opposition of reason and emotion this discourse also makes available the 
position of the unemotional individual who is capable of dispassionate rationality. 
According to this construction of emotion, reason cannot exist where there is 
emotionality, and therefore the objective clear-headed thinker becomes the only 
possibility for enabling rational action. The possibility of emotion having a unique 
contribution that is different from what reason can offer is thereby lost. This provides 
the rationale for excluding any considerations based on emotional perspectives from 
decision-making processes. The division of emotion from reason therefore sets loose 
the emotional beast who can act impulsively without remorse, and it also unleashes 
the logician who is devoid of feeling and therefore of humanity.
Discussion
This study set out to examine how emotion is portrayed in contemporary CBT self- 
help literature. The discourses that were identified portray emotion in a way that fits 
well with the objective of presenting CBT as a possible and necessary solution to
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dealing with emotion. Portraying emotion as the outcome of a logical process provides 
a precise method for how emotion can be controlled by changing cognition.
Presenting emotion as irrational, or as something that can be evaluated as either good 
or bad, in turn provides the justification for needing and desiring this control. 
Portraying emotion as more psychological than physical strengthens the positions of 
psychology and psychotherapy as providers of explanation and treatment for 
emotional problems, thereby also supporting the use of CBT rather than drugs. 
Together these discourses create a version of reality that allows for and even requires 
an intervention such as CBT to alleviate emotional distress. In this way the portrayal 
of emotion that these discourses result in provides a very strong argument for the 
widespread use of psychological therapy in general and CBT in particular. At the 
same time there are also inherent tensions between some discourses. According to 
Edwards (1997), the variety of discursive resources that exist concerning emotions are 
interrelated and contradictory in order to allow for flexible use in a variety of 
situations. Therefore the tensions between discourses in the data can partly be 
understood in terms of this being a general characteristic of the interaction between 
discourses that concern emotion in contemporary Western culture. However, the 
inherent contradiction between portraying emotion as the result of a cognitive process, 
and the depiction of emotion as irrational and thereby the opposite of reason and 
rational thought, still serves to undermine the solidity of the ‘logic’ that CBT purports 
to be built on. Although illogical, this contradiction serves the enterprise of CBT well, 
since it justifies the attempt to control emotion due to its being irrational, and still 
preserves the foundation of CBT, namely the theory of emotion as being secondary to 
cognition.
The discourses of emotion that have been identified in these texts, and that so 
effectively support the enterprise of CBT, draw on a long history in Western thought 
of portraying emotion in accordance with these ways. It seems that for as long as 
anything has been written on the subject of emotion there has also existed a discourse 
of the control of emotion. An extreme example is the Stoic ideal of the sage who 
hardly experiences any emotion (Graver, 2007). The discourse of control is also found 
in the writings of later philosophers such as Descartes (1911) and Spinoza (1909), 
who describe control of emotion as both possible and necessary. In more modem
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times the examples are endless, ranging from the behaviourist focus on conditioning 
to the expansion in recent years of the topic of ‘emotion regulation’ within psychology 
(Gross, 2007). The discourse of evaluating emotion has equally ancient roots. An 
early example of this discourse is again found in the philosophy of the Stoics, whose 
theory of emotion emphasizes the desirability of only a few select emotions and 
advocates the eradication of emotions such as fear, anger and sadness which were 
deemed unacceptable (Sorabji, 2000). A less extreme example is found in the writings 
of Aristotle, who held that emotion should be expressed in the appropriate manner and 
in the right situations in order to be acceptable (Sorabji, 2000). The discourse of 
evaluating emotion and emotional expression is therefore well established historically, 
and is still found in contemporary philosophy of emotion (Mulligan, 2010). The 
discourse of emotion as irrational similarly has a long history; already Spinoza 
described emotion as contrary to reason and the harmonious existence of the rational 
individual (Spinoza, 1909). This discourse is also found in the theories of 
psychological therapies; the psychoanalytic tradition is based on the view of emotion 
as irrational (Freud, 1932/1974). Generally there exists a tradition in Western thought 
of placing emotion and reason in opposition to one another (Strier, 2004).
The discourses present in the data portray emotion in ways that support the need for, 
and the possibility of, CBT. This selective portrayal emerges due to the 
marginalisation of other possible discourses. When emotion is portrayed as irrational, 
this depiction marginalises the possible depiction of emotion as functional, which 
exists in many guises in contemporary theory of emotion. Emotion has been described 
as functional from an evolutionary perspective, according to which emotional 
reactions have evolved because they are adaptive for survival (Ekman, 2003). There 
are also current neurobiological theories of emotion as functional (Damasio,1994). 
Earlier versions of this discourse include portraying emotion as the basis for morality, 
as is evident in the theory of Hume (1978) and in various forms in the writings of 
Adam Smith and Darwin (Greenspan, 2010), or the conception of emotion as the basis 
for survival and flourishing, as is evident in the theory of Descartes (1911) and as was 
generally held in the seventeenth century (James, 1997). In the examined texts this 
alternative discourse, of emotion as a helpful guide, is marginalised by the discourse 
of emotion as irrational.
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In a similar fashion, the portrayal of emotion as the output of a process that involves 
cognition leaves aside other alternatives for understanding emotion. A different theory 
that has been advanced by a number of theorists is that of emotion as being faster than 
thought, and therefore not dependent on cognition as an intermediary (Zajonc, 1980; 
Prinz, 2004). Notably LeDoux (1996) argued that emotion can occur without the 
mediation of the neocortex, and thereby potentially without the help of cognition. This 
description of emotion, which has been given considerable support within 
neuropsychology, is effectively rendered non-existent by the emphasis on cognition as 
the source of emotion. Similarly the portrayal of emotion as psychological rather than 
physical means that alternative depictions are not considered. William James 
presented the first pure account of emotion as consisting entirely of physical 
sensations (Mandler, 2003). In contemporary theory the notion of a physical 
component as part of emotion can be found in most theories, apart from the strongest 
cognitive theories that endorse the Stoic view of emotion as identical to a form of 
evaluative judgement (Deigh, 2010). By emphasizing the psychological nature of 
emotion, the territory of the psychological therapies is defended and the competing 
discourse of physicality is marginalised.
While the discourse of control of emotion has a long history in Western thought, there 
are also other possible ways of portraying emotion. During the seventeenth century 
emotion was commonly portrayed as a powerful and devastating force of nature that 
could not be reined in (James, 1997). The notion that emotion should be controlled 
also has an opposing view that has been variously influential in society. A popular 
portrayal of emotion in Western culture is that it can be dangerous to ‘bottle up’ 
strong emotions and that it would be safer to let them out (Harris, 2001). This view 
can be found in Freudian psychology which has proposed that psychic tension needs 
to be discharged and that the emotions function as a form of safety-valve (Heelas, 
1986). However, the value of ventilation of emotion also has much older roots and 
was proposed already by Neoplatonists (Harris, 2001).
A general characteristic of the portrayals of emotion present in the data, is that they all 
seem to involve an understanding of emotion as something that is located in the
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individual person. This portrayal does not allow for the possibility of understanding 
emotion as a phenomenon that is created in the interaction between people, and that is 
heavily influenced by culture. According to social constructionist researchers (Lutz, 
1988; Harré, 1986), emotion can be understood as an emergent product of social life, 
so that questions of underlying biology or universality of emotions become irrelevant. 
Research on cultural differences in how emotion is spoken about and experienced has 
been used to support a view of the cultural relativity of emotions. Thus talk about 
emotion is not just understood as a reflection on what happens but as actively creating 
the emotional experience (Lutz, 1988). This conception of emotion is completely 
foreign to the version of reality that is being presented in the data.
Central to counselling psychology is the notion of pluralism (McAteer, 2010); of 
being mindful of a variety of perspectives and avoiding a limited view. The portrayal 
of emotion in the analysed texts is being widely spread due to the popularity of self- 
help literature and the hegemony of CBT among the psychological therapies. Wliile 
this study has examined the portrayals of emotion that are found specifically in CBT 
self-help literature, it could be argued that the version of CBT presented in these 
chapters represents a basic form of the core of the therapy, and one that reaches a wide 
audience. Therefore it is vital for counselling psychologists to be aware of the limited 
nature of this portrayal of emotion, and to be mindful of the possibility of alternative 
perspectives.
Any extrapolation from the findings of the present research should however be 
considered in relation to the possible limitations of the study. While a discourse 
analytic approach does not require a large and representative sample, in the fashion of 
traditional approaches to research within psychology, it is still considered important to 
ensure that enough data is gathered to allow for the recognition of the full variety of 
discourses that are employed to portray the discursive object (Coyle, 2007). The 
sample of chapters analysed in this study can therefore appear to be rather small, 
although there are no immediate reasons to suggest that the number of chapters is a 
limitation in this sense. It is however possible that the inclusion of a wider range of 
literature would have given the study a greater variety of discourses, which in turn 
would have meant that the implications of the results would have been farther ranging.
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In conclusion, it is clear that the portrayal of emotion that has been found to be present 
in the data is not the only available possibility. The discourses found in the data 
portray emotion in ways that are suitable for supporting the practice of CBT. These 
discourses present a version of reality in which emotion is irrational and needs to be 
controlled, and where those suffering from emotional problems are ill, unnatural and 
morally wrong, and can be blamed for their situation. In this version of reality there is 
a distinct need for psychotherapy, specifically CBT, to explain and control emotion. 
This portrayal of emotion becomes very widely spread due to the popularity of self- 
help literature and the current interest in CBT. This happens at the expense of other 
portrayals of emotion that could become marginalised in the process, as the therapy 
that is becoming mainstream spreads its preferred reality and gradually creates a 
particular form of ‘truth’ about emotion. Further research would be recommended to 
explore the nature of the constructions of emotion in other forms of CBT literature, as 
well as in the spoken language of CBT therapists in the mental health sector.
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Appendix 1: Reflections on the use of self
After conducting this piece of research, the notion of reflecting on the use of self is 
interesting since it implies that there is such a thing as a self. I then start wondering 
whether this self is meant to exist in a physical form and perhaps have to share the 
internal space with a psyche and the mind as well? I suppose these are the kind of 
musings that are the reasonable outcome of having delved into the depths of social 
constructionism. Interestingly, the influence of my acquaintance has been so far- 
reaching that I now respond with this questioning attitude in daily life and regard this 
perspective as a form of common sense rather than as being necessarily social 
constructionist. To a certain point I have therefore found that I agree with the ideas of 
social constructionism. However, there are limits to this agreement, and I have come 
to realise that it does not extend to the extreme form of social constructionism that 
does not recognise any form of reality whatsoever. I have found that I can appreciate 
the value of the social constructionist perspective when it comes to approaching 
concepts that are intangible and clearly culturally specific and created in social 
interaction. A simple example would be the concept of the psyche, or as it was 
referred to in earlier centuries, the soul. These slightly different concepts both refer to 
the same sort of general idea of something that is intangible; something that is very 
much an idea and not an object. For the examination of such concepts, or the 
examination of diagnostic labels, or the subject of my own research: emotion, I can 
very much appreciate the value of this approach. However, I still find there to be a 
difference between the psyche and a table, although both are, in some sense, man- 
made. Therefore I have found that I cannot subscribe to the ontological position that 
there is no reality to be found. I prefer to differentiate between that which can be 
thumped and that which is more conceptual. However, this position also poses 
difficulties since emotion is something that can be understood as having a physical 
reality in its bodily manifestations, while also being sufficiently intangible to allow for 
it to be understood and described in very different ways. My confusion regarding the 
social constructionist position and my disagreement with aspects of it has been a 
constant companion during the research process, and has led to a considerable amount 
of frustration. However, the challenge of attempting to think and write within this 
framework has given me a greater understanding of the significance of
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epistemological and ontological positions than I think I would have gained if I had 
remained within the confines of the traditional realist and positivist research.
My interest in the study of emotion is the foundation of my choice of research area, 
and this interest led me to the subject of my literature review as well. The specific 
choice of CBT rather than any other psychotherapy was made based on the increasing 
domination of CBT in the mental health sector and my concern regarding this trend. 
Although I believe that CBT can be very useful if it is practiced with consideration of 
the individuality of the client, I am still concerned by the recommendation of CBT to 
the exclusion of other therapies. An aspect of Counselling Psychology that I strongly 
identify with is the idea that there are a number of different perspectives that are 
possible, and that it is important not to ignore different contributions. By focusing 
exclusively on the contribution of CBT, the value of other psychotherapies is ignored. 
It is also the case that different approaches suit different individuals and therefore it is 
important to have a variety of therapies available. Another aspect of Counselling 
Psychology is the importance of the therapeutic relationship. The insistence on CBT 
ignores the importance of the relationship, since it assumes the superiority of one form 
of therapy over others. Having conducted this research while having a placement in a 
psychodynamic psychotherapy department and attempting to practice within the 
psychodynamic model, has doubtlessly also affected my personal view of the CBT 
model of therapy. While analysing the data and writing the report I have attempted to 
be mindful of my personal opinions regarding the nature of CBT and the current 
influence of CBT on the mental health sector. In an interesting twist, considering the 
subject of my research, I have been aware of my own emotional reactions to the 
process of the analysis, and the thrill I have found in being able to pick apart the texts, 
and find what I interpreted as clear indications of discourses that advocate the control 
of emotion or portray emotion as irrational. I was often amazed by the statements 
found in the texts and the certainty with which different ‘truths’ about emotion were 
presented. I believe that my awareness of my opinions has allowed me to stop and 
reflect on the possible influence of my ‘self on the process. This has hopefully been 
beneficial for the process of the analysis. In the end it has of course only resulted in 
yet another text that has no greater claim to ‘truth’ than the chapters I have analysed.
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Abstract
The practice of CBT is currently being widely promoted in the mental health sector. 
The cognitive approach underpinning CBT has been criticised for downplaying or 
ignoring emotion. This article presents research that examines how emotion is dealt 
with in the practice of Beckian cognitive therapy, by analysing therapy sessions 
conducted by A. T. Beck, the founder of cognitive therapy. The approach to research 
is social constructionist and the method used is Conversation Analysis. The analysis 
revealed a general lack of free exploration of, and empathie responsiveness to, clients’ 
expressions of emotional experience. The lack of recognition of emotional experience 
can be understood in terms of adherence to a theoretical perspective that emphasises 
the role of cognition in therapeutic change.
Keywords
Emotion, CBT, cognitive therapy, conversation analysis
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Introduction
The subjective experiences that are signified by the term ‘emotion’ can be described 
as being central to the enterprise of psychotherapy (Safi*an & Greenberg, 1991). Since 
counselling psychology aspires to bridge the gap between research and practice 
(Manafi, 2010), research into how emotion is approached in therapeutic practice is 
very relevant to the discipline. The study of emotion in psychotherapy and psychology 
can be illuminated by consideration of the historical influences of earlier theories of 
emotion. This involves delving into theories within philosophy, as the field of emotion 
theory was inherited from this older discipline (Lyons, 1980). A review of major 
contributions to the theory of emotion reveals that the history of philosophy is 
characterised by theories that involve moral judgements about the value of emotion 
(Johansson & Draghi-Lorenz, 2011).
Looking at the history of emotion theory, moral positions regarding the value of 
emotion become apparent in the tendency for theories to condemn certain emotions 
and be more accepting of others. The emotions that can roughly be characterised as 
‘negative’ are generally considered to be less acceptable than the ‘positive’ emotions. 
Although there are variations in how forcefully emotionality is condemned, so that the 
Stoics and Spinoza are critical of any emotional expression whereas Aristotle has a 
more balanced view, all of the theories involve some form of judgement as to which 
emotions are acceptable and how or when they should be expressed (Johansson & 
Draghi-Lorenz, 2011). The reviewed theories are therefore enlightening in that they 
reveal the historical context of modem emotion theory as characterized by moral 
judgement about the desirability of emotion. While the theories that underpin 
contemporary psychotherapeutic practice do not contain such explicit judgements 
about emotion, the historical review indicates the possibility that emotion is a topic 
that is particularly vulnerable in this respect (Johansson & Draghi-Lorenz, 2011). This 
would therefore warrant attention to the way that emotion is approached in the 
psychotherapies. While psychotherapeutic theory underpins practice and thereby has a 
powerful influence on how therapy is actually conducted, in order to gain a more 
nuanced understanding of practice it is necessary to examine this directly.
143
In current practice in the UK, the psychotherapeutic tradition of cognitive behavioural 
therapy (CBT) is being promoted as the preferred form of treatment for a large 
number of psychological problems. The National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence (NICE) recommends treatment with CBT more often than any other fonn 
of psychotherapy (Sanders, 2010), and notably for such commonly experienced 
psychological problems as depression and anxiety (NICE, 2009; NICE, 2011). CBT is 
also currently being delivered to a very wide audience due to the expansion of the 
Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (lAPT) programme (Sanders, 2010). 
The combined effect of these factors is that the practice of CBT is currently 
widespread within mental health in the UK. It therefore seems that it would be 
warranted to examine the therapeutic practice that characterises the CBT tradition.
The cognitive approach underpinning CBT has been criticised for downplaying or 
ignoring emotions (Sanders & Wills, 2005). Examining the way that emotion is dealt 
with in CBT could shed light on the details of the practice. However, since the CBT 
tradition encompasses a range of therapies it is difficult if not impossible to 
investigate how ‘CBT’ is practised. A solution to this dilemma is to examine the 
practice of cognitive therapy, which was developed by Beck (1976), since second- 
wave CBT developed ftom the union of cognitive and behavioural therapy (Mansell, 
2008). The Beckian model has been dominant in the UK for the past 30 years 
(Westbrook, Kennerly & Kirk, 2011). Currently the lAPT service delivers Beckian 
cognitive therapy for depression as part of its high-intensity stage of individual CBT 
(Westbrook et al., 2011; LAPT, 2007). Current practice that is dubbed ‘CBT’ can 
therefore be seen to have its roots in the cognitive therapy of Beck, and to still 
encompass the Beckian model in therapeutic practice that is delivered on a large scale. 
For these reasons the present research aims to examine how emotion is dealt with in 
the practice of Beckian cognitive therapy. This is to be accomplished by analysing 
recordings of therapy sessions conducted by Beck, due to his status as the principal 
developer of cognitive therapy. The method adopted here is conversation analysis 
(CA) .This method allows for close attention to the detail of sequential aspects of 
dialogue.
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Conversation analysis is an approach that originally emanates from ethnomethodology 
and sociology (Maynard, 2013). However the present research will adopt a theoretical 
orientation of social constructionism. While conversation analysis is generally only 
minimally social constructionist (Burr, 2003), the approach focuses explicitly on 
language as social action (Wooffitt, 2005), and takes the view that language is 
involved in active construction and negotiation rather than being a passive reflection 
of the world (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998). Therefore the approach can still be 
considered to be within the social constructionist paradigm.
The epistemological position of social constructionism challenges the view that 
objective unbiased access to reality is possible, and holds instead that any knowledge 
is constructed through social processes of interaction between people (Gergen, 2009). 
This constitutive function of language leads to the view of the use of language as a 
form of action, since our perception of the world becomes constructed through talking 
(Burr, 2003). Conversation analysis shares the focus on language as social action and 
aims to give a detailed exploration of how social actions are performed and responded 
to in talk (Wooffitt, 2005). Central to this aim is the attempt to explicate the 
organisation of interaction in terms of its sequentiality (Perakyla, Antaki, Vehvilainen 
& Leudar, 2008b). A basic principle of CA is that any tum-at-talk is intrinsically 
related to the prior turn (Drew, 2013), and the analysis therefore studies how 
participants display their orientation to this principle by designmg their turns so that 
they are connected to the preceding turn (Perakyla et al., 2008b). Through this inter­
connectedness of utterances, the interaction of participants engaged in conversation 
can be understood as resulting in the emergence of an intersubjective field of shared 
understandings with regard to how their actions relate to each other (Perakyla, 2013). 
Illumination of this sequential nature of talk, which allows for analysis of process 
aspects of dialogue, constitutes the main contribution of this approach to 
psychotherapy research (Perakyla et al., 2008b).
While the basic principle of CA is that analysis of data should be undertaken without 
any preconceptions about the nature of the data, the present research modifies this 
position in accordance with the social constructionist view that any account involves 
social construction due to the constitutive nature of talk (Burr, 2003). Therefore an
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analysis that is independent of the perspective of the researcher is impossible, and 
instead it is necessary to acknowledge the ways in which this perspective may shape 
the analysis.
With regard to using CA for the exploration of interaction in institutional settings, 
Perakyla and Vehvilainen (2003) suggest that the research also needs to recognise the 
existence of other theories of interaction that influence the talk that is being analysed. 
The organized knowledge that concerns how interaction between professionals and 
clients should be conducted can be conceptualised as “professional stocks of 
interactional knowledge” (SIKs) (Perakyla & Vehvilainen, 2003, p.730). According to 
Perakyla and Vehvilainen (2003) CA research can engage in a dialogue with SIKs to 
illuminate the findings of sequential analyses of interaction in psychotherapy. In the 
case of psychotherapy this kind of knowledge is found in the theories and models that 
inform and guide practice.
CA has developed a set of methods that allow for the capture of the organisation of 
talk at a very high level of detail (Wooffitt, 2005). Since the primary activity in 
psychotherapy is talking (Perakyla, 2013), the very fine-grained descriptions of 
interaction that are made possible by CA make this form of analysis a very useful tool 
for understanding how psychotherapy is done (Madill, Widdicombe & Barkliam 
2001). For the purpose of the present research, CA allows for a detailed analysis of 
how interactions that pertain to emotional experience, or involve reference to emotion, 
unfold sequentially and create movement in the intersubjective field between the 
therapist and client.
Method 
Data
The transcripts that were analysed in this study are of recordings of three therapy 
sessions conducted by Dr A. T. Beck. All of the clients participating in these sessions 
are genuine clients as opposed to actors. Two of the clients are female and one is 
male. The recordings of the sessions with the two women are audio-recordings 
whereas the recording of the session with the man is a video-recording. The 
recordings are the following:
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Cognitive therapy o f depression: Interview # 1 (Patient with hopelessness problem) 
(Beck, 1979).
Cognitive therapy o f anxiety and panic disorders: First interview techniques (Beck, 
1985).
Three approaches to psychotherapy III: Part 3 (Beck, 1986).
The data was obtained opportunistically. These were the only recordings that could be 
obtained in which the clients were not played by actors. The recordings were found 
through an extensive internet search using combinations of the foliowmg terms: 
“Beck”, “cognitive therapy”, “CBT” and “sessions”.
Analysis
The recordings were transcribed in accordance with the basic set of notational 
symbols that is established in CA (Perakyla, Antaki, Vehvilainen & Leudar 2008a; 
Hepburn & Bolden, 2013; Sidnell, 2010; Wooffitt, 2005). These transcription 
conventions allow for the capture of temporal and sequential aspects of speech 
delivery such as degree of overlap between turns and the lengths of pauses. The 
transcription symbols also provide ways of noting other activities that do not involve 
speech such as sighing or laughing, hi accordance with these conventions punctuation 
is not used in its grammatical sense but rather to represent intonation at the completion 
of a turn (Hepburn & Bolden, 2013).
The analysis of the transcripts involved the identification of instances where emotion 
was referred to or expressed in some form. A research focus on emotion in social 
interaction involves a degree of complexity since a certain background level of 
emotionality can be considered to be present at all times (Perakyla, 2013). However, 
depending on the form of expression of emotion that is focused on, emotion can be 
interpreted as being more present in certain instances. Previous research in CA has 
addressed the significance of both lexical and prosodic resources (Voutilainen, 2012; 
Maynard & Freese, 2012; Couper-Kuhlen, 2012), as well as non-vocal resources, such
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as facial expression and posture (Goodwin, Cekaite & Goodwin, 2012; Perakyla & 
Ruusuvuori, 2012), in the communication of emotional stance. In the present research 
the analysis focused on instances where emotion is expressed or referred to verbally. 
This is due to the nature of the data since only one recording was available in video­
format which would allow for the detection of visual cues of emotionality. Instances 
of reference to emotion or expression of emotional stance were therefore identified by 
lexical choice. This involved instances where emotion was directly referred to by use 
of words that signify emotional states such as ‘sad’ or ‘happy’, as well as instances 
where the utterances had emotional valence (Perakyla, 2013) such as in the use of 
intensifiers (Voutilainen, 2012), or in ‘troubles-telling’ (Jefferson, 1988). The latter 
instances were identified by reference to examples provided in previous CA research 
by Voutilainen (2012), Rae (2008) and Voutilainen, Perakyla and Ruusuvuori (2010).
Since the focus of the present research is on the actions of the therapist (even though 
the sequential nature of talk still means that this involves attending to the interaction 
between therapist and client), the analysis was not limited to instances of 
communication of emotional stance by the client. Instead both segments that involve 
emotional expression by the client, and segments where either the client or the 
therapist make reference to emotion, were highlighted for analysis. Following the 
identification of instances that pertained to emotion, the relevant segments of talk 
were analysed in terms of the sequential interaction that surrounded the emotional 
expression or reference.
Credibility  ^of the research
Research using CA cannot be evaluated in accordance with the concepts of reliability 
and validity, since these are notions that are related to research that is mainly 
quantitative and is conducted withm a theoretical orientation of positivism or realism. 
For this reason other criteria for evaluating quality need to be used with regard to CA 
(Madill et al., 2001). Potter (1996) has developed four considerations that are 
applicable to discourse or CA research, whilst noting that not all of the criteria will be 
evident in any one analysis. The criteria are reader’s evaluation, participant’s 
understanding, deviant-case analysis and coherence (Potter, 1996).
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By providing the reader with the details of the analysis, the present research fulfils the 
criterion of reader’s evaluation which concerns the way that the extracts from the data 
and the process of analysis are presented. Tlie criterion of participant’s understanding 
is also fulfilled since the analysis attends to the understandings of the participants 
themselves as they become available in the sequential unfolding of the talk. It could 
be argued that the third criterion is not relevant to this analysis since, with regard to 
psychotherapy in general, the findings of the present research are themselves more 
akin to a deviant case than to any general pattern. With regard to the final criterion of 
coherence, which concerns the ability of an analysis to inform practice and build upon 
prior research, the present research does utilise insights from previous CA research on 
emotion in the analysis of the data. However, due to the limited amount of research on 
emotion within this psychotherapeutic tradition, further research would be needed to 
substantiate these findings.
Reflections on the role of the researcher
In the interest of transparency, it should be stated that the author works within the 
discipline of Counselling Psychology, which values pluralism with regard to 
psychotherapeutic practice (McAteer, 2010). The interest in the therapeutic tradition 
of CBT is therefore partly motivated by an appreciation of pluralism and an associated 
concern regarding the widespread adoption of CBT as best practice in the UK. This 
concern, which is also based on personal experience of practicing within I APT, may 
therefore have informed the analysis of the data.
Ethical issues
The present study does not raise any ethical issues since the data that was selected for 
analysis consists of publicly available recordings. In addition the identities of the 
clients involved are protected since no personally identifying infonnation is revealed.
Results
The analysis of the transcripts revealed that there is a general lack of exploration of 
emotional experience and a lack of empathie responding to talk that has emotional 
valence. This can be understood as being partly due to an emphasis on investigating 
client experience in accordance with theoretical assumptions, and on communicating
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theoretically informed conceptualisations to clients. The lack of attention to emotional 
experience is observable in sequences where the therapist fails to include clients’ 
emotion talk when summarising, or where the therapist avoids exploration of 
emotional experience through a shift of topic, such as via an optimistically phrased 
question. Where there is explicit mention of emotion, or talk that has an emotional 
tenor, this is not explored freely but rather the emotional experience is approached 
indirectly. This is accomplished through restricting exploration to mental phenomena 
that are presumed to be related to the experience of emotion, such as imagery and 
verbal cognitions. Any such exploration is directed by the therapist so that there is no 
space for free exploration, and the therapist’s questioning seems to follow a 
preconceived agenda informed by theory, rather than being led by the idiosyncratic 
content of the client’s narrative. There is also a lack of empathie responding to 
expression of emotional experience. These findings are illustrated below with extracts 
of sequences of dialogue from the transcripts.
Deleting
The therapist’s actions display a recurring tendency to focus away from the emotional 
aspects of the clients’ experiences. This is illustrated in the following extract which 
provides a blatant example of deleting aspects of the client’s talk that pertain to 
emotion, when summarising the client’s account.
Extract 1 (Beck, 1986)
1 B: So let’s-let’s examine the depression and see (.) just what it’s made up of. Now
2 on what basis do you think uh (.) you can make the diagnosis that you’re
3 depressed?
4 C: (3) ((deep sigh)) Uh (.) I-I have that terrible feeling in my stomach. That (.) I am
5 just very lonesome. And that I will be alone for the rest of my life.
6 B: Mhm.
7 C: And ( .)  at this point in my life ( .)  no one wants me.
8 B: Mhm. (4) ((writing)) Now it seems that your depression then is made up of the
9 fabric of several conclusions. One is that you’re lonesome. Number two is that
10 you’re alone now. Three is that you’re gonna be alone for the rest of your life. And
11 four (.) that nobody wants you. ((Client nods)) So. This is the way you see your life
12 situation (.) in a very negative way. In terms of you (.) and other people.
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13 C; Yes.
In his first turn the client substantiates his claim of being depressed by describing the 
feeling he has in his stomach which he labels as “terrible” (line 3). The rest of the 
client’s account of the depression then refers back to this feeling. Through the design 
of his turn the client marks his being lonesome, and that he will be alone for the rest of 
his life, as attributes of the feeling in his stomach. The use of the word “that” indicates 
the connection between the subsequent mention of lonesomeness and the previously 
mentioned feeling in his stomach (line 3). This design is then repeated for the 
following talk, except for the addition of the conjunction ‘and’ (lines 4 and 6), which 
indicates that it is an extension of the previous talk (Sidnell, 2010). Therefore in the 
client’s description of his depression, the visceral ‘terrible’ feeling is the main 
ingredient which the rest of the telling refers back to. The description of the 
depression is also emotive in terms of lexical choice. The use of intensifiers lends an 
affective tenor to talk (Voutilainen, 2012), and here the feeling is described as 
“terrible’’, and the lonesomeness is intensified with “very” (lines 3-4). The content of 
the picture that is painted, of a lonely future and of a present in which nobody wants 
him, also contributes to the emotionality of the description. In particular the use of 
what Pomerantz (1986) describes as extreme case formulations, “I will be alone for 
the rest of my life” and “no one wants me”, endow the story with an air of pathos.
Once he has finished writing the therapist responds with giving a formulation of the 
client’s description of his depression. According to Heritage and Watson (1979) a 
formulation is a proposed version of events which ostensibly follows from the account 
of the client, whilst also introducing a transformation. The initial component of the 
turn is the sequential marker “now” (line 7) which conveys that there is some relation 
between what he is about to say and what the client has just said. By then preceding 
the telling with the speculative marker ‘it seems’, the therapist indicates that he is 
presenting his version of the client’s account. However, the formulation is still given 
the appearance of a straight-forward summary of what the client has said through its 
unusual design as a four-item list (lines 8-10), as opposed to the typical three-item list 
(Sidnell, 2010). Deviating from the classic list format seems to lend the formulation 
more weight and authority since the list becomes less of an oratory technique. Instead
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it is as if the nature of the ‘reality’ being described demands that the list contain four 
items.
The therapist’s formulation contains some of the elements of the client’s account, yet 
the therapist’s version has a very different emphasis. While the client emphasised the 
visceral feeling, the therapist describes the depression as consisting of ‘conclusions’ 
(lines 7-8), thereby emphasising a cognitive dimension. This alteration is in line with 
what Heritage and Watson (1979) describe as the typical function of a formulation: to 
edit the proposed summary of the client’s talk in order to define the topic in a certain 
way. A formulation will delete some aspect of the client’s talk, select another aspect to 
reproduce, and transform the selected part into what purports to be a summary of what 
the client has said (Heritage & Watson, 1979). In this case the therapist has deleted the 
mention of the stomach-feeling, selected the talk about being lonesome, not wanted 
and being alone for the rest of his life, and transformed it into “conclusions” that make 
up the client’s depression. In this way the formulation has edited the client’s 
description of his depression to fit the theory of the therapy, by emphasising the role 
of cognition. The depression has been transformed from a visceral feeling into four 
conclusions.
In response to the minimal agreement token that the client provides by nodding (line 
9), the therapist abandons the tentativeness of his initial preface to his summary. 
Following the sequential marker (“so”), which connects his talk to the previous list, he 
designs his talk as a statement of fact through the use of the definitive expression “this 
is” (line 10). The therapist has thereby upgraded his formulation fi-om a speculation 
that displays some independency from the client’s talk, to a statement that ostensibly 
summarises the gist of the client’s talk about his depression. This serves to further 
obscure the editing that the therapist has done in creating his version of the client’s 
account.
A fonnulation such as that provided in this extract is a powerful tool for therapists 
since it is presented as a summary of the natural upshot of the client’s talk, while in 
actuality it does a significant amount of other work as well (Antaki, 2008). The 
formulation also has sequential power in that it projects an agreement which the client
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has actively to provide (Heritage & Watson, 1979). Due to the yes-expecting format 
of the formulation, it is difficult for the client to disagree without paying an 
interactional cost (Perakyla et al., 2008b). The result is that the therapist has 
successfully edited out the visceral felt sense that was emphasised by the client, and 
has taken the client’s lonesomeness and fears of being alone for ever and turned them 
into ‘conclusions’.
Shifting away
Another way in which emotion is sometimes not attended to in the sessions, is by the 
therapist shifting away from exploring the emotional experience. One of the ways this 
is done is through posing a question that encourages a more optimistic stance. The 
following extract provides an example of this.
Extract 2 (Beck, 1979)
1 B: Now you do seem to be a little down on yourself (.) is that correct?
2 C: Myeah.
3 B: Cause you just said (.) because I wanna do it (.) can’t be very worthwhile, do
4 you have a sense that you’re not a very worthwhile person?
5 C: Yeah a lot of the times.
6 B; You think
7 C: =I mean ( .)  I know other people who blame everybody else for their problems.
8 It’s always somebody else’s fault. I don’t feel that way. I feel I did it to myself.
9 B: So you blame yourself and (.) you consider yourself not worthwhile?
10 C: Sometimes.
11 B: How about right now?
12 C: Right now? Yeah (.) sometime (.) half and half I guess.
13 B: Half-and half. You think that part of you at least feels uh (.) worthwhile enough
14 to go out and make a new life for yourself? Or a better life?
15 C: (6.5) I don’t know. (2) I don’t know. I don’t.
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The conversation in the beginning of this extract deals with a topic that is emotionally 
laden. The client’s response to the question about considering self “not a very 
worthwhile person” constitutes what Bercelli, Rossano and Viaro (2008) refer to as an 
extended agreement (lines 7-8), which is more reliable than if the client merely agrees. 
The extension of her agreement thereby confirms the therapist’s suggestion. The 
affective tenor of this topic, the client’s opinion of herself, is underscored by the 
client’s statement “I feel I did it to myself’ (line 8).
The client initiates a shift away from the emotionally laden topic by downgrading the 
frequency of her experience of being self-critical to “sometimes” (line 10). The 
therapist then uses this as the basis for posing a question that has an optimistic flavour, 
in that it introduces the idea of feeling “worthwhile enough” and the possibility of 
taking action to improve her situation (lines 13-14). While the question is designed as 
a yes-no interrogative (YNI), wherefore either a “yes” or a “no” would constitute a 
type-conforming response (Raymond, 2003), the question is constructed so as to 
prefer an affirmative response by way of its design: “you think that...?” (line 13), and 
thereby it becomes a suggestion disguised as a question. The use of the term “at least” 
(line 13) indicates that what the therapist is asking for would be a minimal level to 
attain, a strategy that intensifies the pressure to give an affirmative response. By 
posing this question, which suggests that the client could feel worthwhile enough to 
make a better life, the therapist abandons the previous talk of not being worthwhile 
and being to blame, which had emotional valence. While the shift is initiated by the 
client, the therapist makes no effort to stay with the more emotionally laden topic, and 
it is his question that creates a shift toward optimism and the possibility of action. The 
possibility of having a richer exploration of a topic that from a surface view seems to 
be rather emotional, is thereby forgone.
Enquiring about imagery
While emotion is frequently not attended to, there is evidence in the data of some 
attention to emotional experience indirectly, through inquiring about mental 
phenomena that are presumed to be comiected to, or to provide the basis for, the 
emotional reaction. One of the ways this is done is through enquiring specifically after 
imagery that is connected to the emotion. There is no exploration of the emotional
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experience in other ways such as by empathie reflection or questions of a more 
general nature; the expression of emotional stance is only responded to by asking 
about related imagery. The following extract is an example of this, as well as 
providing an illustration of a tendency on the part of the therapist to be directive and 
to ask questions rather than allow for free client-led exploration of emotional 
experience. Instead of attending to the narrative of the client, the therapist asks 
questions that seem to be informed by theoretical assumptions about the connection 
between emotion and imagery. This tendency, which gives the exchanges an air of 
interrogation by the therapist rather than joint exploration, is recurring throughout the 
data. In this extract it very effectively limits the exploration of the emotional 
experience to the related imagery.
Extract 3 (Beck, 1985)
1 B: Now the other thing that you’re afraid of besides the personal attack is some
2 kind of (.) physical (.) disease or disorder.
3 C: Yes it’s kind of a passive thing that will take over. Take me over. Um (.) some
4 (.) tumour or something like that.
5 B: Uhuh.
6 C: That’s always been there (.) sort of (.) going to appear (.) and again (.) serving
7 the sam e purpose o f  d e fea tin g  m e.
8 B: Uhuh.
9 C: And as I get older the anxiety seems to be greater because it seems (.) rationally
10 more possible that one gets ill as they get older.
11 B: Uhuh. And do you picture yourself as being ill? Do you get an image of that?
12 C: Yes. That I have some incurable disease.
13 B : M m . [W h a t do y o u  s-]
14 C: [And again] I’m defeated.
15 B: Uhuh. And what do you see in your image right now?
16 C; Well hh (.) I see me (.) unable to get out of bed (.) being (.) at the end of (.)
17 cancer or something like that.
18 B: So you see yourself actually in bed.
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19 C: Yes. In bed. Definitely. Lying down. Unable to (.) even get the physical energy
20 to (.) do it.
In this extract the therapist introduces the topic of the client’s fear of physical disease. 
The client describes the feared scenario in increments and the therapist responds with 
acknowledgement tokens (“uhuh”) (lines 3-10). The client’s description refers to 
something that she is afraid of, and the description also has emotional valence in that 
she describes how the disease will “take me over” (line 3) and speaks of it “defeating 
me” (line 7). The client’s description is thereby similar to what is termed “troubles- 
telling”, in which one person complains of their difficulties to another (Jefferson, 
1988). The minimal responses from the therapist could be interpreted as simply giving 
the client space to continue talking about her fear, but due to their brevity the 
responses only signal receipt of talk. There is no attempt to communicate empathy, as 
could be accomplished by extending the client’s turns and thereby displaying 
understanding and intersubjectivity (Antaki, 2008). The client may be pausing and 
subsequently providing another increment of her talk in order to invite the therapist to 
recognise that a more elaborate response is required. People will orient to the lack of a 
preferred response and give the listener further opportunities to respond by providing 
subsequent increments of talk (Sidnell, 2010).
When the therapist does finally give a more extensive response, it is in the form of 
questions rather than an empathie response to the troubles-talk. While the first 
question is somewhat vague and can be answered in various ways (“do you picture 
yourself’) the second question specifically enquires about an image (line 11). Instead 
of providing empathie reflection or in some other non-specific way encouraging the 
client to expand on her experience of anxiety, the therapist is directing the exploration 
of the client’s fear to considering the presence of related imagery. The therapist does 
not allow for fi*ee exploration of the emotional experience, instead the concept of 
imagery is introduced by the therapist and made the focus. Therefore the therapist’s 
response is not led by the idiosyncratic content of the client’s narrative but rather by 
some other agenda.
The client’s subsequent turn can be understood as a reaction to the therapist’s lack of 
responding to the troubles-telling. After a rather brief response to the question about
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imagery (line 12), she provides an extension of her talk, marked as such by the 
conjunction “and”, which is a partial repetition of a segment of her earlier troubles- 
talk: “and again I’m defeated” (line 14). By restating part of her troubles-talk the 
client seems to be giving the therapist yet another opportunity to provide an empathie 
response. A question creates conditional relevance so that an answer is expected 
(Sidnell, 2010), and if it is not provided its absence will be treated as noticeable by the 
therapist. Therefore it is difficult in a conversation to refrain from providing an answer 
to a question without paying an interactional price, and because of this the use of 
questions is a very powerful tool for the therapist to steer the conversation (Antaki, 
2008). When the client therefore answers the therapist’s question and then adds the 
troubles-talk to her answer, it can be interpreted as a solution to the competing actions 
of giving an answer and giving the therapist another opportunity to respond to her 
troubles-talk. However, as in the first few turns of this segment, the therapist does not 
respond to the troubles-talk but rather concentrates on pursuing the line of questioning 
that concerns imagery related to the fear of disease (line 15). This is in keeping with 
the previous lack of responsiveness to troubles-talk and seems to reflect a focus on 
investigating the client’s experience in accordance with theoretical assumptions about 
the role of imagery. The therapist’s actions are thus being led by theory rather than the 
particulars of the client’s narrative.
When the therapist continues to follow the thread of investigating imagery rather than 
responding empathically, the client provides further answers and ceases the attempts 
at troubles-talk (lines 15-20). The therapist’s questioning thereby directs the 
exploration toward looking at imagery related to the client’s fear, and in so doing 
closes down any other avenues for exploration with regard to the client’s emotional 
experience. The conditional relevance of questions makes this strategy difficult for the 
client to resist without paying an interactional price.
Enquiring about and focusing on cognition
Apart from enquiring about related imagery, another way in which emotion is 
approached indirectly is through enquiring about thoughts related to emotional 
experience. By focusing on cognitions the emotionality of the client’s experience is 
thereby deemphasised. This is illustrated in the following extract, in which the
157
excavated thoughts are subsequently incorporated in a formulation which does not 
include talk of emotion.
Extract 4 (Beck, 1985)
1 B: And (.) you not only sense it but you hear the criticism. What is your immediate
2 reaction?
3 C: (5.5) Scared sad.
4 B: Uhuh. And the scared (.) is based on what thought?
5 C: (2) That Fm no good.
6 B: Mhm. So we see that this rule is operating. Very strongly. And as soon as you
7 have a success (.) it means that you are (.) vulnerable.
8 C: That’s right yeah. Yeah.
9 B: As long as you’re not successful you’re not vulnerable. Cause there’s nothing to
10 tear down is there?
11 C: That’s right.
12 B: As long as you haven’t finished a painting they can’t really tear it down cause
13 nobody knows what it’s going to be like. And in fact (.) once you’ve finished it you
14 s till can ’t be to m  d o w n , y o u ’re  n o t v u ln e ra b le , because it  hasn ’ t been  show n  yet.
15 So at the time of the showing (.) at the real pinnacle of your success (.) you’re also
16 the most vulnerable. And you’re the most vulnerable because of this belief (.) that
17 if someone is critical of me then it means that Fm no good and worthless.
18 C: Mm.
Prior to this extract the client has declared that she becomes anxious when anyone 
criticises the art that she has successfully completed and displayed. The therapist uses 
a question with the interrogative pro-form “what” to enquire about her immediate 
reaction (lines 1-2). The question is general in that “reaction” can refer to any form of 
experience. In this case the term elicits an answer in the fomi of emotion-words (line 
3). The therapist then responds with a further question about what thought the scared 
feeling is based on (line 4). The question is prefaced by the conjunction “and”, which 
signals that this question is an extension of the client’s preceding talk. In this way the 
question is made to seem a natural continuation of what the client has said about her 
reaction. However, the question is directive in that it asks about a very specific aspect 
of her experience of being scared. In contrast to the previous question about her
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“reaction”, this question steers the client toward the cognitive aspect of her 
experience. The immediate response to the client’s mention of emotion is therefore to 
enquire specifically after thoughts, thereby limiting any exploration of the emotional 
experience to cognitive aspects. The question is also limiting in that it omits the 
second emotion that the client mentioned, thereby restricting what can be responded to 
since the therapist is only asking about being scared. The form of questioning that is 
employed here is therefore very directive in that it focuses on and enquires about very 
specific aspects of the client’s reported experience.
In addition to limiting the client’s exploration of the emotional experience, the 
therapist’s question also serves to impose a theoretical premise on the client, since it 
contains an embedded presupposition (MacMartin, 2008) that the scared feeling is in 
fact based on a thought. Due to the conditional relevance established by a question, 
the client is expected to provide an answer (Sidnell, 2010). However, responding to 
the question would be to implicitly accept the embedded presumption. Another option 
would be to treat the therapist’s question as problematic, yet this would involve 
engaging in other-initiated repair which is a dispreferred response (Sidnell, 2010). It is 
therefore difficult for the client to resist accepting the presumption, since doing so 
would either involve refusing to answer and thereby violating the conditional 
relevance of the question, or openly challenging the content of the question.
The therapist’s response to the client’s thought is to incrementally deliver a 
formulation of the client’s preceding talk (lines 6-17), as is often done in therapy 
following a question-answer sequence (Bercelli et al., 2008). The connection of the 
therapist’s formulation to the preceding talk is indicated by the sequential marker “so” 
which marks the formulation as a mere extension of the client’s talk (line 6). In this 
way, as in the previous example of formulation, the therapist is ostensibly 
summarising the client’s talk. However, the summary subtly excludes the specific 
mention of emotional experience by only referring to being “vulnerable” (line 7).
There is therefore a similarity with a previous extract, in which emotional aspects of 
the client’s talk were deleted, in that there is no clear reference to the emotions the 
client has just described. While the formulation deemphasises emotion, the role of 
cognition is highlighted. In the final increment of the formulation the client’s
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vulnerability is explained as being the result of her belief (lines 16-17). In this extract 
there is therefore a progression from the indirect exploration of emotional experience 
through inquiring after related cognitions, to the formulation of the cognition as the 
main ingredient of the client’s problem. Meanwhile the very clear initial description of 
emotion, “scared sad”, is not even included in the summary, except possibly in the 
nebulous form of ‘vulnerability’. Emotional experience is thereby treated as merely an 
intermediate step on the route to uncovering the cognitions, which are then 
highlighted in a formulation as the root cause of the client’s experience. The question- 
answer sequence that precedes the formulation, in which emotion is only explored in 
terms of cognition, is used as the basis for extracting information so that the 
formulation, which is steeped in theory, can be presented.
Discussion
The aim of the present research was to examine how emotion is dealt with in the 
practice of Beckian cognitive therapy, through conversation analysis of transcribed 
recordings of therapy sessions conducted by Beck. The analysis resulted in the 
identification of several ways in which emotion is not attended to. Clients’ 
expressions of emotional experience are not included in summaries given by the 
therapist, and the therapist does not pursue the exploration of emotional experience 
but rather shifts away through change of topic such as via an optimistically phrased 
question. Emotional experience is frequently dealt with indirectly through questioning 
about other mental phenomena such as imagery and verbally constructed cognitions. 
There is a general lack of empathie responding to clients’ communication of 
emotional stance, and an associated limitation of free exploration of these aspects of 
subjective experience. This lack of attention and responsiveness to expression of 
emotion appears to be partly due to an emphasis on investigating client experience in 
accordance with theoretical assumptions, and on communicating theoretically 
informed conceptualisations to clients.
As mentioned previously, it is advisable for CA research into psychotherapy to 
consider the influence of what has been referred to as professional stocks of 
interactive knowledge (SIKs) on the unfolding of the interaction. In the case of the 
present research SIKs can arguably be expected to be found in Beck’s own writings on
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cognitive therapy. Perakyla and Vehvilainen (2003) distinguish between SIKs that 
directly concern the interaction in therapy and those that pertain to non-interactional 
aspects. An example of the latter would be theories of psychotherapy. The literature 
on CT provides knowledge and recommendations of both kinds, since reference is 
made to how the therapist should interact with the client as well as to the underlying 
theory that informs the practice. In the description of cognitive therapy of depression. 
Beck, Rush, Shaw and Emery (1979) present the connection between emotional 
distress and dysfunctional cognitions as the thrust of the cognitive theory of 
psychotherapy. Based on this theoretical assumption, the objective of cognitive 
therapy is described as that of focusing on the client’s dysfunctional cognitions in 
order to relieve the emotional distress. The operation of this theoretical perspective 
can be identified in the data, in the focus on investigating mental phenomena other 
than emotion, such as imagery and verbally constructed thoughts, as well as in the 
conceptualisation of distress in terms of cognitions. However, the recommendations of 
Beck et al. (1979) for the practice of cognitive therapy also include mention of the 
need for a sound therapeutic alliance in order for the therapy to work, and there is 
specific mention of empathising with emotional experience and of reflecting the 
client’s feelings in order to increase rapport. It is difficult to identify the influence of 
these recommendations for practice in the data, as the sessions are characterized by a 
lack of empathie responding and reflection of feelings. Curiously therefore, the 
present research seems to indicate that the practice of cognitive therapy that is 
captured in the data reflects the assumptions of cognitive theory, while aspects of the 
recommendations for therapeutic interaction are not discernible. The practice that has 
been analysed therefore seems to be heavily led by theory. It is notable that there are 
also other recommendations for practice that have been followed, such as the use of 
extensive questioning and the elicitation of specific cognitions related to affect. 
Therefore it seems that the aspects of recommendations for interaction that have been 
put into practice are those that are clearly compatible with and derived from the 
theory. Conversely those interactional recommendations that have not been followed 
refer to attending to the expression of emotional experience through empathy and 
reflection of feelings. Perhaps it is also relevant that these latter aspects of interaction 
are described as important due to their support of the therapeutic alliance, which is 
considered a necessary but not sufficient ingredient of therapy. However these aspects
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of attending to emotion are not described as part of the core of the processes that 
create change. This view of empathy and reflection of emotion, as merely part of the 
groundwork of therapy but not as crucial ingredients of the main therapeutic work, 
may contribute to an ease of losing these aspects in practice.
The lack of attention to emotional experience that is evident in the data could also be 
understood in tenus of the view expressed by Beck et al. (1979), that while it is vital 
for the success of the therapy that the client be able to experience and express emotion 
during sessions, care should be taken to avoid spending too much time on the patient 
expressing emotion. There is also a distinction made between CT and experiential 
schools of psychotherapy that are said to exclusively value a focusing on emotional 
experience and be dismissive of rational techniques for alleviation of distress (Beck et 
al., 1979). Therefore there seems to be a degree of tension surrounding the question of 
how emotion should be dealt with in cognitive therapy. While attention to emotional 
experience is described as important for facilitating a therapeutic alliance, according 
to the theory actual therapeutic change is considered to take place tlirough cognitive 
processes. The lack of attention to emotional experience that is present in the data can 
be understood as a consequence of this tension. The difficulty with this kind of 
approach is that, as has been indicated by CA research on emotion in psychotherapy, 
therapeutic actions that centre on emotion are a necessary part of therapy. Voutilainen, 
Perakyla and Ruusuvuori (2010) found that empathetic responsiveness to emotional 
experience functioned as a prerequisite of more cognitively oriented interventions. 
This finding substantiates a recognition of the value of empathy, and of attending to 
the subjective experience of the individual, that has a long history in psychotherapy 
and that forms the core of counselling psychology.
Based on the considerations outlined thus far, the findings of the present research have 
certain implications for the field of counselling psychology. The analysis of the data 
indicates that the practice that has been examined involves an approach to therapy that 
is strictly guided by theoretical assumptions. As a consequence of this theoretically 
imbued practice there is no attention to, or free exploration of, subjective experience 
of emotion. This also involves a lack of empathie responding to the expression of 
emotional experience. It is significant that these characteristics of the practice can be
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understood in terms of adherence to a theoretical perspective that emphasises the role 
of cognition in therapeutic change and regards attention to emotional experience as 
merely part of the foundation for the cognitively oriented interventions. This 
highlights the possibility that a theory of psychotherapy that focuses on change 
through cognitive processes and rational techniques may be vulnerable to the risk of 
losing empathie responsiveness and attention to emotional experience in its practice, 
even if the value of these aspects of interaction are recognised formally in its 
literature. The gravity of such a loss cannot be overstated, and the risk of it becomes 
increasingly relevant when considering that the present research has analysed sessions 
by the founder of cognitive therapy. The data can therefore not be understood as 
representing an anomaly or just the practice of one practitioner. The present research 
therefore indicates the potential risks of a practice that is overly adherent to theory, 
especially in the case of therapies that do not recognise attention to emotional 
experience as therapeutic in itself. While the analysis was based on data from sessions 
of cognitive therapy and not of current practice in CBT, the influence of the theory of 
cognitive therapy on current practice of standard Beckian CBT means that the 
implications of this analysis still have relevance. Due to the humanistic and 
phenomenological stance of counselling psychology, attending to all aspects of the 
subjective experience of the client is central to practice and more important than 
attending to theoretical principles (Ashley, 2010). A focus on theory and lack of 
attention to emotional experience is therefore incompatible with counselling 
psychology practice. In light of the current widespread practice of standard CBT in the 
UK, awareness of the potential implications of the present research is therefore 
warranted.
In the process of considering the implications of the present research, it is relevant to 
also address its limitations. Due to the difficulty encountered in acquiring recordings 
of sessions by Beck working with real clients, the amount of data that was available 
for analysis is somewhat limited. This restricts the ability to draw conclusions based 
on the results of the analysis. The nature of the data that was analysed also imposes 
limitations on the findings. While transcription was carried out in accordance with the 
norms of CA research and therefore allows for fine-grained analysis, any transcription 
always involves a degree of interpretation (Hepburn & Bolden, 2013), and the amount
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of data that is transcribed will vary. Since the analysis was restricted to lexical and 
syntactic aspects of talk, any illumination of interaction that could have been offered 
by also analysing prosodic aspects was not included. Due to the nature of the data it 
was also not possible to consider the role of non-vocal expression of emotion in all of 
the recordings, wherefore this facet of communication of emotion has not informed 
the analysis. However, despite these considerations regarding the nature of the data, 
the findings are still based on the analysis of a very detailed transcript of tum-by-tum 
interaction, which includes all information about the nature of talk that is typically 
found in CA research. The implications of the present research are therefore based on 
a thorough analysis. Further research is needed to confirm and elaborate the findings 
of the present research, and specifically to directly investigate the nature of current 
practice of standard CBT.
164
References
Antaki, C. (2008). Formulations in psychotherapy. In A. Perakyla, C. Antaki, S.
Vehvilainen & I. Leudar (Eds.), Conversation analysis and psychotherapy (pp. 
26-42). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Ashley, H. (2010). Humanistic contributions to pluralistic practice. In M. Milton 
(Ed.), Therapy and beyond: Counselling psychology contributions to 
therapeutic and social issues (pp. 123-138). Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.
Beck, A. T. (1976). Cognitive therapy and the emotional disorde?^s. New York, NY: 
New American Library.
Beck, A. T. (Therapist). (1979). Cognitive therapy o f depression: Intei^iew # 1
(Patient with hopelessness problem) [CD]. Bala Cynwyd, PA: Beck Institute 
for Cognitive Therapy.
Beck, A. T. (Therapist). (1985). Cognitive therapy o f  anxiety and panic disorders: 
First inteiwiew techniques [CD]. Bala Cynwyd, PA: Beck Institute for 
Cognitive Therapy.
Beck, A. T. (Therapist). (1986). Three approaches to psychotherapy III: Part 3 [VHS 
video]. Corona Del Mar, CA: Psychological & Educational Films.
Beck, A., Rush, A. J., Shaw, B. F., & Emery, G. (1979). Cognitive therapy o f  
depression. New York, NY: The Guildford Press.
Bercelli, F., Rossano, F., & Viaro M. (2008). Client’s responses to therapist’s
reinterpretations. In A. Perakyla, C. Antaki, S. Vehvilainen & I. Leudar (Eds.), 
Conversation analysis and psychotherapy (pp. 43-61). Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press.
Burr, V. (2003). Social constructionism (2nd ed.). Hove, UK: Routledge.
Couper-Kuhlen, E. (2012). Exploring affiliation in the reception of conversational 
complaint stories. In M.-L. Sorjonen & A. Perakyla (Eds.), Emotion in 
interaction (pp. 113-146). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Drew, P. (2013). Turn design. In J. Sidnell & T. Stivers (Eds.), The handbook o f 
conversation analysis (pp. 131-149). Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.
Gergen, K. J. (2009). An invitation to social constmction (2nd ed.). London, UK: Sage 
Publications.
165
Goodwin, M. H., Cekaite, A., & Goodwin, C. (2012). Emotion as Stance. In M.-L. 
Soijonen & A. Perakyla (Eds.), Emotion in interaction (pp. 16-41). Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press.
Hepbum, A. & Bolden, G. B. (2013). The conversation analytic approach to
transcription. In J. Sidnell & T. Stivers (Eds.), The handbook o f conversation 
analysis (pp. 57-76). Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.
Heritage, J. & Watson, R. (1979). Formulations as conversational objects. In G.
Psathas (Ed.), Eveiyday language: Studies in ethnomethodology (pp. 123-162). 
New York, NY: Irvington Press.
Hutchby, L, & Wooffitt, R. (1988). Conversation analysis: Principles, practices and 
applications. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (lAPT) Programme (2007). The
competences required to deliver effective cognitive and behavioural therapy 
fo r people with depression and with anxiety disorders. Retrieved from 
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/clinical-
psychology/CORE/CBT_Competences/CBT_Competence_List.pdf
Jefferson, G. (1988). On the sequential organization of troubles-talk in ordinary 
conversation. Social Problems, 35(4), 418-441. Retrieved from 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.joumals/socprob35&collection=j 
oumals&index=joumals/socprob432&id=432
Johansson, E. C., & Draghi-Lorenz, R. (2011). A review o f theories o f emotion from  
Aristotle to Hume. Unpublished literature review. University of Surrey, 
Guildford, UK.
Lyons, W. E. (1980). Emotion. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
MacMartin, C. (2008). Resisting optimistic questions in narrative and solution- 
focused therapies. In A. Perakyla, C. Antaki, S. Vehvilainen & I. Leudar 
(Eds.), Conversation analysis and psychotherapy (pp. 80-99). Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press.
Madill, A., Widdicombe, S. & Barkham, M. (2001). The potential of conversation
analysis for psychotherapy research. The Counseling Psychologist, 29(3), 413- 
434. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0011000001293006
166
Manafî, E. (2010). Existential-phenomenological contributions to counselling
psychology’s relational framework. In M. Milton (Ed.), Therapy and beyond: 
Counselling psychology’ contributions to therapeutic and social issues (pp. 21- 
40). Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.
Mansell, W. (2008). What is CBT really, and how can we enhance the impact of
effective psychotherapies such as CBT? In R. House & D. Loewenthal (Eds.), 
Against andfor CBT: Towards a constructive dialogue? (pp. 19-32). Ross-on- 
Wye, UK: PCCS Books.
Maynard, D. W. (2013). Everyone and no one to turn to: Intellectual roots and 
contexts for conversation analysis. In J. Sidnell & T. Stivers (Eds.), The 
handbook o f conversation analysis (pp. 11-31). Chichester, UK: Wiley- 
Blackwell.
Maynard, D. W., & Freese J. (2012). Good news, bad news, and affect: Practical and 
temporal ’’emotion work” in everyday life. In M.-L. Sorjonen & A. Perakyla 
(Eds.), Emotion in interaction (pp. 92-112). Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press.
McAteer, D. (2010). Philosophical pluralism: navigating the sea of diversity in
psychotherapeutic and counselling psychology practice. In M. Milton (Ed.), 
Therapy and beyond: Counselling psychology contributions to therapeutic and 
social issues (pp. 5-20). Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (2009). Depression: The 
treatment and management o f depression in adidts. Retrieved from 
http://guidance.nice.org.uk/CG90
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (2011). Generalised anxiety 
disorder and panic disorder (with or without agoraphobia) in adults.
Retrieved from http://guidance.nice.org.uk/CGl 13
Perakyla, A. (2013). Conversation analysis in psychotherapy. In J. Sidnell & T.
Stivers (Eds.), The handbook o f conversation analysis (pp. 551-574). 
Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.
Perakyla, A., & Ruusuvuori, J. (2012). Facial expression and interactional regulation 
of emotion. In M.-L. Sorjonen & A. Perakyla (Eds.), Emotion in interaction 
(pp. 64-91). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
167
Perakyla, A., & Vehvilainen, S. (2003). Conversation analysis and the professional 
stocks of interactional knowledge. Discourse & Society, 14(6), 727-750. 
http://dx.doi.Org/10.1177/09579265030146003
Perakyla, A., Antaki, C., Vehvilainen, S., & Leudar, A. (Eds.). (2008a). Conversation 
analysis and psychotherapy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Perakyla, A., Antaki, C., Vehvilainen, S., & Leudar, A. (2008b). Analysing
psychotherapy in practise. In A. Perakyla, C. Antaki, S. Vehvilainen & I. 
Leudar (Eds.), Conversation analysis and psychotherapy (pp. 5-25). 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Pomerantz, A. (1986). Extreme case formulations: A way of legitimizing claims. 
Human Studies, 9(2-3), 219-229. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00148128
Potter, J. (1996). Discourse analysis and constructionist approaches: Theoretical
background. In J. T. E. Richardson (Ed.). Handbook o f qualitative research 
methods fo r  psychology and the social sciences (pp. 125-140). Leicester, UK: 
BPS Books.
Rae, J. (2008). Lexical substitution as a therapeutic resource. In A. Perakyla, C. 
Antaki, S. Vehvilainen & I. Leudar (Eds.), Conversation analysis and 
psychotherapy (pp. 62-79). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Raymond, G. (2003). Grammar and social organization: Yes/no interrogatives and the 
structure of responding. American Sociological Review, 68(6), 939-967. 
Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1519752
Safran, J. D., & Greenberg, L. S. (1991). Emotion in Human functioning: Theory and 
therapeutic implications. In J. D. Safran & L. S. Greenberg (Eds.), Emotion, 
psychotherapy, and change (pp. 3-15). New York, NY: The Guildford Press.
Sanders, D. (2010). Cognitive and behavioural approaches. In R. Woolfe, S.
Strawbridge, B. Douglas, & W. Dryden (Eds.), Handbook o f counselling 
psychology (3rd ed., pp. 105-129). London, UK: Sage Publications.
Sanders, D., & Wills, F. (2005). Cognitive therapy: An introduction. London, UK: 
Sage Publications.
Sidnell, J. (2010). Conversation analysis: An introduction. Chichester, UK: Wiley- 
Blackwell.
168
Voutilainen, L. (2012). Responding to emotion in cognitive psychotherapy. In M.-L. 
Sorjonen & A. Perakyla (Eds.), Emotion in interaction (pp. 235-255). Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press.
Voutilainen, L., Perakyla, A. & Ruusuvuori, J. (2010). Recognition and interpretation: 
Responding to emotional experience in psychotherapy. Research on Language 
and Social Interaction, 43 (1), 85-107.
Westbrook, D., Kennerly, H., & Kirk J. (2011). An introduction to cognitive
behaviour therapy: Skills and applications (2nd ed.). London, UK: Sage 
Publications.
Wooffitt, R. (2001). Researching psychic practitioners: Conversation analysis. In M. 
Wetherell, S. Taylor & S. J. Yates (Eds.), Discourse as data: A guide fo r  
Analysis (pp. 49-92). Milton Keynes, UK: Sage Publications.
Wooffitt, R. (2005). Conversation analysis and discourse analysis: A comparative 
and critical introduction. London, UK: Sage Publications.
169
Appendix 1: Reflections on the use of self
Even though this is my second foray into the wilderness of social constructionism, it is 
only with this attempt that I have found a comfortable position within this theoretical 
perspective. In my research last year I flung myself into the intense social 
constructionism of discourse analysis, and emerged intrigued but also somewhat 
dissatisfied. I gravitated toward the critical realist stance and found it difficult to 
accept the more radical version of social constructionism. In this second attempt at 
engaging with social constructionism, I have found a more comfortable position 
alongside those who argue that the social constructionist perspective does not deny the 
existence of a material world, but merely emphasises that in representing this world 
through speech or the written word, we are engaging in social construction. This 
perspective does therefore not deny that the material world can have consequences for 
the individuals that live in it. Having found a version of social constructionism that I 
can accept has been veiy important for my research this year, since the intricacies of a 
marriage of conversation analysis with social constructionism have at times been 
difficult to grasp. The origins of conversation analysis in ethnomethodology and 
sociology were concerning due to the more realist view that this involved.
Apart fi'om the complexity of the theoretical perspectives, my experience of doing this 
research is that I have thoroughly enjoyed delving into the detail of the conversation 
analytic method. It has been fascinating to find that the common-sense understandings 
of speech can be ‘explained’ in terms of the detailed analysis of use of words. The 
focus on the sequential nature of talk, and how people will show how they interpret 
the talk of others in their manner of responding to it, also allows for an analysis of 
conversation that really captures process aspects of dialogue, and does not risk falling 
into the trap of considering utterances in isolation. It would be interesting to 
supplement an analysis such as the one that I have done this year with a closer 
inspection of other aspects of communication. Particularly in the case of expression of 
emotion, the use of facial expression and body movement would be a very useful 
resource for analysis.
Although I have found conversation analysis to be fascinating, I have also struggled 
with trying to apply the method and do justice to the analysis that it enables. I value
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the notion of staying close to the data and I have appreciated the possibility to 
consider the context of each utterance. With methods that are less detailed in the 
analysis there is always the risk of floating away from the data with theoretical 
speculations, and conversation analysis instead enables an interpretation that says 
much closer to the data. However, having this possibility also creates dilemmas since 
it is impossible to avoid making interpretations. Even the process of transcription 
involves making choices about how to represent the information on the recording. The 
selection of extracts to exemplify tendencies has also been a struggle, because any 
decision about removing an extract from the full transcript involves taking the extract 
out of the context that gives it its meaning. What seems like the first turn of an extract 
would in the full transcript be understood as a response to a previous turn. I have 
found this balancing act, of trying to utilise the potential of the method whilst still 
needing to make choices and interpretations, very difficult.
The topic of this research, the way that emotion is dealt with, has also been a source of 
confusion and complexity. After three years of thinking and reading about emotion in 
slightly different ways I have come to the conclusion that this topic is singularly 
complicated. My interest in emotion is originally motivated by my own subjective 
experience of my emotionality and how I have come to be interested in it through my 
personal therapy. However, while I subjectively experience what I refer to as 
emotional reactions, engaging with this topic in theory is an entirely different venture. 
In the present research there was always the concern that it is actually very difficult to 
decide where there is emotionality and where there is not. A more in depth 
consideration of this problem would make research profoundly difficult, since there 
could always be said to exist some level of emotionality in any instance, and the 
demarcations between ‘more’ and ‘less’ emotionality then become very blurred and 
hard to distinguish or justify. Restricting the research focus to emotion as evidenced 
by lexical choice is therefore a pragmatic choice, and one which allows for 
engagement with some aspects of emotionality without entering into such very 
complex considerations. However, due to my genuine interest in the study of emotion 
I still reflect on the effects of imposing such restrictions, and how it would be possible 
to study emotionality whilst trying to take into account all resources that we have 
available for expressing emotion. It is also a struggle to accommodate my own
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understanding of emotion within the social constructionist perspective. I appreciate 
the value of recognising that ‘emotion’ is a socially constructed term, one that 
arbitrarily distinguishes some aspects of subjective experience from others, such as 
what we describe as ‘hunger’, and that the differentiation of emotion into separate 
emotion categories is really an artefact of culture. However I struggle with the lack of 
focus on embodiment. For me emotional experience is also bodily experience, and 
therefore I find that I have to look to other theoretical perspectives, such as 
phenomenology, to engage with this aspect of emotion. I find that this is one of the 
aspects of counselling psychology that I value, the stance of pluralism, which allows 
me to acknowledge that different perspectives enable me to focus on and engage with 
different aspects.
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Appendix 2: Sample of the data analysed in the present research
Extract from transcript of recording from Three approaches to psychotherapy III: Part 
j  (Beck, 1986).
B: Ok. Now. What’s going to happen when you’re lying in bed (.) it’s a Saturday 
afternoon (.) it’s kinda grey outside. Nobody’s calling you you’re all alone. What are 
you going to be thinking then?
C: I (1) there’s a real good chance I’ll be depressed.
B: Uhuh.
C: Very good chance.
B: And you’re gonna be thinking thoughts like (.) T’m all alone (.) I’m always gonna 
be alone (.) and nobody wants me.’
C: Yes.
B: And what are you gonna do about it then?
C: (4) ((Sigh)) I’ve got to (.) call somebody.
B: Ok. One thing is you can call somebody up.
C: Yes.
B: And (.) what will that- if you call somebody up (.) and that person responds 
positively (.) what will that tell you?
C: It tells me that somebody cares for me.
B: That’s right. Somebody cares for you. In other words (.) your belief is wrong. (2) 
And has that happened that sometimes you’ve had this belief that nobody cares for 
you (.) you called somebody up and got some positive feedback?
C: Yes.
B: So you’ve already demonstrated to yourself the belief is wrong.
C: (2) Yes.
B: At times.
B: But-one demonstration doesn’t do it (.) one swallow doesn’t make a spring. Right? 
You have to keep demonstrating it to yourself.
C: Yeah.
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B: So the next time (.) when you’re home alone (.) on a Saturday afternoon (.) and you 
get this belief (.) you can test it out by calling up somebody. ((Client nods)) But 
suppose (.) that person isn’t home. What happens (.) you just go back to lying in bed 
and-
C: =Then Fm-then Fm very hurt. Yes that’s happened. Fm hurt. F 11 try calling 
somebody else (.) and (.) yes this has happened Fll call three or four people (.) none of 
em are home they’re all out (.) they’re doing something (.) they’re-they’re having a 
good time (.) and Fm sitting at home by myself.
B: Yah. And so you feel hurt and what do you think. What thought makes you feel 
hurt?
C: I (2) think that that person doesn’t care because they’re not home and they didn’t 
call me that day.
B: That’s right. First of all (.) they don’t care because if they did they’d be home 
waiting for your phone-call.
C: Yes. H h huh hah hhah
B: Hh hh right?
C: Hh h yes hh hh
B: And secondly (.) if they really reallv cared (.) they would be on that phone calling 
you.
C: Yes.
B: Now is there any other reason (.) that they might not call you besides your 
explanation that they don’t care. Is there an alternative explanation why (.) a person 
might not call you?
C: (1.5) Uh (2) they’re busy with their life? (6) And (3) And they (2) some of the 
people (.) that I have communicated with over the last year or so (.) feel that uh (2) 
you can only support someone for so long. And then they have to do it on their own.
B: Or they have to take more initiative. But ok. Now (.) let’s see (.) this may be 
helpful to you because your big problem is these grey Saturday afternoons when 
you’re alone. So (.) could we do a little bit of a role-play and let’s imagine (.) that uh 
(.) Fm you (.) it’s Saturday afternoon and Fm kinda lounging in the bed and then you 
tell me what my thoughts should be. Or see if they’re incorrect and how you might 
correct them. Ok? Now here I am (.) home all alone. I don’t know (.) nobody has 
called me all day that’s awful. That means (.) nobody cares for me. How are you 
going to answer that?
C: People do care for you. You have lots of friends.
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